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Abstract
In this PhD thesis, the focus is placed on the optimization of user Quality of Experience (QoE)
in Cyber Physical Social Systems and specifically in cultural heritage spaces. In order to achieve
maximization of visitor perceived satisfaction, the challenges associated with visitor optimal
decision making regarding touring choices and strategies in a museum or a cultural heritage
space are examined and the problem of museum congestion is addressed.
Cultural heritage spaces, and museums in particular, constitute a special type of socio-physical
system because, in contrast to other social systems like schools or churches, user experience
is primarily controlled by the visitors themselves. Such a system also embodies both human
behaviors and physical and technical constraints, a fact that makes adopting a socio-technical
perspective in order to improve the visiting experience, essential.
Within the above setting, quantitative models and functions are initially formulated to express
the visitor experience that is gained throughout a touring process. The functions are based on
several socio-physical and behavioral factors. Using this QoE modeling approach, the problem
of how to optimise visitor route choices is addressed. A social recommendation and personaliza-
tion framework is also presented that exploits common visitor characteristics and recommends
a set of exhibits to be visited. The creation of self-organizing museum visitor communities
are proposed as a means to enhance the visiting experience. They exploit visitor personal
characteristics and social interactions and are based on a participatory action research (PAR)
process. Recommendation Selection and Visiting Time Management (RSVTM) are combined
and formulated into a two-stage distributed algorithm, based on game theory and reinforcement
learning.
In addition, this PhD thesis examines the problem of congestion management in cultural her-
itage spaces from a more pragmatic perspective, considering visitor behavioral characteristics
and risk preferences. The motivation behind this approach arose from the observation that, in
cultural heritage spaces, people interact with each other and consequently the decisions and
behavior of one visitor influence and are influenced by others. It is, therefore, important to
understand the unknown behavior tendencies of visitors especially when making decisions in
order to improve their visiting experience and reduce museum congestion. The proposed mech-
anisms are founded on and powered by the principles of Prospect Theory and the Tragedy of
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the Commons. Particular attention is paid to modeling and capturing visitor behaviors and
decision making under the potential risks and uncertainties which are typically encountered by
visitors during their visit. According to their relative popularity and attractivenss, exhibits at a
cultural heritage site are classified into two main categories: safe exhibits and Common Pool of
Resources (CPR) exhibits. CPR exhibits are considered non-excludable and rivalrous in nature,
meaning that they may experience ”failure” due to over-exploitation. As a result, a visitor’s
decision to invest time at a CPR exhibit is regarded as risky because his/her perceived satisfac-
tion greatly depends on the cumulative time spent at it by all visitors. A non-cooperative game
among the visitors is formulated and solved in a distributed manner in order to determine the
optimal investment time at exhibits for each visitor, while maximizing the visitor’s perceived
satisfaction. Detailed numerical results are presented, which provide useful insights into visitor
behaviors and how these influence visitor perceived satisfaction, as well as museum congestion.
Finally, pricing is introduced as an effective mechanism to address the problem of museum
congestion. Motivated by several studies that position pricing as a mechanism to prevent
overcrowding in museums, this thesis analyzes and studies the impact of different pricing policies
on visitor decisions when they act as prospect-theoretic decision-makers. The theory of S-
modular games is adopted to determine the time invested by each visitor at exhibits while
maximizing satisfaction gained.
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Abstract in Greek
Περίληψη στα Ελληνικά
Σε αυτή τη διδακτορική διατριβή, η έμφαση δίνεται στη βελτιστοpiοίηση της piοιότητας της εμpiει-
ρίας του χρήστη σε Κυβερνοφυσικά Κοινωνικά Συστήματα και ειδικότερα σε χώρους piολιτιστικής
κληρονομιάς. Εξετάζονται θέματα piου αφορούν τις βέλτιστες αpiοφάσεις των εpiισκεpiτών σχετικά
με τις εpiιλογές και τις στρατηγικές piεριήγησής τους μέσα σε ένα μουσείο ή χώρο piολιτισμού, με
αpiώτερο στόχο τη μεγιστοpiοίηση της ευχαρίστησης των εpiισκεpiτών και την αντιμετώpiιση του
piροβλήματος της συμφόρησης των μουσείων.
Οι χώροι piολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς και ειδικότερα τα μουσεία αpiοτελούν έναν ειδικό τύpiο κοινωνικο-
φυσικών συστημάτων γιατί σε αντίθεση με άλλα κοινωνικά συστήματα, όpiως είναι τα σχολεία ή
οι εκκλησίες, η εμpiειρία του χρήστη εξαρτάται κυρίως αpiό τον ίδιο. Εpiίσης οι χώροι piολιτιστικής
κληρονομιάς εμpiεριέχουν όχι μόνο φυσικούς και τεχνικούς piεριορισμούς αλλά και piεριορισμούς piου
piροέρχονται αpiό ανθρώpiινες συμpiεριφορές. Η υιοθέτηση λοιpiόν μίας κοινωνικο-τεχνικής αντίλη-
ψης με στόχο τη βελτιστοpiοίηση της εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη κρίνεται αpiαραίτητη και υιοθετείται
στην piαρούσα διδακτορική έρευνα.
Μέσα σε αυτό το piλαίσιο, αρχικά διατυpiώνονται piοσοτικά μοντέλα και συναρτήσεις, piου βασίζο-
νται σε διάφορους κοινωνικο-φυσικούς piαράγοντες και εκφράζουν την εμpiειρία του εpiισκέpiτη κατά
τη διάρκεια της εpiίσκεψής του σε ένα μουσείο. Χρησιμοpiοιώντας τα μοντέλα και τις συναρτήσεις
αυτές, μελετώνται piως μpiορούν να βελτιωθούν οι εpiιλογές piεριήγησης του εpiισκέpiτη μέσα σε ένα
μουσείο. Εpiιpiροσθέτως, piαρουσιάζεται ένας μηχανισμός εξατομικευμένων κοινωνικών piροτάσε-
ων, piου αφενός βρίσκει τα κοινά χαρακτηριστικά των εpiισκεpiτών και αφετέρου piροτείνει στους
εpiισκέpiτες ένα υpiοσύνολο εκθεμάτων για να εpiισκεφτούν. Ακόμα piαρουσιάζεται η δημιουργία
αυτο-οργανούμενων ομάδων εpiισκεpiτών, οι οpiοίες εκμεταλλεύονται piροσωpiικά χαρακτηριστικά
των εpiισκεpiτών καθώς και τυχόν μεταξύ τους κοινωνικές αλληλεpiιδράσεις με στόχο τη βελτίωση
της μουσειακής εμpiειρίας τους. Εpiίσης διατυpiώνεται το συνδυαστικό piρόβλημα της εpiιλογής μίας
piροτεινόμενης piεριήγησης αpiό το μουσείο και του καθορισμού του χρόνου εpiίσκεψής στο μου-
σείο. Για την εpiίλυση του piροβλήματος αυτού, χρησιμοpiοιείται ένας κατανεμημένος διεpiίpiεδος
αλγόριθμος piου βασίζεται στη Θεωρία Παιγνίων και στην ενισχυμένη μάθηση.
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Παράλληλα, η διδακτορική αυτή διατριβή ερευνά τη διαχείριση της συμφόρησης των μουσείων α-
piό μία piιο ρεαλιστική οpiτική, piου λαμβάνει υpiόψιν της χαρακτηριστικά της συμpiεριφοράς των
εpiισκεpiτών καθώς και τις piροτιμήσεις τους όσον αφορά το ρίσκο. Το κίνητρο αυτής της piροσέγ-
γισης piροέρχεται αpiό την piαρατήρηση ότι στους χώρους piολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς, οι άνθρωpiοι
αλληλεpiιδρούν μεταξύ τους και συνεpiώς η συμpiεριφορά και οι αpiοφάσεις ενός εpiισκέpiτη εpiηρε-
άζουν και εpiηρεάζονται αpiό τους άλλους. Προκειμένου να βελτιωθεί η εμpiειρία των εpiισκεpiτών
και να μειωθεί η συμφόρηση των μουσείων, είναι αpiαραίτητο να κατανοηθούν οι άγνωστες συμpiε-
ριφορές των εpiισκεpiτών - ειδικά όσον αφορά τις διαδικασίες λήψης αpiοφάσεων. Οι μηχανισμοί
piου piροτείνονται βασίζονται στη Θεωρία Προοpiτικής και στην Τραγωδία των Κοινών, και σχε-
τίζονται με την αpiοτύpiωση και μοντελοpiοίηση της συμpiεριφοράς των εpiισκεpiτών καθώς και τη
λήψη αpiοφάσεων υpiό συνθήκες ρίσκου ή αβεβαιότητας, οι οpiοίες και συναντώνται συχνά κατά
τη διάρκεια μίας εpiίσκεψης σε ένα μουσείο. Η piαρούσα έρευνα κατηγοριοpiοιεί τα εκθέματα ενός
μουσείου σε δύο ομάδες: στα ασφαλή και στα ‘‘Κοινού Αpiοθέματος Πόρων’’ εκθέματα. Ο διαχω-
ρισμός αυτός γίνεται με βάση το piόσο δημοφιλή και ελκυστικά έργα τέχνης θεωρούνται αpiό τους
εpiισκέpiτες του μουσείου. Τα ‘‘Κοινού Αpiοθέματος Πόρων’’ εκθέματα θεωρούνται τα διάσημα
έργα τέχνης, τα οpiοία λόγω υpiερβολικού συνωστισμού γύρω τους, μpiορεί να ‘‘καταρρεύσουν’’.
Εpiομένως η αpiόφαση ενός εpiισκέpiτη να αφιερώσει χρόνο σε ένα ‘‘Κοινού Αpiοθέματος Πόρων’’
έκθεμα θεωρείται ότι ενέχει ρίσκο γιατί η ευχαρίστηση piου θα λάβει εξαρτάται σε piολύ μεγάλο
βαθμό αpiό το συνολικό χρόνο piου θα αφιερώσουν σε αυτό και οι υpiόλοιpiοι εpiισκέpiτες. ΄Ενα μη
συνεργατικό piαίγνιο ανάμεσα στους εpiισκέpiτες εφαρμόζεται και εpiιλύεται για τον υpiολογισμό του
βέλτιστου χρόνου piου piρέpiει να αφιερώσει κάθε εpiισκέpiτης στα εκθέματα ώστε να μεγιστοpiοιήσει
την ευχαρίστησή του και να μην οδηγηθούν σε κατάρρευση τα εκθέματα. Λεpiτομερή αριθμητικά
αpiοτελέσματα piαρουσιάζονται και δίνουν ενδιαφέρουσες και χρήσιμες piληροφορίες σχετικά με τη
συμpiεριφορά των εpiισκεpiτών και το piως αυτή εpiηρεάζει τη λαμβανόμενη ευχαρίστησή τους αλλά
και τη συμφόρηση των μουσείων.
Η piαρούσα διδακτορική έρευνα ολοκληρώνεται με την piαρουσίαση διαφόρων μηχανισμών κοστο-
λόγησης των εpiισκεpiτών ως ένα μέτρο αντιμετώpiισης της συμφόρησης των μουσείων. Τα αpiοτε-
λέσματα piου piαρουσιάζονται εpiιβεβαιώνουν ότι κατάλληλοι μηχανισμοί τιμολόγησης μpiορούν να
οδηγήσουν ένα μουσείο σε μεγαλύτερη σταθερότητα, αφού μειώνουν την piιθανότητα κατάρρευ-
σης των εκθεμάτων, χωρίς piαράλληλα να εpiηρεάζουν αρνητικά την piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας των
εpiισκεpiτών.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
These days cultural heritage spaces, and museums in particular, are becoming dynamic envi-
ronments at the service of society. They aim to reconnect with the public and demonstrate their
value and relevance to contemporary life. Although museum exhibitions already draw crowds
and offer multiple experiences to visitors, new techniques are required to actively engage vis-
itors in a participatory manner and improve their experience. One of the most fundamental
questions that arises with relevance to cultural heritage spaces is: ”Which is the most efficient
methodology for enhancing the visiting experience?”
As a principle, we consider cultural heritage spaces to be Cyber-Physical Social Systems, where
visitors evolve in an environment that involves several constraints and inter-dependencies [1]. A
visitor interacts in a physical or virtual space with others, and the decisions and behaviour of one
influence and are influenced by others [2]. The intuitive key principle behind our consideration
and work as it relates to the visitor point of view is: ”How to make the most of your cultural
heritage space visit”. On the other hand, from the cultural heritage space operator point of
view, it can be considered to be expressed by the phrase: ”A knowledge of your visitors is
essential for growing your customer base and better planning your service”.
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Another important consideration that motivated our research is that unlike in other social
environments, such as schools and churches, human experiences in a cultural heritage space
are primarily controlled by visitors themselves. It is they who decide how much time to spend
in a museum and which exhibits to observe. It is therefore important to understand visitor
behaviour tendencies and risk preferences in order to improve the visiting experience.
Consequently, to address the above challenges and suggest personalized enhanced experiences
for museum visitors, our research consists of two key directions. The first involves the proper
modeling of visitor Quality of Experience (QoE), both qualitatively and quantitatively, as well
as the investigation of methodologies that improve visitor touring experience. The second
deals with understanding visitor behavior and specifically how behavioral factors influence
decision making processes and affect perceived cultural experiences. In the following chapters,
we present the challenges faced by each of these research areas, while simultaneously providing
the approaches, designs and methodologies used to address them.
1.2 Contributions
Despite considerable and extended research interest in cultural heritage, several fields that
are critical for the enhancement of visitor perceived satisfaction have never been approached.
A holistic quantitative analysis and formulation of visitor QoE, as well as methodologies to
improve the overall visitor experience around a cultural heritage space either by a) recom-
mending exhibits and an optimal route to follow or b) by proposing a solution to the problem
of Recommendation Selection and Visiting Time Management are absent from relevant studies.
Moreover, there is a considerable research gap in terms of the consideration and evaluation
of visitor behavioral patterns and how these affect optimal visiting time and overall perceived
satisfaction.
The key novelties and contributions of our proposed approach and framework can be summa-
rized as follows:
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1. A holistic approach for the formulation and treatment of museum visitor QoE is presented.
The main parameters that influence museum visitor QoE are identified and related to four
visiting styles (i.e., ant, butterfly, fish, grasshopper). Different weights are also empirically
determined for these parameters. Different QoE functions for each influential parameter
and visiting style as well as a Total QoE function are formulated.
2. A social recommendation and personalization framework that captures visitor interests
and social interactions is designed, to suggest the most interesting exhibits for each visitor.
3. A Museum Visitor QoE Routing (MVQoER) problem is formulated and solved via a
graph based representation of the examined topology and the adoption of well known
shortest path algorithms. The link weights of the graph are defined by considering not
only physical constraints but also several QoE related parameters.
4. Visitors are modeled as learning automata, via a reinforcement learning mechanism that
allows them to select the most appropriate recommendation for their museum tour. Visi-
tors are able to intelligently sense their environment (such as the actions of other visitors)
while keeping track of their own decisions, in order to take more informed and personally
beneficial actions in the future. As time evolves, their decisions converge, and visitors
finally select the type of recommendation that will improve their perceived QoE.
5. A holistic approach to QoE-based visiting time management in museums is introduced.
Each museum visitor aims to maximize their perceived QoE in a distributed manner
for the selected recommendation. Based on the non-cooperative and distributed nature
of visiting time management, a maximization problem for each visitor QoE function is
formulated and solved by using the quasi-concavity of the visitor QoE function.
6. The QoE function is further analyzed, with a congestion control function as part of it.
Thus, the QoE function consists of: (a) the pure QoE function and (b) the congestion
control function. The pure QoE function reflects the tradeoff of achieved QoE over the
time spent. The congestion control function is sophisticatedly selected to achieve fairness
among museum visitors with respect to time spent at exhibits.
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7. Visitor behavior as regards loss aversion and gain seeking characteristics within cultural
heritage spaces is studied. This thesis claims that visitors do not behave as neutral
expected utility maximizers but tend to exhibit risk seeking or loss averse behaviour
under uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework constitutes the
first study in this area of research. The fundamental components and concepts of Prospect
Theory are introduced and properly adapted within the research area of cyber-physical
social systems, with emphasis on cultural heritage spaces.
8. A cultural heritage space and its exhibits are organized into two main groups. The
first are safe exhibits that are typically less congested, where visitors are assumed to
receive guaranteed satisfaction proportionate to the visiting time invested. The second
are Common Pool of Resources (CPR) exhibits, which are the most popular exhibits
within a museum and thus likely to be congested with uncertain outcomes in terms of
visitor satisfaction. A key difference between the two types of exhibits is that visitor
perceived satisfaction received by viewing the latter depends not only on invested time
decisions of specific visitors, but also on that of the rest of the visitors. The satisfaction
of each visitor is qualitatively and quantitatively expressed through their actual utility
function, which considers the perceived satisfaction from visiting safe and CPR exhibits.
9. Visitor prospect-theoretic utility functions are formulated by considering visitor actual
utilities, visitor available visiting time and visitor reflection on gains and losses. As
each visitor determines the investment of his time at both safe and CPR exhibits in
an autonomous manner, the problem is formulated as an optimization of the prospect-
theoretic utility of each visitor with respect to their visiting time and treated as a non-
cooperative game among visitors. The non-cooperative game is solved in a distributed
manner and its Nash equilibrium point is determined. The existence and uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium point demonstrates the stable operation of the considered social
system at the equilibrium point. At that point, visitor satisfaction is guaranteed with
optimal investment of available visiting time at corresponding exhibits.
10. A series of extensive numerical results that evaluate the performance and the inherent
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attributes of the proposed visitor-centric investment decision-making framework under
prospect theory are presented. Throughout the experimentation and evaluation study,
both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations with respect to visitor risk behavior
are considered. A comparative study of the proposed optimal solution against different
strategy alternatives demonstrates its superiority and benefits as regards user satisfaction
and proper system operation.
11. The role and impact of human heterogeneity, as regards loss aversion and sensitivity to
obtained satisfaction, is examined and explained. How these behavioral parameters drive
ultimate visitor investment at CPR and safe exhibits and also influence overall social
system evolution is investigated.
12. Particular observations are made and guidelines are drawn, reflecting the point of view of
both the cultural heritage site operator and the individual visitor. These can be used to
improve and optimize several objectives and metrics throughout a cultural heritage site
tour.
13. The concepts of visitor time investment, resource fragility and pricing are integrated
under a common umbrella, using the principles of Prospect Theory and Tragedy of the
Commons. It is illustrated that pricing constitutes a valid measure against overcrowding
because it encourages visitors to take decisions that prevent them from over-exploiting
exhibits. Thus the likelihood of exhibit failure is reduced and museum operation stability
is preserved.
1.3 Outline
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a holistic approach to
the formulation and optimization of museum visitor QoE. The most influential parameters of
visitor QoE are identified and quantified, and individual QoE functions for each parameter and
visiting style are defined. A Total QoE function is also presented, which considers the different
parameter weights.
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Chapter 3 demonstrates a human in-the-loop approach with the proposition of a physical,
personal and interest-aware tour of a museum that maximizes visitor perceived QoE. A social
recommendation and personalization approach is designed that creates visitor profiles, exploits
common characteristics and interests and recommends a set of exhibits to be visited based
on those interests. A Museum Visitor QoE Routing problem is formulated and solved via a
graph-based approach that determines both an optimal and heuristic but less complex solution.
In chapter 4, we suggest the creation of self-organizing museum visitor communities that are
based on visitor personal characteristics and aim to enhance the visiting experience through
a Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach. A museum touring framework is also pro-
posed in order to maximize visitor perceived QoE, while three different community formation
alternatives are studied and evaluated.
In chapter 5, we formulate the problem of Recommendation Selection and Visiting Time Man-
agement (RSVTM) and propose a two-stage distributed algorithm, based on game theory and
reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning enables visitors to make on-the-fly recommen-
dation selections that maximize their QoE. The proposed framework allows for autonomic
visitor-centric management and optimization in a personalized manner, so that visitors them-
selves decide on the best visiting strategies.
Chapter 6 demonstrates the formulation, quantification and evaluation of visitor realistic behav-
ior by properly capturing visitor loss aversion and gain seeking characteristics within cultural
heritage environments. In order to assess the impact of visitor behavioral factors on visitor QoE,
the fundamental components and concepts of Prospect Theory are properly adapted. The ob-
tained visitor QoE is expressed through a prospect-theoretic utility function and depends on
the cumulative time spent by all visitors at exhibits. Thus, visitor behaviors and decisions
are interrelated and, in order to determine visitor optimal investment time at exhibits, a non-
cooperative game among visitors is formulated and solved in a distributed manner.
Chapter 7 presents a socio-technical analysis of the congestion management problem in muse-
ums. We study and analyze the impact of several appropriate pricing policies on the decisions
and strategies of visitors when acting as prospect-theoretic decision-makers. Based on the ob-
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tained results, we propose pricing as an effective mechanism to preserve museum operation
stability.
Finally, chapter 8 concludes this dissertation with an overview of the study, a summary of
the research results and recommendations for future research that could be carried out as an
extension of the work conducted in this study.
Chapter 2
Modelling Visitor Experience and
Optimization
2.1 Introduction
A visit in a museum is a dynamic, multi-variable, personalized and sensitive experience. Visitor
perceived satisfaction can be affected by numerous factors, such as visual, audio, architectural
characteristics. The proper consideration and formulation of those factors in well-structured
functions to reflect museum visitor Quality of Experience (QoE) is of great importance in order
to understand, predict and optimize visitor QoE. Visitor QoE optimization can provide signif-
icant benefits in the following areas: (a) visitor satisfaction, (b) visitor engagement leading to
repeat visits and recommendations, i.e., word-of-mouth advertising [3] and (c) input for museum
managers for improving museum services and museum brand loyalty. User behavior modeling
and recording of user satisfaction, in a formal and exploitable manner, is therefore critical
when designing and delivering services as personalization, adaptation and recommendation are
becoming of increasing importance.
Several research works on museum visitor perceived satisfaction [4], [5], argue on one hand about
the non-existence of a “typical museum visitor” and, on the other, that visitor satisfaction can
be affected either by common or personalized factors. Veron and Levasseur [6] identify four
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visiting styles based on visitor movement in the physical space of a museum, in a primarily
qualitative piece of research. Zancanaro et.al [7] extend Veron’s and Levasseur’s research by
providing empirical evidence and a quantitative validation of the aforementioned qualitative
theory. In [8] museum visitor behavior is studied towards evaluating the impact of exhibitions
on visitor satisfaction. Rojas et. al [9] relate visitor emotions to their corresponding QoE.
However, the majority of the above research mainly emphasize the sociocultural aspect of
museum visitor QoE. A first attempt to formulate museum visitor QoE using mathematical
functions is proposed in [10]. It considers the distance between a visitor and an exhibit as well
as the time a visitor spends observing an exhibit. Lykourentzou et. al [11] further study the
effect of smart routing and intelligent recommendations on museum visitor QoE.
2.1.1 Proposed Framework characteristics
Despite the attention that museum visitor QoE has recently attracted, a holistic framework
that will identify, quantify and mathematically formulate the parameters that influence visitor
QoE with respect to visiting styles [6] and towards improving visitor experience is still lacking.
The first part of our research aims exactly to fill this gap.
The basic characteristics, contributions and differences of our study can be summarized as
follows:
1. The main parameters that influence museum visitor QoE are identified via a detailed
questionnaire answered by experts in the field of arts and museology (Section 2.2.1).
These parameters are also related to the four visiting styles, proposed in [6] (Section 2.3).
2. Different QoE functions are formulated for each parameter and visiting style. The math-
ematical formulation of visitor QoE with respect to each influential parameter (Section
2.4), is one of the main novelties of the first part of our research. Based on such a for-
mulation, a wide range of QoE-aware or QoE-driven related personalized services may be
designed, e.g. smart guidance, etc.
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3. Based on the statistical analysis of the answers retrieved by the questionnaire, different
weights are determined for the influential parameters.
4. We introduce a holistic approach regarding the formulation of museum visitor QoE that
differentiates per visiting style and takes into consideration the influential parameters, as
well as their corresponding weights.
5. An optimization problem of Total QoE function is formulated and solved, to determine
the optimal values of the most influential parameters that maximize visitor QoE (Section
2.5).
2.2 Methodology Towards Designing QoE functions
2.2.1 QoE influential parameters & Questionnaire to Experts
In order to relate physical museum parameters to visitor perceived QoE, we identify five pa-
rameters that are also mentioned in the literature [6], [10], [11], [12] as presented below:
1. drms: distance between an exhibit and a visitor,
2. djj1 rms: distance between two sequential exhibits, ej and ej1
3. ρrvisitors/m2s: crowd density,
4. tf rmins: time spent with a facilitator to receive helpful exhibit related information,
5. Srm2s: exhibition size
The aforementioned parameters neither influence visitor QoE in exactly the same manner nor
hold equal weight. A questionnaire was therefore compiled to experts (e.g. archeologists,
museum and gallery directors, etc.) in order to determine the relative importance of each
parameter and obtain some critical values for them. The questionnaire [13] consisted of a set of
14 questions and was distributed both physically and via Google Forms. In the first part of the
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Figure 2.1: Importance weight of each QoE parameter
questionnaire, the expert was authorized and filled in some indicative demographic information
in order to confirm their expertise. Afterwards, questions more focused on QoE were included,
i.e. on optimal distance between a visitor and an exhibit, the distance between two sequential
exhibits, etc. Finally, experts were asked to state the importance of each parameter using a
five point scale.
Over a period of two months, the questionnaire was distributed to several relevant associa-
tions/forums and individual museums, including the International Council of Museums (ICOM)
[14], the International Association of Art-Critics-Greek [15], the Acropolis Museum, the Na-
tional Art Gallery and Alexander Soutzos Museum, the Museum of Byzantine Culture. Overall,
fifty detailed evaluations were collected. Our statistical analysis of these responses enabled us
to determine a weight for each parameter within the overall QoE function, as presented in
Fig.2.1.
2.3 Visitor Visiting Styles
Museum visitor QoE is affected by visitor preferences and habits. Veron and Levasseur [6]
conducted some anthropological research and by analyzing visitor movement in the physical
space of a museum, they concluded that there are four types of visiting styles. Specifically, they
classified visitors into four animal metaphor clusters: ant, fish, grasshopper and butterfly. The
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animal metaphors describe the natural movement of visitors with their differences determined
by specific preferences and interests. In [4], the authors proposed a visualization tool to detect
visitor visiting styles (Fig. 2.2).
“Ant visitors” (Fig. 2.2a) follow a long and linear path close to exhibits because they are
interested in visiting almost all exhibits in a museum. Due to their interest in the details of
exhibits, they are in favor of having a facilitator providing information. They are willing to
walk a lot and they avoid empty spaces such as room centers. Also, crowd density does not
discourage them because they are determined to view entire exhibitions.
On the other hand, “fish visitors” (Fig. 2.2b) prefer to stand in the center of an exhibition
room, as they want to have a larger picture of the exhibits and the chance to view more than
one concurrently. They are not interested in exhibits’ details, thus they are not willing to spend
increased time with a facilitator. Moreover, crowd density affects dramatically their perceived
satisfaction because as they stand in the center of museum rooms, their visual contact can be
easily blocked by crowds.
“Grasshopper visitors” (Fig. 2.2c) have clear preferences. They are only interested in specific
exhibits and view them at a close distance while spending plenty of time there. Because they
already know a lot of information about the exhibits they are interested in, they are not in
favour of spending much time with a facilitator. As their animal metaphor indicates, they tend
to cover long distances or pass straight through empty spaces, such as center of museum rooms,
in order to visit the targeted exhibits. Furthermore, they are bothered by increased crowd
density because it restricts their enjoyment of the few exhibits that they have a priori decided
to visit.
Lastly, “butterfly visitors” (Fig. 2.2d) like “ant visitors” are interested in visiting all exhibits
in a museum. They also move about close to exhibits in order to look at details and they enjoy
spending time with a facilitator. In contrast to that of “ant visitors”, the path of “butterflies”
can easily be redirected in cases of congestion. If a specific part of a museum has increased
crowd density, “butterfly visitors” will choose to change their path direction instead of waiting
in long queues.
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(a) Ant (b) Fish (c) Grasshopper (d) Butterfly
Figure 2.2: Visitor Visiting Styles
2.4 Formulation of individual QoE functions
Based on the aforementioned influential parameters (Section 2.2.1) and the visiting styles of
visitors (Section 2.3), our goal is to formulate appropriate QoE functions. Therefore, in the
following section, individual QoE functions are presented for each visiting style and parameter
pd, djj1 , ρ, tf , Sq. It should be noted that all the numerical values considered in the following
analysis were determined from expert responses via the questionnaire [13].
2.4.1 Distance between an Exhibit and a Visitor
Visitor perceived QoE, with respect to the distance dpmq between an exhibit  P E and a visitor
v P V , is differentiated according to the size of the exhibit , i.e. whether it is small or large.
According to the above mentioned specialist responses [13], the dimensions of a small exhibit
are approximately 45cm x 35cm, while a large one is approximately 1.5m x 1m. The QoE of
ant (A), butterfly (B) and grasshopper (G) visitors increases as the distance between them and
an exhibit  P E increases. However, there is a specific distance interval (Fig. 2.3) at which
maximum satisfaction is perceived and after which point visitor QoE decreases, because then
visitors cannot observe exhibit details.
Where fish (F) visitors are concerned, and as we have already mentioned in Section (2.3), they
tend to stand at the center of rooms, observing exhibits without being very interested in details.
Thus, the fish visitor QoE is maximized when there are lower distance values between them
and an exhibit, while when the distance increases (for values considerably greater than the
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Figure 2.3: Distance between an exhibit and a visitor
rest of the three visiting styles), their QoE decreases rapidly because they can not have clear
picture of the exhibits as a whole. The above observations are expressed through the equations
Eq.2.1, Eq.2.2, Eq.2.3 and Eq.2.4. The Eq.2.1 expresses QoE for ant, butterfly and grasshopper
visitors for smaller exhibits whereas Eq.2.2 reflects QoE for the same visiting styles but for larger
exhibits. The Eq.2.3 shows fish visitor QoE for smaller exhibits and Eq.2.4 presents fish visitor
QoE for larger exhibits.
QoEA,B,Gpdps “ smallqq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
1
dopt1,sm
¨ dpsq, 0 ă dpsq ď dopt1,sm
1, dopt1,sm ă dpsq ă dopt2,sm
´ 1
dzP,sm´dopt2,sm ¨ dpsq `
dzP,sm
dzP,sm´dopt2,sm , dopt2,sm ď dpsq ď dzP,sm
(2.1)
where dopt1,sm “ 0.5, dopt2,sm “ 1.5 and dzP,sm “ 4
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QoEA,B,Gpdps “ bigqq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
1
dopt1,bg
¨ dpsq, 0 ă dpsq ď dopt1,bg
1, dopt1,bg ă dpsq ă dopt2,bg
´ 1
dzP,bg´dopt2,bg ¨ dpsq `
dzP,bg
dzP,bg´dopt2,bg , dopt2,bg ď dpsq ď dzP,bg
(2.2)
where dopt1,bg “ 1.5, dopt2,bg “ 2.5 and dzP,bg “ 7
QoEF pdps “ smallqq “
$’’&’’%
p 1
QoElow,F
2 qdpsq´dopt,sm,F , 0 ă dpsq ď dopt,sm,F
badpsq, dpsq ě dopt,sm,F
(2.3)
where QoElow,F “ 0.3, dopt,sm,F “ 2.5, a “ 0.52 and b “ 5
QoEF pdps “ bigqq “
$’’&’’%
p 1
QoElow,F
qdpsq´dopt,bg,F , 0 ă dpsq ď dopt,bg,F
´ 1
d2opt,bg,F
¨ pdpsqq2 ` 2
dopt,bg,F
¨ dpsq dopt,bg,F ď dpsq ď dzP,bg,F
(2.4)
where dopt,bg,F “ 5 and dzP,bg,F “ 10
2.4.2 Distance between Two Sequential Exhibits
All types of visitors are dissatisfied when exhibits are extremely congested, i.e. when there is a
small distance between sequential exhibits, because they feel “bombarded” by information. On
the other hand, visitor QoE decreases when exhibits are sparsely located because an exhibition
is not rich in terms of content and visitors have to cover a lot of ground to observe a satisfactory
number of exhibits. However, there is an optimal distance interval between sequential exhibits
(Fig. 2.4), where visitor perceived satisfaction is maximized. Thus, visitor QoE with respect
to the distance, djj1 , between two sequential exhibits is formulated as in Eq.2.5, Eq.2.6, Eq.2.7,
Eq.2.8.
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Figure 2.4: Distance between sequential exhibits
QoEB,G,F pdjj1 ps “ smallqq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
1
d2
jj
1
,opt1,sm
¨ djj1 psq2, 0 ă djj1 psq ď djj1 ,opt1,sm
1 djj1 ,opt1,sm ă djj1 psq ă djj1 ,opt2,sm
d ¨ djj1 psq2 ` e ¨ djj1 psq ` f, djj1 psq ě djj1 ,opt2,sm
(2.5)
where djj1 ,opt1,sm “ 0.5, djj1 ,opt2,sm “ 0.7, d “ ´1.56, e “ 2.19 and f “ 0.23
QoEB,G,F pdjj1 ps “ bigqq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
1
d2
jj
1
,opt1,bg
¨ djj1 psq2, 0 ă djj1 psq ď djj1 ,opt1,bg
1 djj1 ,opt1,bg ă djj1 psq ă djj1 ,opt2,bg
g ¨ djj1 psq2 ` h ¨ djj1 psq ` i, djj1 psq ě djj1 ,opt2,bg
(2.6)
where de,opt1,bg “ 1.4, de,opt2,bg “ 1.7, g “ ´0.59, h “ 2.01 and i “ ´0.71
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QoEApdjj1 ps “ smallqq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
1
d2
jj
1
,opt1,sm,A
¨ djj1 psq2, 0 ă djj1 psq ď djj1 ,opt1,sm,A
1 djj1 ,opt1,sm,A ă djj1 psq ă djj1 ,opt2,sm,A
j ¨ djj1 psq2 ` k ¨ djj1 psq ` l, djj1 psq ě djj1 ,opt2,sm,A
(2.7)
where djj1 ,opt1,sm,A “ 0.3, djj1 ,opt2,sm,A “ 0.4, j “ ´2.78, k “ 2.22 and l “ 0.56
QoEApdjj1 ps “ bigqq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
1
d2
jj
1
,opt1,bg,A
¨ djj1 psq2, 0 ă djj1 psq ď djj1 ,opt1,bg,A
1 djj1 ,opt1,bg,A ă djj1 psq ă djj1 ,opt2,bg,A
m ¨ djj1 psq2 ` n ¨ djj1 psq ` o, djj1 psq ě djj1 ,opt2,bg,A
(2.8)
where djj1 ,opt1,bg,A “ 0.9, djj1 ,opt2,bg,A “ 1.2, m “ ´0.31, n “ 0.74 and o “ 0.56
2.4.3 Crowd Density
Visitor QoE for all visiting styles decreases when crowd density increases (Fig. 2.5). Fish
visitor QoE, in particular, is affected by increased crowd density. Because fish visitors stand
in the center of museum rooms, increased crowds completely prevent them from having visual
contact with the exhibits. On the other hand, because ant visitors have decided a priori to visit
all exhibits in a museum, high congestion does not discourage them. They are willing to wait
in long queues to view exhibits. Visitor QoE with respect to crowd density ρ can be formulated
as:
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Figure 2.5: Crowd Density
QoEpρq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
pQoELowLevelqρ, F ish
pQoELowLevelq
1
CrDeB,G
¨ρ
, But.{Gras.
pQoELowLevelq
1
CrDeA
¨ρ
, Ant
(2.9)
where QoELowLevel “ 0.2, CrDeB,G “ 1.5 and CrDeA “ 2.5
2.4.4 Time Spent with a Facilitator
The information provided by a facilitator to visitors enables them to better understand the
exhibits they view. Thus, as the time spent with a facilitator increases, visitor perceived
satisfaction increases (Fig.2.6). For ant, butterfly and grasshopper visitors, who are more
interested in receiving information compared to fish visitors, who are more interested in just
viewing exhibits, there is a specific time interval where their QoE is maximized. However, for
all visiting styles, QoE decreases if the time spent with a facilitator exceeds a specific threshold.
The relationship between visitor QoE and the time spent with a facilitator, tf , is given by the
equations Eq.2.10 and Eq.2.11.
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Figure 2.6: Time a Visitor Spends with a Facilitator
QoEptf qA,B,G “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
´p ¨ tf 2 ` q ¨ tf , 0 ă tf ď tf,opt1
1, tf,opt1 ă tf ă tf,opt2
´ 1
tf,max´tf,opt2 ¨ tf `
tf,max
tf,max´tf,opt2 , tf,opt2 ď tf ď tf,max
(2.10)
where p “ 0.25, q “ 1, tf,opt1 “ 2, tf,opt2 “ 3 and tf,max “ 5
QoEptf qF “
$’’&’’%
tf , 0 ă tf ă tf,opt
r ¨ tf 2 ` s ¨ tf ` t, tf,opt ď tf ď tf,max
(2.11)
where tf,opt “ 1, tf,max “ 2, r “ 1 and t “ ´s “ 4
2.4.5 Exhibition Size
A final influential parameter for visitor QoE is the size of a museum exhibition. As an exhibition
size increases, visitor QoE rises, due to the fact that more exhibits are available to visitors (Fig.
2.7). However, if the size of an exhibition is relatively large compared to visitor willingness to
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Figure 2.7: Museum Size
walk, their QoE decreases. Visitor QoE with respect to an exhibition size, S, can be formulated
as follows:
QoEpSqA,B,G,F “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
u ¨ vS, 0 ă S ď Sopt1
1, Sopt1 ă S ă Sopt2
w ¨ xS, S ě Sopt2
(2.12)
where u “ 0.19, v “ 1.19, w “ 2.38, x “ 0.94, Sopt1 “ 9 and Sopt2 “ 14.
2.5 Formulation of a Total QoE Function
In this section, we formulate a Total QoE function that considers the aforementioned parameters
as well as visitor visiting styles. Each parameter contributes in a different manner to the overall
visitor QoE. The weight wi for each parameter i, where i “ d, djj1 , ρ, tf , S is calculated based
on the responses given on the questionnaire circulated among experts, as presented in Section
2.2.1. The values of the weights have been normalized, thus 0 ď wi ď 1.
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Visitor Total QoE function for each visiting style can be expressed as the normalized weighted
summation of individual QoE functions and is given as follows:
QoETOTALx “
wdQoExpdpsqq ` wd
jj
1QoExpdjj1 psqq ` wρQoExpρq ` wtfQoExptf q ` wSQoExpSq
wd ` wd
jj
1 ` wρ ` wtf ` wS
(2.13)
where QoEx denotes the total QoE of each type of visitor (i.e. x = A, B, G, F).
Our next goal was to determine the optimal values, i.e. d, djj1 , ρ, tf , S, in order that visitor
Total QoE be maximized. Therefore, we formulated the following maximization problem.
max
d,d
jj
1 ,ρ,tf ,S
QoExpi “ d, djj1 , ρ, tf , Sq,
s.t. dmin ă d ă dmax, djj1 ,min ă djj1 ă djj1 ,max,
ρmin ă ρ ă ρmax, tf,min ă tf ă tf,max, Smin ă S ă Smax
and determined the global maximum pd˚, d˚
jj1 , ρ
˚, tf˚ , S˚q “ argmaxQoExpi “ d, djj1 , ρ, tf , Sq
via multivariable calculus, i.e. via determining the critical points, calculating the Hessian
matrix and its determinants [16]. The vector pd˚, d˚
jj1 , ρ
˚, tf˚ , S˚q reflects the optimal values of
d, djj1 , ρ, tf , S such that visitor QoE is maximized.
2.6 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide some numerical results that illustrate the operational features of the
proposed framework. As observed in Fig.2.1, the parameters that significantly influence visitor
perceived QoE are: (a) the distance drms between an exhibit and a visitor pwd “ 0.635q, (b)
crowd density, ρrvisitors/m2spwρ “ 0.89q and (c) the time a visitor spends with a facilitator,
tf [min] pwtf “ 0.665q. Based on this observation and assuming that the parameters related to
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museum deployment (i.e., djj1 and S) remain constant, we study two use case scenarios. For
demonstration purposes only, in both scenarios, we consider that the size of the exhibits is
small. However, a similar analysis can be provided for larger exhibits as well.
In Scenario A, visitor Total QoE is studied as a function of the distance between a visitor and
an exhibit, d with increasing crowd density, ρ and it mainly reflects the perspective of museum
directors. On the other hand, Scenario B reflects visitor perspective and evaluates visitor Total
QoE with respect to crowd density, ρ, for various cases of time spent with facilitator, tf . Based
on this second scenario, visitors select the optimal lenght of time spent listening to a facilitator,
given existing crowd density, in order to maximize their perceived QoE.
2.6.1 Scenario A
Fig.2.8 illustrates visitor Total QoE as a function of the distance d between a visitor and an
exhibit, as formulated in Eq.2.1 and Eq.2.3 for different indicative values of crowd density, i.e.
ρ “ 0, ρ “ 1, ρ “ 2, while tf “ 1.2min and djj1 “ 0.6m2. Considering Total QoE for
ant, butterfly and grasshopper visitors, the results reveal that as the distance between a visitor
and an exhibit, d increases, (up to 0.5m), Total QoE improves significantly. It is maximized
at distances between 0.5m and 1.5m and as visitors become more distant from exhibits (i.e.
d ą 1.5m), their perceived satisfaction decreases. For extremely large values of distance,
i.e. d ą 4m, visitor Total QoEx, where x=A,B,G remains stable at the lowest point. This
observation stems from the fact that when ants, butterflies and grasshoppers stand too close to
an exhibit, they are unable to view the whole picture and, as they become more distant, they
are not able to observe details.
As concerns fish visitors, Total QoE is relatively low when they stand close to exhibits and
increases gradually as they move away, towards the center of the room. Similarly, their Total
QoE decreases rapidly, as their distance from an exhibit becomes too great.
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Figure 2.8: Visitor Total QoE as a function of drms for different crowd densities, ρ
2.6.2 Scenario B
Fig.2.9 illustrates visitor Total QoE as a function of crowd density, ρ for different values of time
spent with a facilitator tf . The distance between visitors and exhibits as well as the distance
between sequential exhibits remain constant, i.e. d “ 2.5m and djj1 “ 0.6m. It is clear from
the graph that fish visitors are affected the most by crowd density because as they stand at
the center of museum rooms, even a small obstacle may prevent them from viewing an exhibit.
Total QoE for ant visitors decreases gradually with respect to crowd density, meaning that
they are not affected much by crowds, due to their willingness to wait in queues. The Total
QoE of butterfly and grasshopper visitors decreases more steadily compared to that of fish
visitors. Therefore, we can infer that butterly and grasshopper visitors are less influenced by
overcrowding than fish are.
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Figure 2.9: Visitor Total QoE as a function of crowd density ρ for different tf values
As regards the time visitors spend with a facilitator, the results reveal that ant, grasshopper and
butterfly visitors, unlike to fish visitors, experience higher levels of Total QoE when they spend
more time with a facilitator and obtain information about exhibits. To be specific, Total QoE
for ant, grasshopper and butterfly visitors is maximized when the time spend with a facilitator
is 1.5min, while the corresponding time for fish visitors is 1min.
Chapter 3
A Human in the Loop Approach
towards Maximizing Visitor QoE
3.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapters, a museum aims to maximize the visitor’s QoE by
encouraging the visitors to repeat visits and recommend their experience to others, i.e., via
word of mouth advertising [3]. This helps a museum to improve its visibility and brand loyalty.
The quality of a museum visiting experience depends on both visitor interest in a museum
exhibition as well as the QoE gained during an actual visit (Chapter 2). The level of interest of
a visitor depends on their personal interests and profile (i.e. age, education, visiting style) which
are obtained usually through social recommendation and personalization analysis. Visitor QoE
refers to the impact that several physical and spatial parameters have on visitor perceived
satisfaction during a museum visit.
This chapter focuses on the user’s behavior modeling with a view towards designing and de-
livering services where personalization, adaptation and recommendation are of paramount im-
portance. The framework, which is presented in this chapter, allows for a more customized,
personalized, and immersive visiting experience, thus improving the visitors’ Quality of Experi-
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ence. In particular, we introduce a museum touring personalized framework that recommends
exhibits to visitors that are the most interesting for them and suggests the optimal path to
follow in the museum in order to view the proposed exhibits.
This part of our research wishes to fill the gap that currently exists in the literature with respect
to propositions and designations of a museum touring approach and is based on a human in the
loop methodology. An overall visitor touring experience refers to a) the selection of the most
appropriate visitor specific exhibits in a museum according to several physical, personal and
interest related factors or constraints and b) the recommendation of optimal routes to follow
to visit proposed exhibits in order to increase overall visiting satisfaction.
Consequently, a social recommendation and personalization analysis was adopted. By exploit-
ing common characteristics and interests among visitors via a ranking system, visitor profiles
were created in order to recommend a set of exhibits to be visited to each visitor. To further
increase visitor perceived satisfaction via the routing process, we suggest an optimal (shortest)
path to follow in a museum in order to view the recommended exhibits.
Finally, a museum visitor QoE routing (MVQoER) problem was formulated as an optimization
problem, taking various QoE related characteristics (i.e. distance between sequential exhibits
pdjj1 q, crowd density (ρ), time spent with a facilitator (tf )), as quantified in the proposed
QoE functions (Eq.2.5, Eq.2.6, Eq.2.7, Eq.2.8, Eq.2.9, Eq.2.10, Eq.2.11) into consideration.
The proposed MVQoER problem is solved via a graph based representation of the examined
topology and the adoption of well known shortest path algorithms. The fundamental novelty
of the proposed solution is that the link weights in the graph representation consider the above
QoE parameters, rather than simple distances or other physical constraints only. We present
two different algorithms to address this problem. One algorithm results [17], [18] in the optimal
solution at the cost of high complexity, and the other [19] concludes with a sub-optimal solution
but with significantly reduced complexity.
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3.2 Social Recommendation and Personalization mech-
anism
Personalization, relevance feedback and social recommendation have arisen as dominant sup-
porting mechanisms in numerous online/mobile multimedia content applications (e.g., Periscope,
Glide, Vine, etc.), online publishing platforms (e.g., YouTube, Wikipedia,etc.) and social net-
works (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, etc.)[20]. End users request personalized services with limited
feedback when maximizing their perceived QoE [21]. Following this paradigm, we designed a
social recommendation and personalization mechanism to record and exploit museum visitor
interests both in specific thematic areas and at specific museum exhibits. We also considered
characteristics such as visiting styles (i.e., ant, butterfly, fish, grasshopper), ages, origins, innate
needs and experiences.
Using our proof-of-concept application, a visitor initially registers by creating an account and
optionally provides personal information, such as name, surname, age, visiting style, education,
country, etc. The information provided is used to set up the initial visitor profile.
After registration, visitors are able to declare their personal interests on a scale with regard
to specific thematic areas (Fig.3.1). Although this procedure is optional, users feel motivated
to provide such information in order to improve their perceived QoE. It is noted that the
thematic areas, presented in Fig.3.1 are selected only for demonstration purposes whereas when
our application is utilized in a real museum environment, the thematic areas can be properly
adjusted and substituted by others.
Visitors are informed via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) that the most important thematic
areas according to their interests have a score of 5, while the less important of 1. Visitors
can change their preferences at any time. The scores obtained are mapped to corresponding
weights wta,vi , where wta,vi in p0, 1s that consider each thematic area ta for each visitor vi. For
example, if a visitor vi selected 1 for the thematic area ta “ 1, then the corresponding weight
is wta“1,vi “ 0.2. If a visitor vi selected 2 for ta “ 1, then wta“1,vi “ 0.4 and so on.
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Figure 3.1: Statement of personal interests
Figure 3.2: Statement of personal interests
Visitor vi also provides a score for an exhibit ej that was visited which then translated as weight
wej ,vi . The score is again based on scalar values from 1 to 5, where visitor interest increases as
the value increases. Each exhibit is then characterized by total interest, which is constructed
using scores provided by the rest of the visitors. More specifically, total exhibit interest is
differentiated according to visitor visiting styles (i.e., ant, butterfly, fish, grasshopper), visitor
ages and the weight of the thematic area the exhibit belongs to as presented in Fig. 3.2.
Therefore, total exhibit interest is expressed as follows:
wV isitingStyle,Ageej “
vV isitingStyle,AgeI ř
vi“1
wta“1,viwej ,vi
vV isitingStyle,AgeI
(3.1)
3.3. Optimal visiting route within museum 29
Figure 3.3: Exhibition Topology
where wV isitingStyle,Ageej denotes the social and personal awareness interest weight for exhibit ej,
wta,vi is the weight of the thematic area ta for visitor vi, wej ,vi is the weight of exhibit ej provided
by visitor vi and v
V isitorStyle,age
I is the total number of visitors with the same characteristics (i.e.
visiting style and age) that provided scores for exhibit ej. It is noted that I is the total
number of visitors in the museum. The interest weight of each exhibit, wV isitorStyle,ageej lies in
the interval (0,1] and visitor interest for exhibit ej, wej ,vi is directly proportional to the value
of wV isitorStyle,ageej . Finally, each exhibit belongs exclusively to a specific thematic area ta.
3.3 Optimal visiting route within museum
We assume that I “ tv1, ..., vi, ..., vIu denotes the set of visitors within an exhibition area for
whom the visiting style, i.e., ant, butterfly, fish, grasshopper is known. Let J “ te1, ...ej, ...eJu
denotes the set of exhibits within the museum under consideration which are distributed within
the exhibition area, as presented in Fig.3.3. Exhibit distribution can vary according to exhi-
bition organizer preferences but it does not influence the operation and functionality of the
proposed Museum Visitor QoE Routing process.
As observed in Fig.3.3, the exhibits on display in an exhibition area can be modeled in a diagram
G “ pV,Eq, where V “ J Y tent, exu is the set of vertices and E denotes the set of physical
and QoE-aware links among two exhibits. The nodes ent and ex in the diagram represent
the physical entrance and exit of the exhibition, respectively. Moreover, as already explained
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in detail in Section 3.2, each exhibit ej is characterized by an interest weight, w
V isitingStyle,Age
ej
(Eq.3.1), which is differentiated by visitor visiting style and age.
An overall visitor touring experience refers to exhibits selected as most interesting for a visitor
and the optimal route proposed thereby increasing perceived satisfaction. Our work is based
on the assumption that a visitor usually visits only a percentage of exhibits, especially in a
large museum, due to several physical constraints and limitations. Consequently, we assume
that the tendency to only visit a percentage of exhibits N ď |J | is due to individual interests or
other factors. For example, a visitor may select the top N exhibits based on i) exhibit interest
weights, ii) exhibit QoE characteristics or iii) a linear combination of the above two factors.
More details on the selection of the N exhibits are provided in Section 3.4, and representative
use case scenarios are demonstrated and evaluated in the numerical results section, i.e., Section
3.6.
Subsequently, we presume there will be a visiting route R between the entrance, (i.e. ent),
and the exit, (i.e. ex ) nodes of a museum exhibition that consists of N ´ 1 links among the
intermediate N exhibits visited. Therefore, the visiting route R can be written as a directed
path, R “ tj “ ent, e1, ..., eN´1, exu, where R P Rent,ex and Rent,ex is the set of all feasible paths
R connecting ent and ex nodes with N ´ 1 hops, guaranteeing that visitors stop by N exhibits
in total.
3.3.1 QoE-aware link weights
The main QoE related metrics that we used for the design and development of the Museum
Visitor QoE Routing Problem (MVQoER) are:
1. djj1 rms: distance between two exhibits ej and ej1 , where ej, ej1 P J
2. ρ [visitors/m2]: crowd density and
3. tfj rmins: the time spent with a facilitator per exhibit ej, where ej P J , receiving useful
information about the exhibit
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The distance djj1 rms between two exhibits represents a spatial parameter, while crowd density
ρ and the time spent with a facilitator tfj express physical constraints of a cultural heritage
space. Adopting the weights wd
jj
1 , wρ and wtfj for the above three parameters respectively, as
determined via the circulated questionnaire [13] and described in Section 2.5, we propose the
following QoE-aware weight for each link pej, ej1 ) of the graph G:
QoEjj1vi
“ wd
jj
1QoEvipdjj1 q ` wρQoEvipρq ` wtfjQoEviptfjq (3.2)
3.4 A Human in the Loop Formulation (MVQoER prob-
lem)
In this section, we formulate a Museum Visitor QoE Routing (MVQoER) problem, aiming to
determine the optimal route for a visitor to follow within a museum, while considering spa-
tial, physical and QoE-aware characteristics, as defined in Section 3.3.1. Most of the proposed
research works in the literature examining the problem of museum visitor routing consider
only physical characteristics, such as visiting time, without including visitor QoE related fac-
tors or visitor personal or social-related information. In this study, museum visitor touring is
approached from a different point of view and visitors, i.e., human entities are at the center
of our study. Visitor QoE-aware characteristics, as well as visitor personal and social-related
information are properly combined with the physical parameters in order to conclude with a
human in the loop routing solution.
Initially, a visitor vi decides which N exhibits (N ď |J |) to visit, based on one of the following
three criteria:
A. Pure personal and social-aware selection. The visitor selects the top N exhibits based
exclusively on an exhibit’s interest weight wV isitingStyle,Ageej , Eq.3.1 as presented in Section 3.2.
B. Pure physical-aware selection. The visitor bases his choice on a physical-aware (paj,vi) factor
for each exhibit, considering both physical constraints and QoE related parameters, such as
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crowd density and time spent with a facilitator. The visitor, vi, selects the top N exhibits
based on the criterion of the best factor paj,vi , which is given as follows:
paj,vi “
wρQoEvipρq ` wtfjQoEviptfjq
wρ ` wtfj
(3.3)
where paj,vi P r0, 1s due to the fact that wρ, QoEvipρq, wtfj , QoEviptfjq P r0, 1s.
C. Joint personal, social and physical-aware selection. The visitor selects a linear combination
of the above two selections, which is shown, as follows:
ij,vi “ a ¨ wV isitingStyle,Ageej ` p1´ aq ¨ paj,vi (3.4)
Given that a visitor selects N exhibits to visit the next goal is to maximize the perceived QoE
while visiting the selected exhibits. Thus, the corresponding optimization problem is formulated
as follows:
min
RPRent,ex
exÿ
r“ent
1
QoEjj1vi
, s.t. r P R,R P Rent,ex (3.5)
where the route R includes all the exhibits N that the visitor vi has selected to visit.
3.5 MVQoER Algorithm
The optimization problem Eq.3.5 is a problem for finding the shortest path from ent to ex using
1
QoE
jj
1
vi
as link weights and when visiting each of the N exhibits exactly once. The Held-Karp
shortest path algorithm [18] can be properly adapted to obtain the optimal path so that: (a)
the visitor visits every N exhibit selected just once, (b) the visitor returns to the starting point
and (c) the path followed is of minimum distance. For clarification purposes, it should be
noted that we assume the entrance and the exit of the museum to be in the same place and the
shortest path does not refer to the shortest physical distance or shortest walking time, but to
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the path that maximizes visitor perceived QoE [22]. The MVQoER algorithm that determines
the optimal solution to the optimization problem, Eq.3.5, is presented as follows:
Algorithm 1 : Optimal MVQoER Algorithm
A. Held-Karp G(V,E)
Data: dij distance between exhibits i and j, where i, j P V ,
G asymmetric graph,
ENT, EXT, parentVertex P V
Set V
1
:“ V
ENT
, EXT :“ ENT, S all subsets of V 1
D(S, c) the minimum distance to reach vertex c P V from ENT, visiting all vertices in S
Phase A: Find sub paths of minimum distance
for @S do
for @v P V 1 AND v R S do
CALCULATE D(s,v) parentVertex:= vertex before v in the subpath
end
end
Phase B.1: Get the distance of the minimum path that starts from ENT, visits all exhibits
just once and returns to EXT
CALCULATE DpV 1 , endV ertexq
parentVertex:= vertex before endVertex in the path
Phase B.2: Get tour of minimum distance
COMPUTE tour from parentVertex return tour
Although the adoption of the Held-Karp algorithm provides the optimal solution, it introduces
a high level of complexity, especially where there are larger number of exhibits N (i.e. OpN22Nq.
Therefore, so as to strengthen the scalability of our approach for larger numbers of exhibits,
we adopted the Nearest Neighbor heuristic algorithm [19] in order to reach a near to optimal
solution. The main difference between the Nearest Neighbor algorithm and the Held-Karp
algorithm, towards solving our MVQoER problem, is that the visitor repeatedly selects the
nearest exhibit, in terms of minimum weight 1
QoE
jj
1
vi
, until all selected N exhibits have been
visited. The heuristic MVQoER algorithm (Nearest Neighbor (NN) algorithm) that determines
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near to optimal solution to the optimization problem, Eq.3.5, is presented as follows:
Algorithm 2 : Heuristic MVQoER Algorithm
B. Nearest Neighbor G(V,E)
Set visitedVertices to zero, startVertex :=v, where v P V , visitedVertices :=v
while visitedVerticesNum ă |V | do
for @u, where u an adjacent vertex of startVertex and u R visitedV ertices do
if (startVertex, u) the shortest edge then
startVertex :=u
visitedVertices :=visitedVertices+u
else
do nothing
end
end
end
return visitedVertices
It is noted then that complexity is significantly reduced with the Nearest Neighbor algorithm
compared to with the Held-Karp algorithm. To be specific, its complexity is of OpN2q, [23].
The gap between the optimal solution and the heuristic one will be evaluated numerically in
the following Section 3.6.
3.6 MVQoER Properties and Numerical Results
In this section, we present numerical results for various use case scenarios and topologies in
order to evaluate the operation of the proposed museum touring framework.
The numerical results, provided below illustrate the difference between the optimal and the
heuristic solution to the MVQoER problem. We subsequently demonstrate how visitor per-
ceived satisfaction is affected by the way exhibits are selected. The selection of the N exhibits,
(N ď |J |), a visitor decides to visit, is based on personal and social-aware criteria or physical-
aware criteria or a combination of the above two factors, as formally defined in Section 3.4. For
demonstration purposes only, below, we assume that the visiting style of the museum visitor is
that of the Ant and that the size of the exhibition is large.
Firstly, we study two scenarios with two different topologies and a varied number of visited
exhibits in order to evaluate the difference between the optimal solution achieved through Held-
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Figure 3.4: Total visitor QoE vs number of visited exhibits for grid topology
Karp algorithm and the heuristic one obtained by Nearest Neighbor algorithm. Both scenarios
illustrate visitor Total QoE as a function of the number of exhibits included in their path. The
only difference in these two scenarios is that in Fig.3.4, there is a grid topology of exhibits
within the exhibition area whereas in Fig.3.5 the exhibits are randomly distributed within the
same area.
Fig.3.4 and Fig.3.5, illustrate that for both topologies and both algorithms, total QoE increases
in a similar manner as the number of exhibits increases, while the difference between the algo-
rithms is quite small. In particular, the heuristic approach (i.e. Nearest Neighbor algorithm)
constantly underestimates visitor total perceived satisfaction, although the gap is less than 5%
in all examined cases and scenarios. This fact indicates that the heuristic approach is a very
good choice due to its low complexity and especially for larger museums.
In the second set of experiments (Fig. 3.6), we studied the overall visitor touring experience.
Initially, the visitor selected the exhibits to visit in the museum and then followed the path
proposed by the algorithm in order to maximize overall satisfaction. For these scenarios, the
Nearest Neighbor heuristic algorithm was used due to its relatively good performance and low
computational and time complexity, as demonstrated above. When considering the selection of
exhibits to visit, we examined the three different selection criteria, described in Section 3.4 (i.e.
pure personal and social-aware selection, pure physical-aware selection and linear combination
of the above two selections).
36 Chapter 3. A Human in the Loop Approach towards Maximizing Visitor QoE
Figure 3.5: Total visitor QoE vs number of visited exhibits for random topology
Figure 3.6: Overall visitor touring experience for different types of exhibits selection as a
function of increasing number of visited exhibits
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Fig.3.6 presents visitor QoE as a function of the number of visited exhibits in relation to the
three different selection processes. As can be seen from the graph, visitor total QoE experience
is higher when visitors select exhibits based on QoE characteristics (i.e. pure physical-aware
selection). The next most efficient way to select N exhibits is when the selection is based on
a combination of exhibit QoE characteristics and exhibit interest weights i.e. joint personal,
social and physical-aware selection. The least effective way to select N exhibits is when exhibit
selection depends only on interest weight, i.e. pure personal and social-aware selection. This
is justified by the fact that the link weights as described in this framework depend on visitor
QoE factors such as time spent with a facilitator, distance between selected exhibits and crowd
density. Therefore, when visitors select exhibits only based on how interested they are in them
and if the corresponding QoE characteristics of these exhibits (e.g. crowd density) at the
time of the visit are not good then the route proposed by the MVQoER algorithm results in
low satisfaction for the visitor. Consequently, the results reveal that a selection strategy that
depends on the combination of personal, social, physical aware and QoE related characteristics
i.e. joint personal, social and physical-aware selection represents a positive tradeoff between
interests and satisfaction gained.
3.7 Conclusions
This part of our research addresses the problem of visitor museum touring. It considers physical
parameters, as well as visitor interests and social interactions, towards maximizing perceived
QoE. A social recommendation and personalization approach is designed to retrieve visitor in-
terests and social interactions, in order to more effectively select the most interesting exhibits
with respect to visitor preferences. The Museum Visitor QoE Routing (MVQoER) problem is
then formulated as an optimization problem for each visitor perceived QoE, and two shortest
path algorithms are adopted to determine an optimal and an heuristic solution, respectively.
Detailed numerical results are presented by considering different use case scenarios and topolo-
gies in order to illustrate the operation and properties of the MVQoER framework.
Chapter 4
Self-organizing museum visitor
communities
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose the creation of self-organizing museum visitor communities that
will exploit visitor personal characteristics and social interactions between museum visitors,
and enhance their visiting experience through a participatory action research (PAR) approach.
Initially, we introduce a novel methodology that considers visiting styles (i.e., ant, butterfly,
grasshopper and fish) as well as visitor personal information, such as age, interest in visiting
specific exhibits, personal interests and background knowledge in order to organize visitors into
homogeneous research groups with common characteristics and interests (Section 4.3). Then,
based on visitor characteristics and social ties between visitors of a group, a facilitator for each
community is selected (Section 4.4). The facilitator is responsible for initiating and orches-
trating the Participatory Action Research (PAR) process [24], [25]. Through such a process,
visitors share knowledge and connect with others while observing exhibits, and thus become
actively engaged. Moreover, we introduce a touring methodology to maximize visitor perceived
satisfaction (Section 4.6.1) and we study and evaluate the formation of the communities under
different criteria (Section 4.6.2).
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4.2 Background information
In a participatory museum, visitors are able to form communities, exchange opinions and co-
create knowledge. We denote by I “ tv1, ...vi, ..., vIu the set of visitors within the exhibition
area. Information, such as a visitor’s visiting style, interest in visiting a specific exhibition
within the museum, expertise on the thematic area of the exhibition, as well as willingness to
participate in research communities with other visitors, is registered and considered.
Let J “ te1, ...ej, ..., eJu denote the set of exhibits within the museum under consideration,
djj1 rms be the distance between the exhibits ej and ej1 P J and ρ [visitors{m2s be museum
crowd density. We define visitor QoE function with respect to djj1 and ρ as follows:
QoExpdjj1 , ρq “ wdjj1 ¨QoExpdjj1 q ` wρ ¨QoExpρq (4.1)
where x “ A,B, F,G expresses visiting styles, and wd
jj
1 and wρ denote the weights of parameters
djj1 and ρ, respectively (Section 2.5).
4.3 Visitor Ties in a Participatory Museum
4.3.1 Interest and Social Ties
In the proposed framework, we measure how much interest and social ties among visitors are
related. In order to express the level of interest as well as social ties existing between visitors, we
exploit the following provided information: (a) visiting style, (b) age and (c) interest in visiting
a specific exhibition in the museum. Based on the level of visitor interest in communicating
others, we present the interest and social ties among the |I| visitors by a symmetric matrix
I “ tiv,v1u|I|x|I| [26]. Each element iv,v1 (or equivalently iv1,v) expresses the interest of visitor v to
communicate and exchange information with v
1
. Our study assumes that the museum visitors
v and v1 have an equal desire to communicate with each other, and thus the interest matrix I is
symmetric. The interest degree iv,v1 ranges from zero to one, i.e., iv,v1 P r0, 1s, where the values
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close to zero reflect less interest in communication between two visitors, while the values close
to one show willingness for close collaboration between them.
The interest degree iv,v1 is a function of visitor visiting style (VS ), age (Age) and interest in
visiting the same exhibition (EI ) and is formulated as follows:
iv,v1 “
ř
y“tV S,Age,EIu
wy ¨ cy
v,v
1ř
y“tV S,Age,EIu
wy
, @v, v1 P I (4.2)
where wy denotes the weight of each factor y, y “ tVS,Age,EIu and cy
v,v
1 is the degree of each
factor y, defined as follows:
(Visiting Style) cV Sv,v1 “
$’’&’’%
1, V Sv “ V Sv1
0, V Sv ‰ V Sv1
(4.3)
(Age) cAgev,v1 “
Agev ´ Agev1
100
` 1 (4.4)
where Agev is the age of visitor v, assuming that Age “ p0, 100s and
(Exhibition Interest) cEIv,v1 “
$’’&’’%
1, EIv “ EIv1
0, EIv ‰ EIv1
(4.5)
In order for the communication between visitors v and v
1
to be established, it should hold true
that: iv,v1 ą ithr, where ithr P r0, 1s
4.3.2 Expertise and Willingness for Participation
The expertise of visitors at a specific exhibition, as well as their willingness to participate in
communities is critical to the process of forming communities and to the selection of the group
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facilitator. A facilitator should possess expertise as well as a willingness to share knowledge
with the rest of the visitors. We combine the above information and introduce the expertise and
willingness (EW ) factor that characterizes each museum visitor v, v P I, as expressed below:
EWv “ a ¨ wev ` p1´ aq ¨ wwv (4.6)
where a is the percentage expressing the importance of each factor, i.e. expertise and willingness
and wev , wwv P r0, 1s are their respective weights. The EW factor is considered in the facilitator
selection process (Section 4.4.1).
4.3.3 Physical Ties
In order for a meaningful, feasible and practical communication between museum visitors to
be established, their physical proximity within the museum should be considered. We adopt a
symmetric matrix Q “ tqv,v1u|I|x|I| where qv,v1 P r0, 1s indicates the physical proximity between
visitors v and v
1
[27]. We assume that the actual physical proximity between two museum
visitors is directly proportional to qv,v1 . A threshold value qthr is considered and only when
qv,v1 ă qthr, can the communication and collaboration between visitors v and v1 be established.
4.4 Self-organizing Museum Visitor Communities
4.4.1 Facilitator Selection
Let us consider a subset I
1 Ď I of museum visitors, as a candidate community. A facilitator
should be selected among the visitors of the community in order to orchestrate the PAR process.
A representative Importance Factor (IFv) is defined for each visitor v, v P I 1 , I 1 Ď I, in order
that the most capable visitor is selected as the facilitator of the group. The IFv factor considers
all the previously mentioned factors, related to visitor v.
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Therefore the IFv for each museum visitor v, v P I 1 , I 1 Ď I is given as follows:
IFv “ EWv ¨
ÿ
vPV 1
iv,v1 ¨ qv,v1 , @v, v1 P I 1 , v ‰ v1 (4.7)
where EWv expresses the expertise of visitor v and his/her willingness to participate in commu-
nities, while
ř
vPI 1
iv,v1 ¨qv,v1 represents the interest of the rest of the visitors within the community
in communicating with visitor v, while considering their physical proximity. Then the visitor v
that has the maximum importance factor IFv, i.e. fc “ arg max
vPI IFv is selected as the facilitator,
fc, of the community c, where c P C and C denotes the set of museum communities.
4.4.2 Communities Formation
As already mentioned, the process we propose for the creation of communities, considers visitor
interest and social ties, physical ties among visitors, as well as visitor expertise in an exhibition
and willingness to participate in communities. To define the communities among museum
visitors, we suggest the following iterative algorithm:
1. Initially, we consider the whole set of museum visitors, i.e. I, as an initial community.
Thus I
1 “ I
2. For the considered coalition I
1
, the facilitator can be determined through Eq.4.7 and
fc “ arg max
vPI IFv.
3. Considering the rest of the museum visitors in the community I
1
, if the following condi-
tions hold true:
iv,fc ě ithr
qv,fc ď qthr, @v P I 1 ´ tfcu
then the visitor v belongs to the same community as fc. The museum visitors that do
not satisfy the above conditions formulate another coalition I
2 Ď I 1 .
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4. Set I
1 “ I2 and if |I 1 | ą 1, return to step 2, otherwise stop.
Based on the above algorithm for the creation of museum communities, we are able to dynam-
ically determine (a) the number of communities, (b) the number of visitors that belong to each
community, and (c) the facilitator of each community. The algorithm can be executed as per a
reasonable time-window, when visitor characteristics have a substantial difference.
4.5 Participatory Action Research (PAR) Vision
PAR is a research method that brings together community members so that they can work
together in order to identify problems faced by the community, empower the community mem-
bers to research and create solutions to those problems and improve themselves within the
community. PAR has been applied to various fields, such as education, public health, work-
place organization, feminism, culture and arts, etc. [25]. PAR has already been applied to
the field of culture and arts with a view towards actively engaging young people in museums
[24]. This part of our research adopts the PAR vision in order to enable museum visitors to
exchange opinions, share knowledge and improve their visiting experience in an interactive and
social manner. Initially, a group of museum visitors with common characteristics and interests
is established, and a facilitator is selected from among them to organize the community and
orchestrate the PAR process, as described in Section 4.4. The facilitator of each group selects
a subset of exhibits to be visited by all members of the specific community. It should be noted
that museum visitors may move about within the museum and visit exhibits of their own in-
terest. Thus, a community formation can change dynamically and visitors can participate in
multiple communities and gain a range of knowledge during their visit. This flexibility, as well
as the successful formation of communities, contribute to an enhanced visiting experience for
visitors.
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4.6 Museum Visitors Quality of Experience Touring and
Communities Formation Alternatives
4.6.1 Museum Touring
In this section, we propose and formulate a Museum Visitor QoE Routing (MVQoER) problem
that aims to determine the optimal route a visitor should follow in a museum to visit the
selected exhibits, while considering visitor QoE-related characteristics, as expressed in Eq.4.1.
We consider that the exhibits residing in an exhibition area can be modeled as a graph G “
pV,Eq, where V “ J Y tent, exu is the set of vertices and E denotes the set of QoE-aware
links among two exhibits. The nodes ent and ex represent the physical entrance and exit of
the exhibition, respectively. Each link among two exhibits ej and ej1 , where ej, ej1 P J has a
QoE-related weight (Eq. 4.1). We assume that the facilitator of each community selects N
exhibits, where N ď |J | to be visited by the group. The main goal of each visitor is to maximize
his/her overall perceived QoE while visiting the selected exhibits. Therefore, the corresponding
optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
min
RPRs,d
dÿ
r“s
1
QoEjj1
, s.t. r P R,R P Rs,d (4.8)
where the route R includes all the exhibits N that the visitor has selected to visit. Specifically,
the above optimization problem is a problem for finding the shortest path from a “source”
exhibit to a “destination” exhibit, using 1
QoE
jj
1 as link weights, so that the visitor visits each of
the N exhibits exactly once. It is noted that a member of the community may follow a different
path to visit the N exhibits.
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4.6.2 Visitors Satisfaction from Communities Formation
In this subsection, we measure museum visitor perceived satisfaction arising from the formation
of communities and his/her participation in the PAR process. Visitor perceived satisfaction
increases when the facilitator is qualified and willing to orchestrate the PAR process, and
communities have homogeneous characteristics, in terms of interest, social and physical ties. In
the following, we introduce three different approaches to quantify visitor satisfaction.
1. Pure Interest and Social-Aware Interaction (PISAI). In the PISAI approach, communities
are formulated based only on visitor interest and social ties (Section 4.3.1). The PISAI
factor that quantifies visitor perceived satisfaction is formulated as follows:
PISAIv “ IFfc ¨
ÿ
v,v1PI 1
iv,v1 , @v, v1 P I 1 , v ‰ v1 (4.9)
2. Pure Physical-Aware Interaction (PPAI). In the PPAI approach, the formation of commu-
nities depends only on museum visitor physical ties. Thus it is possible that a community
may be created without its visitors wishing to communicate with each other. The corre-
sponding PPAI factor is expressed as follows:
PPAIv “ IFfc ¨
ÿ
v,v1PI 1
qv,v1 , @v, v1 P I 1 , v ‰ v1 (4.10)
3. Joint Interest, Social and Physical-Aware Interaction (JISPAI). In this approach, the
communities are formulated by considering visitor interest, social and physical ties. The
JISPAI factor is formulated as follows:
JISPAIv “ IFfc ¨
ÿ
v,v1PI 1
iv,v1 ¨
ÿ
v,v1PI 1
qv,v1 , @v, v1 P I 1 , v ‰ v1 (4.11)
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Figure 4.1: Total community creation satisfaction factor vs number of visitors
4.7 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide some indicative numerical results, illustrating the operational fea-
tures of the proposed framework. The weight wy of each factor y “ tV S,Age, EIu is considered
as wy “ 0.33 and the percentage expressing the importance of expertise and willingness of each
visitor is a “ 0.5. A detailed Monte Carlo analysis is performed for increasing number of vis-
itors, i.e., 10 to 100 and, for each number of visitors the experiment is repeated 10000 times.
The values of interest and social ties iv,v1 , the weights of visitor expertise and willingness for
participation wev , wwv and the values of physical proximity between visitors v and v
1
, qv,v1 have
been randomly assigned.
Fig.4.1 illustrates visitor total PISAI, PPAI and JISPAI factors as a function of the number
of visitors. It is observed that when visitors create communities based only on their physical
proximity, i.e. the PPAI curve, their overall interest is low because they are not particularly
interested in communicating with each other and with the facilitator. Corresponding observa-
tions hold true for the PISAI curve as well. The aforementioned drawbacks are dealt with if
the creation of communities takes both physical and interest-social ties among visitors, i.e. the
JISPAI curve, into consideration.
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Figure 4.2: Total perceived touring satisfaction vs number of visitors
Fig.4.2 presents visitor total perceived satisfaction as a function of the number of visitors
for the three community formation alternatives. The results reveal that when interest-social
and physical ties are considered to form visitor communities (the JISPAI curve), visitor overall
perceived satisfaction increases because visitors are very interested in communicating with each
other, exchanging information and participating in the PAR process. On the other hand, if only
physical ties or interest-social ties are considered, visitor total satisfaction is low due to either
a visitor low interest in communicating with others or low physical proximity among visitors.
Chapter 5
QoE in Cyber-physical Social Systems
based on Reinforcement Learning &
Game Theory
This chapter addresses the problem of museum visitor Quality of Experience (QoE) optimiza-
tion by viewing and treating the museum environment as a cyber-physical social system. To
achieve this goal, we harness the internal ability of visitors to intelligently sense their environ-
ment and make choices that maximize their QoE as regards which museum touring option is
the best for them and how much time to spend on a visit. We model the museum setting as a
distributed non-cooperative game where visitors selfishly maximize their own QoE. In this set-
ting, we formulate the problem of Recommendation Selection and Visiting Time Management
(RSVTM) and propose a two-stage distributed algorithm, based on game theory and reinforce-
ment learning, which learns from visitor behavior to make on-the-fly recommendation selections
that maximize visitor QoE. The proposed framework enables autonomic visitor-centric manage-
ment and optimization in a personalized manner, enabling visitors to decide on most favourable
visiting strategies. We evaluate the performance of the proposed RSVTM algorithm under re-
alistic simulation conditions and our results indicate high operational effectiveness and superior
performance when compared to other recommendation approaches. Our framework constitutes
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a practical alternative for museums and exhibition spaces that wish to optimize visitor QoE in
a flexible, efficient, and cost-effective manner.
5.1 Motivation and Related Work
As already mentioned in previous chapters, QoE has been thoroughly studied in the literature
from a qualitative as well as quantitative perspective. In [28], museum visitor QoE is stud-
ied in relation to five main directions, i.e., easiness and fun, cultural entertainment, personal
identification, historical reminiscences, and escapism. In [29], the authors examine the impact
of story-centric narrations with references to exhibits on visitor QoE. They particularly focus
on leveraging the advantages of mobile-based guided tours, which are either audio/multimedia
guides that visitors can rent or borrow during their museum visit, or applications that visitors
can download onto their own smartphones and tablets. Moreover, in [30], the authors aim to
link tourists’ perceptions of cultural offers with perceived satisfaction as well as to study the
impact of negative visitor experiences on museum word of mouth reputations.
Recently, studies have correlated visitor QoE with the museum touring experience. In [31],
[32], the authors propose a museum touring framework that aims to minimize the visiting time
of a group of visitors, using a mixed integer programming approach. However, this framework
ignores visiting styles. A more personalized approach to the previous problem is proposed in
[33], as it considers both visitor preferences and the prestige of exhibits. Maximized visitor
QoE is expressed as Total visitor interest in a set of exhibits. In [34], the authors study the
time spent visiting a cultural space by considering various visitor factors, such as whether they
are a first-time visitors, traveling with children, using a guidebook, with a guided tour, etc.
The authors use data that were collected via a global positioning system (GPS), as well as
questionnaires distributed to visitors. They conclud that works of art with no admission charge
are visited more than those with an admission charge, but that the visiting time is longer when
the visitor pays for the visit. Additionally, in [35], [36], the authors consider a cost optimization
formulation to solve the routing problem and determine an optimal tour for each visitor, given
50Chapter 5. QoE in Cyber-physical Social Systems based on Reinforcement Learning & Game Theory
a set of visitor preferences and constraints. A location-aware recommender system is presented
in [37], where the authors make personalized recommendations to museum visitors based on
typical observations, e.g., geolocalization over time as well as psychological and social aspects
of visitors in relation to museum physical parameters. The proposed recommender system is
also characterized by its centralized operation. A central entity i.e., the recommender system
makes decisions regarding recommendations without providing any intelligence or autonomicity
to the visitors themselves.
All aforementioned research efforts focus on quantifying and optimizing visitor perceived QoE,
mainly via physical context parameters (e.g., museum size, placement of exhibits, etc.). They
do not consider the impact the recommended services have on visitor choices or visitor optimal
visiting time. Furthermore, they provide centralized approaches in order to formulate and
optimize visitor QoE. These may not scale well, or may not even be feasible, in a large cyber-
physical social system, because the decision-making process would require too much time for a
stable outcome to be reached.
In this chapter, we address the effects of recommendations on choices and visitor Qoe in a
formal and unified manner. The main goal of our study is to introduce and design an opti-
mization framework that captures visitor QoE in a quantifiable, yet simplistic and manageable
manner. Our framework determines an optimal recommendation selection for visitors, as well
as an optimal visiting time in order to maximize QoE. Specifically, we rely on the iterative
design and adoption of i) a reinforcement learning framework to treat the problem of intelligent
recommendation selection, and ii) a game theoretic approach to determine the optimal visit-
ing time for museum visitors. The reason for using a game theoretic approach is that due to
the distributed nature of the optimization problem. Visitors behave selfishly as regards their
own QoE maximization and the decisions made by all visitors are interrelated. For example,
the increased time one visitor may spend visiting a museum negatively affects the perceived
satisfaction (i.e., QoE) of the rest of the visitors, as it increases museum congestion. Proper
consideration of the above problem allows for improved management and alleviation of the
congestion issue in museums.
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5.2 Contributions and Outline
The basic contributions of our proposed approach and framework are summarized as follows.
1. For the first time in the literature, visitors are modeled as learning automata via a reinforce-
ment learning mechanism to allow them to select the most appropriate recommendation for a
museum tour. The concept of learning automata is adopted from control theory, where learning
automata entities can make autonomous decisions and selections from available choices by sens-
ing their environment, and based on their past decisions. Visitors are able to intelligently sense
their environment (e.g., actions of other visitors) while keeping track of their own decisions in
order to take more informed and advantageous actions in the future. As time evolves, their
decisions converge within the application, and visitors select the type of recommendation that
improves their perceived QoE.
2. We introduce a holistic approach to QoE-based visiting time management in museums.
Visitors aim to maximize their perceived QoE in a distributed manner for the selected recom-
mendation. Based on the non-cooperative and distributed nature of managing visiting time,
we formulate a maximization problem for each visitor QoE and present it as a non-cooperative
game. While considering the different types of visiting styles, we follow an approach based on
the quasi-concavity of the visitor QoE function and arrive at a unique Nash equilibrium point.
3. The perceived satisfaction of useum visitors is reflected and represented in a formal and
quantitative way through appropriately defined QoE functions. QoE functions are based on
the following attributes: (a) time spent on a museum visit, (b) selected type of recommendation
and (c) fulfillment of visitor QoE prerequisites. The key novelty in our research is that the QoE
function consists of the following two parts: (a) the pure QoE function and (b) the congestion
control function. The pure QoE function reflects the trade-off between the QoE a visitor
gains during a museum visit and the duration of a visit. The congestion control function is
sophisticatedly selected in order to achieve fairness among museum visitors with respect to
accessing exhibits and time spent in a museum.
4. The proposed framework enables autonomic visitor-centric management and QoE optimiza-
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tion in a personalized manner, allowing self-* properties, e.g., self-optimization, self-adaptation,
etc.
5. A two-stage distributed algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal visiting time and
recommendation selection for each museum visitor. The output of the visiting time management
problem feeds the learning system in a recursive manner, in order to increase knowledge therein.
6. Detailed numerical results are provided that demonstrate the performance and operational
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithm, along with its flexibility and adaptability
under various scenarios. The proposed framework was tested with data provided by users via a
questionnaire, and additional simulation results were then generated to achieve a more thorough
analysis. Finally, the performance of the proposed framework is evaluated in comparison to
relevant state-of-the-art frameworks and its superiority is demonstrated as regards achieved
QoE.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.3, a detailed description of
the joint recommendation selection and visiting time management framework and process is
presented which identifies all the elements involved and their respective roles and relations. In
Section 5.4, we submit the models introduced and assumptions involved. Section 5.5 contains
all the details of the recommendation selection mechanism. The formulation and solution of
the reinforcement learning framework are described via a game theoretic approach to the corre-
sponding time management problem, towards optimizing visitor QoE. In Section 5.6, we propose
a distributed and iterative algorithm that implements the reinforcement learning recommen-
dation selection and the distributed visiting time management process. Section 5.7 contains
the performance evaluation of the proposed approach and concluding remarks are provided in
Section 5.8.
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5.3 Overview of the Joint Recommendation Selection &
Visiting Time Management Framework
In this section, we formulate and address the problem of joint Recommendation Selection and
Visiting Time Management (RSVTM) in a museum environment. We note that the same
problem formulation can more generally be applied to any exhibition area.
In a nutshell, the proposed problem and process formulation are as follows. On arriving at
a museum, visitors select a type of tour from the various recommendations which will drive
their visit. The different types of tour recommendation, from a self-guided tour with the use
of a simple map to a guided visit in the visitor’s own language, offer different levels of QoE.
The recommendation selection is based on a reinforcement learning framework, through which
museum visitors act as learning automata. As time evolves and before visitors make their final
selection, they gain knowledge and experience.
Fig.5.1 presents the examined RSVTM problem as a learning system. Each museum visi-
tor/learning automaton i, i P ℵ where ℵ denotes the set of visitors, at each operation time slot
τ of the reinforcement learning loop, has a set of actions αxpτq. Each action represents a differ-
ent recommendation selection x for the museum tour. In order to make their decision, museum
visitors consider the museum environment and specifically the output set βpτq “ tQpτq, tpτqu,
where Qpτq and tpτq are the vectors of the combined QoE and visiting time of all museum
visitors that are simultaneously in the museum. The output βpτq “ tQpτq, tpτqu is determined
from the visiting time management framework 5.1. The solution to the visiting time manage-
ment problem leads to an optimal visiting time for the visitor. Based on the chosen actions
of visitors and the corresponding reaction of their environment, we are able to determine the
reward probability pxpτq, which is associated with the action αxpτq. The reward probability
represents the penetration of the Rthx recommendation among museum visitors. The action
probability vector of a museum visitor i, i P ℵ is Pripτq, where each one of its elements Pri,xpτq
expresses the probability of selecting the recommendation Rthx and is determined from the model
of learning automata [38], [39].
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Figure 5.1: Joint Recommendation Selection and Visiting Time Management (RSVTM) fram-
work as a learning system.
Having been informed of the actions of other museum visitors as regards their recommendation
selections, each museum visitor i, i P ℵ then sets out to determine their optimal visiting time
ti˚ thereby maximizing their perceived QoE. Therefore, the goal is formulated as a distributed
maximization problem for each museum visitor’s combined QoE function with respect to their
visiting time. Because of the distributed nature of the optimization problem and the selfish
behavior of visitors when optimizing their own perceived QoE, a game theoretic approach is
adopted to determine the optimal visiting time vector t˚ “ tt1˚ , ..., ti˚ , ..., tN˚u for visitors. The
Nash equilibrium concept is adopted to analytically solve the non-cooperative visiting time
management game. To demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
in the non-cooperative visiting time management game, we prove that the museum visitor’s
combined QoE function Qi is quasi-concave with respect to ti.
The distributed non-cooperative visiting time management game among museum visitors is
performed at every time slot (of the external loop of the reinforcement learning framework) to
determine their optimal visiting time ti˚ , @i P ℵ and their corresponding combined QoE values.
Therefore, an overall cycle of joint recommendation selection and visiting time management is
realized. The above-described overall procedure is performed iteratively and before the museum
visitors start their tour as presented in Fig.5.1. Its actual running time is quite short (in the
range of a few seconds) and is envisioned to run on a mobile application that the museum
will offer for free to museum visitors and that can be downloaded to their smartphones. It is
noted that the recommendation selection process runs multiple timeslots (i.e., extremely short
duration of time) and for each timeslot, the visiting time management process runs multiple
iterations until it converges at the optimal visiting time for each museum visitor.
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5.4 Models and Preliminaries
5.4.1 System Model
In this section, we study the optimal visiting time for a museum visitor. We assume that a
museum provides visitors with < different types of recommendations. Though several different
recommendations may exist, for simplicity, we assume that there are three different types of
recommendations. Let us denote the set of recommendations, available to visitors as < “
tRA, RB, RCu. Each R provides a different QoE for visitors, while it also asks for a different
investment time on the part of the visitor. The model will be discussed in detail in Section
5.4.2. As mentioned before, we denote the set of museum visitors that consists of visitors
with different visiting styles, i.e., ant, butterfly, fish, and grasshopper as ℵ “ t1, ..., i, ..., Nu.
Consequently, we have the corresponding subsets: ℵa,ℵb,ℵf ,ℵg and ℵ “ ℵa Y ℵb Y ℵf Y ℵg.
Each museum visiting style has different characteristics, as regards visiting time and tolerance
of crowd density.
Museum visitor visiting time is denoted by ti and due to museum physical characteristics (e.g.,
size) and visitor personal preferences, it is lower and upper bounded, i.e., tMini ď ti ď tMaxi .
Let t´i be the visiting time vector of the rest of the museum visitors that are in the museum
at the same time as the visitor i, i P ℵ. Each type of recommendation Rx, where x “ A,B,C
and Rx P < offers a different level of QoE to the visitor that selects it. Let us denote the QoE
values offered by the recommendations RA, RB and RC as Qx, where x “ A,B,C respectively.
Without loss of generality, the QoE values offered by each recommendation are sorted as QA ă
QB ă QC , where the interpretation is that a higher value of QoE reflects an enhanced level of
recommendation service, as discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.2. A simple but effective
performance measure to verify that visitor QoE prerequisites are fulfilled, is the relative visiting
time ratio, rti, of museum visitor i, i P ℵ and is given as follows:
rti “ tiř
jPℵ,j‰i tj
(5.1)
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where
ř
jPℵ,j‰i tj is the cumulative visiting time of other visitors concurrently in the museum
with visitor i. We can infer that as the cumulative visiting time of the rest of the visitors
increases, either the crowd density increases or visitors spend more time at exhibits. In any
case, the QoE of the museum visitor i, i P ℵ, deteriorates, either because there are too many
visitors in the museum or some exhibits are “blocked” from view by other visitors. Moreover,
each museum visitor is characterized by a target relative visiting time ratio, i.e., rttarget,yi where
y “ a, b, f, g, which is differentiated based on the visiting style, as presented in Fig.5.2. The
target relative visiting time ratio represents a desired value for each visitor, depending on
their visiting style. Below this value, visitor perceived satisfaction decreases rapidly as the
museum is considered highly congested, while above this value, visitor perceived satisfaction
slowly increases as the impact of the rest of the visitors’ visiting time on the individual visitor
i, i P ℵ is reduced. We observe that butterfly visitors, for example, can redirect their visiting
path in cases of increased crowd density, in contrast to ant visitors, who sequentially visit
all exhibits. We assume that increased crowd density annoys butterfly visitors less than ant
visitors, i.e., rttarget,bi ă rttarget,ai . Furthermore, because fish visitors observe exhibits from the
center of an exhibition room, their view is easily blocked by other visitors who linger in front
of some exhibits. Unlike others, ant visitors wait patiently to visit all exhibits. Thus, we have
rttarget,ai ă rttarget,fi . In the case of grasshopper visitors who are interested in few exhibits if
those exhibits are blocked by other visitors, their QoE dramatically deteriorates. Therefore,
grasshopper QoE requirements are more demanding compared to those of all other types of
visitors. Consequently, we consider that rttarget,bi ă rttarget,ai ă rttarget,fi ă rttarget,gi .
5.4.2 Recommendation Models and Policies
As mentioned before, we assume that a museum offers different recommendations to visitors that
correspond to different levels of perceived QoE, as well as different lenghts of visiting times. We
assume that more visitors select the enhanced type of recommendation, leading to an increased
demand for it and thus there would be a longer queue to obtain the service. Therefore, the
recommendations < “ tRA, RB, RCu can be characterized by a congestion control parameter cx,
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Figure 5.2: Visiting efficiency function for different visiting styles of museum visitors.
where x “ A,B,C, which represents the potential waiting time for a specific recommendation
type. In such a way, visitor need to consider the trade-off involved in selecting an enhanced
type of recommendation, as it may increase their QoE but entail a longer invested visiting time
[34]. In other words, they may have to wait in long queues to get the service.
In our research work, we consider three indicative types of recommendations which are presented
below:
A. Recommendation A (RA): The museum provides a map of the museum at its entrance.
Although visitors don’t wait in long queues for this service, they may have to spend a lot of
time navigating the museum without guidance. Also, visitor perceived QoE, i.e.,QA, is limited
because the information gained regarding exhibits is limited to the corresponding text-tags
attached to each exhibit.
B. Recommendation B (RB): A facilitator is provided to navigate visitors inside the museum
and provide additional useful information about exhibits. As visitors arrive at the museum,
form groups and a facilitator starts a museum tour with a group at specific timeslots. Therefore,
visitors will usually wait longer compared to the previous recommendation RA as a group has
to created before the tour can start. However, their perceived QoE, i.e., QB increases compared
to QA because they gain more information about exhibits, and their visit is shorter and more
efficient, due to its structured and guided nature.
C. Recommendation C (RC): Further to the previously described characteristics of recom-
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mendation RB, in recommendation RC the facilitator offers headphones to visitors so that
information is provided in their native languages. Such groups are typically scheduled to start
tours at sparsely allocated timeslots, and thus waiting time increases. However, the enhanced
service obtained increases visitor QoE, i.e.,QC .
Based on the above description, we consider that QA ă QB ă QC in our proposed frame-
work. It should be noted that additional types of recommendations can be considered without
violating the principles and application of the proposed framework. Moreover, in order to sup-
port the concept of ”open museums for everybody”, we assume that all the above-described
recommendations have the same cost (price) for museum visitors. Although actual pricing is
outside the scope of this part of our study, the cost of each recommendation could be easily
accommodated by our proposed framework, if combined within the congestion control param-
eter cx, x “ A,B,C. Therefore an enhanced recommendation could have an increased cost, i.e.
cA ă cB ă cC .
5.4.3 QoE Function and Modeling
The concept of QoE function has been adopted to represent the perceived satisfaction of visitors
from (a) the time spent for the museum visit, (b) the selected type of recommendation, and (c)
the fulfillment of their QoE prerequisites. A combined QoE function is adopted by each museum
visitor, which consists of two parts: (a) the pure QoE function and (b) the congestion control
function. Museum visitor pure QoE function is reflected via the ratio of the achievable QoE to
the corresponding time spent on a museum visit. We assume that visitor perceived satisfaction
increases if they achieves a high QoE without spending excessive time on a museum visit.
Note that tMini ď ti ď tMaxi , as mentioned in Section 5.4.1 but tMini is not always the optimal
visiting time for a museum visitor. Museum congestion is implicitly expressed by the time
the rest of visitors spend in the museum, i.e.
ř
jPℵ,j‰i tj, concurrently with visitor i, i P ℵ. This
formulation stems from the observation that either a large number of visitors are simultaneously
exploring the museum (i.e., increased crowd density) or there are some visitors spending more
time observing exhibits, thus contributing to museum congestion and also ”blocking” visitor
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i, i P ℵ from observing them.
Specifically, the pure QoE function is formulated as a sigmoidal function with respect to the
relative visiting time ratio rti, i.e. QX ¨f yi prtiq where x “ A,B,C and y “ a, b, f, g. The visiting
efficiency function f yi prtiq (Fig. 5.2) represents visitor perceived satisfaction and depends on
museum congestion, as well as on time invested in the museum visit. For analysis purposes, a
common sigmoidal function is adopted, i.e. f yi prtiq “ p1 ´ e´AyrtiqMy where Ay and My with
y “ a, b, f, g are positive parameters controlling the slope of the visiting efficiency function.
If the target relative visiting time ratio rttarget,yi is achieved, then the QoE prerequisites of
visitor i are fulfilled. To realize this, the rttarget,yi value is mapped at the inflection point of
the sigmoidal function QX ¨ f yi prtiq where x “ A,B,C and y “ a, b, f, g. If QoE of visitor i
is lower than QX ¨ f yi ¨ prttarget,yi q, then his/her perceived satisfaction decreases rapidly, which
alerts him/her to the fact that, from his perspective, the museum is congested. In contrast, if
the achieved QoE is greater than QX ¨ f yi ¨ prttarget,yi q then museum visitor perceived satisfaction
presents a slight increase due to the fact that QoE expectations have already been fulfilled.
In a nutshell, the combined QoE function of visitor i, i P ℵ can be expressed as follows:
Qipti, t´iq “ Qx ¨ f
y
i ¨ prtiq
ti
´cxNkxeti , i P ℵ, x “ A,B,C, y “ a, b, f, g,ℵ “ ℵaYℵbYℵfYℵg (5.2)
where Nx is the number of visitors that have selected the recommendation x and k P R`.
The congestion control function i.e. cxN
k
xe
ti , adopted in the second part of the combined QoE
function (Eq.5.2) is a convex function with respect to visitor visiting time ti. This formulation
has been sophisticatedly selected in order for fairness to be achieved among museum visitors
with respect to accessing exhibits and spending time in a museum and in accordance with
the selected type of recommendation x. Finally, it should be noted that the first part of
the combined QoE function expresses visitor i’s perceived satisfaction while considering both
his/her own strategy (i.e., visiting time, ti), as well as the strategies of the rest of the visitors
(i.e. rti). The second part of the function (i.e. congestion control function) acts as a penalty
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so that visitors sophisticatedly adapt their visiting time to avoid harming the perceived QoE
of other visitors.
5.4.4 Penetration Model of Recommendation in Visitors’ Pool
The selection of a recommendation type by a museum visitor is affected by i) the congestion
control parameter cx, x “ A,B,C, ii) the number of visitors Nx that select the specific recom-
mendation x and iii) the penetration of the recommendation. Museum visitors are influenced by
and tend to express interest in a recommendation that is selected by a larger number of visitors.
They believe that this recommendation is ”better”, i.e. offer increased perceived QoE, than the
others. Therefore, the penetration pxpτq of a recommendation Rx, x “ A,B,C,RX P < is the
ratio of the total QoE of all visitors selecting recommendation Rx over the total achieved QoE
of all visitors that are in the museum at the examined timeslot τ and is expressed as follows:
pxpτq “
řN
i“1,Rx Qx ¨ f yi ¨ prtiqřN
i“1,@RxP<Qx ¨ f yi ¨ prtiq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
τ
5.5 Joint Recommendation Selection & Visiting Time
Management Problem
5.5.1 Framework Design
As mentioned before, this chapter addresses the problem of joint Recommendation Selection
and Visiting Time Management (RSVTM) in a museum environment or in general in a cultural
heritage space. On arriving at a museum and before starting their museum tour, visitors select
a type of recommendation that will drive their visit, and which is based on a reinforcement
learning framework. Specifically, visitors act as learning automata, gaining knowledge and ex-
perience from their past potential actions. They are able to intelligently sense the environment
while keeping track of their decisions so as to take more advantageous actions in the future. As
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time evolves, their decisions converge, and they select the type of recommendation that will im-
prove their perceived QoE. In order to decide which recommendation to select, visitors should
know: i) their visiting time t “ tt1, ..., ti, ..., tNu, ii) the corresponding combined QoE values
Q “ tQ1, ..., Qi, ..., QNu at the previous time slot τ of the reinforcement learning framework
and iii) the penetration pxpτq, of each recommendation Rx, x “ A,B,C.
Having been given the actions αpτq of museum visitors in regards to their recommendation
selection, a distributed non-cooperative visiting time management game is performed in every
time slot of the external loop of the reinforcement learning framework. The game determines the
optimal visiting time ti˚ , @i P ℵ and the corresponding combined QoE values (5.2). As a result,
an overall cycle of joint recommendation selection and visiting time management is executed.
The overall procedure described above and presented in Fig.5.1 is performed iteratively in time,
before visitors start their tour in the museum. Moreover, the RSVTM algorithm is executed
every time a new museum visitor arrives at the museum, while the decisions of the previously
arrived visitors remain constant once they have started their museum tour. Finally, the actual
running time of the RSVTM framework is quite short (a matter of few seconds), as it will be
presented in the detailed numerical results in Section 5.7.
5.5.2 Recommendation Selection based on Reinforcement Learning
The action probability vector of museum visitor i, i P ℵ is Pripτq “ tPri,Apτq, P ri,Bpτq, P ri,Cpτqu,
where Pri,xpτq, x “ A,B,C, expresses the probability of selecting the recommendation Rthx , x “
A,B,C. The model of learning automata [40], [41], is expressed as follows:
Pri,xpτ ` 1q “ Pri,xpτq ` b ¨ pxpτq ¨ p1´ Pri,xpτqq, xpτ`1q “ xpτq (5.3a)
Pri,xpτ ` 1q “ Pri,xpτq ´ b ¨ pxpτq ¨ Pri,xpτq, xpτ`1q ‰ xpτq (5.3b)
where b P p0, 1q and is a step size parameter that controls the convergence time of the learning
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process. The impact of parameter b on the convergence time of the algorithm is numerically
studied in Section 5.7. The Eq.5.3a represents the probability that visitor i will select a different
type of recommendation x in time slot τ ` 1, i.e. xpτ`1q compared to the one selected in time
slot τ , i.e. xpτq. In contrast, Eq. 5.3b reflects the probability of visitor i continuing to prefer
the same type of recommendation, i.e. xpτ`1q “ xpτq.
We assume that the RSVTM framework has no prior knowledge of the action probability
Pripτq “ tPri,Apτq, P ri,Bpτq, P ri,Cpτqu and the reward probability pxpτq where x “ A,B,C
and 0 ď pxpτq ď 1. Therefore, the initial selection of recommendation by museum visitors could
be made with equal probability, i.e. Pri,xpτ “ 0q “ 13 . As the RSVTM algorithm is executed,
there is a convergence towards the type of recommendation that reduces visitor waiting time
and increases visitor perceived satisfaction. The description of the recommendation selection
reinforcement learning algorithm is presented in Section 5.6.
5.5.3 Visiting Time Management
Having been given the recommendation selection, each museum visitor i, i P ℵ aims to determine
his/her optimal visiting time ti˚ in order to maximize his/her perceived QoE, as expressed in
Eq.5.2. Therefore, the aforementioned goal is formulated as a distributed maximization problem
of each visitor’s combined QoE function with respect to his/her visiting time ti, as follows:
max
ti
Qipti, t´iq,
s.t. tMini ď ti ď tMaxi
@i P ℵ, x “ A,B,C,
y “ a, b, f, g, ℵ “ ℵa Y ℵb Y ℵf Y ℵg
(5.4)
Considering the distributed nature of the above maximization problem as well as the selfish
behavior of visitors when optimizing their perceived QoE, a game theoretic approach is adopted
in order to determine the optimal visiting time vector t˚ “ tt1˚ , ..., ti˚ , ..., tN˚u of museum visitors.
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Let us denote by G “ tℵ, Ti, Qiu the non-cooperative visiting time management game, where
ℵ is the set of players, i.e. museum visitors, Ti “ rtMini , tMaxi s is the strategy space and Qi is
the corresponding combined QoE function of visitor i, i P ℵ. The Nash equilibrium concept is
adopted so as to analytically discover the solution to the non-cooperative visiting time man-
agement game. In order to prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the
non-cooperative visiting time management game, we must prove that the visitor’s combined
QoE function Qi (Eq. 5.2) is quasi-concave with respect to ti [42].
Definition 5.1. A function Qi is strictly quasi-concave, if for any pair of distinct points ti and
t
1
i in the convex domain Ti and for 0 ă λ ă 1:
Qipt1iq ą Qiptiq ñ Qipλ ¨ ti ` p1´ λq ¨ t1iq ą Qiptiq
Based on Definition 5.1, any concave function is quasi-concave.
Theorem 5.1. The combined QoE function of museum visitor i, i P ℵ,ℵ “ ℵa Y ℵb Y ℵf Y ℵg
is quasi-concave in the modified strategy space T
1
i corresponding to the relative visiting time
ratio interval rti P
`
lnM
A
, rtB
˘
, where rtB P
´
lnM
A
, ln10
4M
A
¯
. Thus, the Nash equilibrium of the
non-cooperative visiting time management game G “ tℵ, Ti, Qiu exists and is unique in the
corresponding strategy space.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. In order to prove the quasi-concavity of a museum visitor’s combined QoE function, we
examine the sign of its second order derivative with respect to ti.
B2Qi
Bt2i
“ gprtiq ` hprtiq ´ cx ¨Nx ¨ eti , (5.5)
where gprtiq “ 2Qxt3i p1´ e
´Ay ¨rtiqMy´1r´MyAye´Ay ¨rtirti ` 1´ e´Ay ¨rtis and hprtiq “ MyA
2
yQx
t3i
p1´
e´Ay ¨rtiqMy´2 ¨ e´Ayrti ¨ rt2i ¨ pMye´Ayrti ´ 1q. The sign of the individual terms of Eq. 5.5
is examined. Considering the function gprtiq, the Bolzano theorem is applied, which is an
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important specialization of the Intermediate Value Theorem [43]. For rti “ lnMyAy , we have:
gprti “ lnMyAy q “ ´lnMy ´ 1My ` 1 ă 0 and for rti “ ln10
4My
Ay
, we have: gprti “ ln10000MyAy q “
´ ln10000My
10000
´ 1
10000My
` 1 ą 0, @My P p1, 1000q. Hence, there exists a rtB P p lnMyAy , ln10000MyAy q
such that gprtiq “ 0. Given that gprtiq is continuous with respect to rti, we conclude that
gprtiq ă 0, @rti P p lnMy
Ay
, rtBq, (5.6)
Considering the second term of Eq.5.5, we have:
hprtiq ă 0 ô rti ą lnMy
Ay
, (5.7)
The third term of Eq.5.5 is always negative, i.e. @rti ą 0. Combining Eq.5.6 and Eq.5.7, we
define the modified strategy space, where B
2Qi
Bt2i ă 0:
rti P p lnMy
Ay
, rtBq, (5.8)
where rtB P p lnMyAy , ln10000MyAy q.
By definition, the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative visiting time management game has
to satisfy
t˚i “ BRiptq “ arg max
tiPTi
Qipti, t´iq, (5.9)
where BRiptq denotes the best response function of each museum visitor i, i P ℵ, ℵ “ ℵa Y
ℵbYℵf Yℵg. Museum visitors adopt the best response dynamics and the game G “ tℵ, Ti, Qiu
converges to its Nash equilibrium, i.e. visiting time vector t˚ “ tt1˚ , ..., ti˚ , ...tN˚u, if museum
visitor’s best response function is standard.
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A function is characterized as standard if it satisfies the properties of (a) positivity, (b) mono-
tonicity, and (c) scalability for all t ě 0, where t “ tt1, ..., ti, ...tNu [44]. These properties can
be easily verified for BRptq in the non-cooperative visiting time management game since,
i. Positivity: t ą 0, thus BRptq ą 0,
ii. Monotonicity: if t
1 ě t then via Eq.5.9 we conclude that BRpt1q ě BRptq,
iii. Scalability: @µ ą 1, then via equation Eq.5.9, we conclude that µBRptq ě BRpµtq.
Therefore, it is proven that the global convergence in the non-cooperative visiting time man-
agement game Nash equilibrium under the proposed best response function, given by equation
Eq.5.9, is guaranteed.
5.6 RSVTM Algorithm
In this section, the proposed RSVTM algorithm is presented. It is a two-step algorithm that
determines both the optimal recommendation and the optimal visiting time for each museum
visitor. We envision that the RSVTM algorithm will run on a mobile application that visitors
will download for free onto their smartphones. The first part of the algorithm is based on a
reinforcement learning framework and is responsible for determining the type of recommenda-
tion that each museum visitor selects before starting the museum tour. The second part is
responsible for determining the optimal visiting time for each museum visitor in a distributed
manner. It is noted that the recommendation selection algorithm runs multiple timeslots τ (of
an extremely short duration). Per each timeslot τ , the visiting time management algorithm,
i.e., the second part of the proposed two-step algorithm, runs multiple iterations until there is
convergence upon the optimal visiting time for each visitor. The algorithm can be repeated
every time a new visitor arrives at the museum, while considering stable the choices of the al-
ready existing visitors in the museum. Below, we present the RSVTM algorithm with reference
to the opening time of the museum, when there are no other visitors yet. However, the same
implementation can be applied at any other instance.
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RSVTM Algorithm Step 1(Initialization): Each visitor states his/her visiting time constraints,
i.e. tMini , t
Max
i . At the beginning of the first time slot, i.e. τ “ 0, the initial recommendation
selection probability vector as Pri,xpτ “ 0q “ 13 , @i P ℵ, x “ A,B,C is set. Afterwards,
each museum visitor chooses a type of recommendation according to his/her recommendation
selection probability vector Pripτ “ 0q.
Step 2 (Recommendation Selection): At every slot τ ą 0, each museum visitor chooses a recom-
mendation according to his/her recommendation selection probability vector Pripτq provided
in Eq. 5.3a and Eq. 5.3b.
Step 3 (Visiting Time Management): Given that all visitors have chosen a type of recommen-
dation, then:
Step 3a: Set ite “ 0, where ite denotes the iteration of the visiting time management part
of the algorithm. The information of the overall visiting time is provided to museum visitors
through the application and each museum visitor determines the term
ř
jPℵj‰i tj by subtracting
his/her own visiting time.
Step 3b: Each museum visitor determines his optimal visiting time ti˚ in accordance with Eq.5.9.
Step 3c: If |tite`1i ´ titei | ď ε, (where ε: small positive constant), the visiting time values have
converged and stop. Otherwise, return to step 3a.
Step 4 (Recommendation Selection): Given the optimal visiting time, the museum can measure
the penetration of each type of recommendation, which is the reward probability pxpτq “řN
i“1,Rx Qx¨fyi prtiqřN
i“1,@RxP<Qx¨fyi prtiq
and provides this information to museum visitors.
Step 5 (Recommendation Selection): Visitors update their recommendation selection probabil-
ity vector via Eq. 5.3a and Eq. 5.3b.
Step 6 (Recommendation Selection): If one of the recommendation selection probabilities, i.e.
Pri,xpτq, x “ A,B,C converges, i.e. Pri,xpτq “ 0.999, stop. The visitor i selects the recom-
mendation Rx. Otherwise, return to step 2.
It should be clarified that the RSVTM algorithm can be characterized as a low complexity
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algorithm, due to its distributed nature and the simplicity of the calculations (i.e., closed-form
expressions) that are performed. Also, as will be shown in detail in the section of numerical
results (i.e. Section 5.7), the recommendation selection probabilities converge fast in terms of
the available required timeslots τ , i.e. there exists a probability Pri,jptq which is larger than
a value approaching one (e.g. 0.999). Finally, it should be highlighted that the details of the
RSVTM algorithm are extracted from museum visitors. The only information provided by the
museum visitor is the visiting time constraints, i.e. tMini , t
Max
i . When the RSVTM algorithm
ends, the application suggests which type of recommendation a visitor should select as well as
the time to spend visiting that will optimize his/her perceived QoE.
5.7 Performance Evaluation & Results
5.7.1 A Human-in-the-Loop Experiment
In order to provide realistic results and properly record the true preferences of museum visi-
tors, we initially performed detailed research with actual visitors as participants. To be specific,
a detailed questionnaire, related to the main goals of the RSVTM framework was circulated
among potential visitors [45]. The questionnaire consisted of 10 distinct questions. In the
first part, it requested demographic visitor data, and then the main questions have been for-
mulated to identify the most representative parameter values that would constitute input for
the RSVTM algorithm. Based on the information collected from the questionnaire and its
statistical analysis, we identified the styles of visitors, the minimum and maximum amounts
of time that visitors are willing to invest in a museum tour, the preference of visitors for the
recommendations RA, RB, RC , as well as their relative willingness to wait for a type of rec-
ommendation. The latter reflects the associated “cost” of the recommendation. As a result,
realistic values for the aforementioned parameters were collected and were subsequently used
to feed the RSVTM algorithm. The questionnaire was answered by over 150 museum visitors,
comprising an equal proportion of males and females and originating from more than ten dif-
ferent countries, including, Greece, Cyprus, UK, France, India, Thailand, Ukraine, Spain and
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the USA.
The data collected enabled us to determine proportions of visitors according to their styles,
their minimum and maximum visiting times, i.e. tMini and t
Max
i , the QoE values offered by each
recommendation, i.e.Qx, x “ A,B,C, as well as the values of the congestion control parameter,
i.e.cx, x “ A,B,C. The data revealed typical values for the ratio of the four visiting styles within
the examined pool of visitors as 28% ant visitors, 24% butterfly visitors, 24% fish visitors, and
24% grasshopper visitors. The duration of a visit ranges from approximately 60 minutes to
180 minutes, while visitor preferences for the three recommendations is given by the following
ratio, i.e. QA : QB : QC “ 5 : 7 : 9. For visitors who express a willingness to wait in order
to enjoy a specific recommendation, their answers were translated as a ratio of the congestion
control parameter, i.e. cA : cB : cC “ 3 : 6 : 10.
5.7.2 RSVTM Properties and Operation
In this subsection, our main goal is to study and illustrate the key operational properties and
characteristics of the RSVTM framework via a detailed simulation-based analysis. In order to
achieve this, we initially consider a basic scenario, where N “ 10 and visitors are examined
according to the following distribution per visiting style: 4 ant visitors, 2 butterfly visitors, 2
fish visitors, and 2 grasshopper visitors. For the execution of the experiment, we assume the
following parameter values: QA “ 0.5, QB “ 0.7, QC “ 0.9, cA “ 3.2 ¨ 10´3, cB “ 5.8 ¨ 10´3, cC “
10.2 ¨ 10´3, b “ 0.3, rttarget,bi “ 0.11, rttarget,ai “ 0.12, rttarget,fi “ 0.13, rttarget,gi “ 0.14 and tMini “
1, tMaxi “ 2. They have been extracted from the questionnaire and mapped or normalized where
needed into meaningful values for the performance analysis. The latter values refer to visiting
time constraints and are properly mapped to 60min and 180min, respectively.
Fig.5.3a presents the achieved QoE levels of visitors via the RSVTM algorithm as a function
of their ID considering their recommendations selected, i.e. A, B, C, and their visiting style,
i.e. a, b, g, f. The results reveal that even under the RSVTM approach, visitors tend to select
the recommendation that can potentially provide a higher QoE, i.e. recommendation C, due
to the fact that: QA ă QB ă QC . However, as recommendation C is a popular selection, it
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Visitors’ QoE as a function of their ID (a) under the RSVTM algorithm; (b)
assuming that all visitors select the best recommendation (Recommendation C) in terms of
potentially achieved QoE
results in congestion as the number of visitors increases. It was observed that visitors who
selected this recommendation, ultimately achieved a lower QoE compared to those that had
selected recommendation B, e.g. visitor 4 vs. visitor 5 and visitor 6 vs. visitors 1 and 2. Based
on this observation, we confirm that the most effective choice in terms of recommendation
selection is not always the one that can potentially provide the highest perceived QoE (i.e.
recommendation C). The potential for increased congestion in the enhanced recommendation
can lead to a greater cost in terms of waiting time and thus to a lower perceived QoE, as
expressed in Eq.5.2.
The latter outcome is also evident in Fig.5.3b, where all visitors selected recommendation
C, which as explained earlier in principle provides a greater QoE due to its superior service.
However, as recommendation C involves congestion, the average visitor achieved QoE is lower
(horizontal line in Fig.5.3b) when selecting it compared to when relying on the RSVTM algo-
rithm (Fig.5.3a). Please also note that some visitors even achieve negative QoE values in the
case of a fixed recommendation C, as the cost associated with the choice of recommendation C,
due to congestion becomes greater than the pure achieved satisfaction. Grasshopper visitors, in
particular, (ID 7 and 8) achieve negative QoE as they are less tolerant of the museum conges-
tion, as discussed in Section 5.4.1 and presented in Fig.5.2. The problem is alleviated with the
proposed RSVTM approach that manages a more dynamic and better distribution of visitors
according to the various recommendation styles. Enabling visitors to sense their environment,
learn from their past actions as stochastic learning automata, and make autonomous optimal
decisions for themselves, allows the RSVTM algorithm to converge upon higher QoE values for
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Figure 5.4: Convergence of RSVTM algorithm to the recommendation selections as a function
of the timeslots.
all visitors, in contrast to when there is an a priori choice of the best available recommendation
that ignores the congestion issue.
Subsequently, a larger and more representative experiment was executed by considering 100 mu-
seum visitors (i.e. 25 visitors from each visiting style) with cA “ 3.2 ¨ 10´5, cB “ 3.6 ¨ 10´5, cC “
4 ¨ 10´5. Our aim was to better demonstrate the operation and behavior of the RSVTM algo-
rithm in terms of several performance parameters and tradeoffs, such as convergence, achieved
QoE, visiting time, etc. Fig. 5.4 illustrates the convergence of visitors on their selected rec-
ommendation, i.e., A, B, C, as a function of the time slots of the recommendation selection
part of the RSVTM algorithm. The results reveal that the RSVTM algorithm converges at a
stable operation point, when all visitors select their recommendation in an autonomous and
distributed manner. The RSVTM algorithm converges at the stable point in less than 400
timeslots (and for practical purposes significantly less than 300 slots), which in real time trans-
lates as less than 3.7 sec. Furthermore, it is observed that the majority of visitors select the
recommendation B and C, which are more enhanced than recommendation A, involving just
the use of a map provided to visitors at the entrance. It is noted that if additional visitors were
present, and recommendations B and C were crowded, then recommendation A would become
a more attractive selection as the system and time evolved.
Fig 5.5 depicts the number of visitors with each visiting style and the type of recommendation
they selected. It is shown that visitor distribution among recommendations follows similar
trends for each visiting style. Thus, there is no case where visitors of a specific visiting style show
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of the visitors to the recommedations for all the visiting styles
preference for specific recommendations. Therefore, the behavior of visitors is homogeneous
with respect to recommendation selection even if they belong to different visiting styles, and
choices are primarily influenced by the congestion factor.
With reference to the same setting and experiment, Fig.5.6 shows the average visitor QoE and
the corresponding average visiting time of the four different visiting styles, i.e. ant, butterfly,
fish, and grasshopper. It is observed that the visitors who have greater flexibility and tolerance
of museum congestion, i.e. smaller values of target relative visiting time, rttarget,bi ă rttarget,ai ă
rttarget,fi ă rttarget,gi are able to achieve greater QoE levels by spending less time on their museum
visit. Therefore, by combining our findings and observations from both Fig.5.2 and Fig.5.6,
we conclude that butterfly-style visitors are the most tolerant of congestion, and achieve the
highest QoE, while spending the shortest visiting time on their museum tour. Ant, fish, and
grasshopper visitors demonstrate decreasing QoE levels and corresponding increasing visiting
times, due to the fact that rttarget,bi ă rttarget,ai ă rttarget,fi ă rttarget,gi .
Below we study the convergence properties of the recommendation selection part of the RSVTM
algorithm. Fig.5.7a presents the running time (left vertical axis) of the RSVTM algorithm
versus the learning rate b, as well as the number of visitors deviating (right vertical axis) from
their corresponding selection made with respect to the ground truth values achieved for b “ 0.2.
Similarly, Fig.5.7b presents the corresponding achieved average QoE (left vertical axis) and
average visiting time (right vertical axis) as a function of the learning rate b. Please note that
as ground truth values for this experiment, we considered the ones achieved for b “ 0.2, as with
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Figure 5.6: Average QoE and average visiting time for all the visiting styles
(a) (b)
Figure 5.7: RSVTM Running time and number of visitor’s deviation (with respect to b “ 0.2)
vs. learning rate b, (b) Average QoE and average visiting time vs learning rate b
smaller values of the learning rate b, visitors are able to better understand their available choices
and make better decisions for themselves. The latter is evident from both Fig.5.7a and Fig.5.7b,
where we notice firstly that the number of visitors deviating from their corresponding choices
for ground truth increases as the learning rate b increases, while also the average QoE decreases
and the corresponding average visiting time increases (Fig.5.7b ). It is worth pointing out that
an increase in visiting time implicitly contributes to an increase in museum congestion. On
the other hand, as the learning rate b increases, visitors select their preferred recommendation
more quickly without exploiting their available options in detail. Thus the RSVTM algorithm
converges faster at the final recommendation selections for visitors (please notice the lower
running times in Fig.5.7a with increasing values of parameter b). Based on the above discussion,
we conclude that there is a trade-off between the learning rate of visitors and the accuracy of
the optimal values for the achieved visitor QoE, visitor recommendation selection and visitor
visiting time.
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5.7.3 Comparative Study
A comparative study is conducted below in order to demonstrate and evaluate the superior per-
formance of the proposed RSVTM framework against other possible alternatives, ranging from
static targeted ones to completely random selections. Specifically, five comparative scenarios
are examined with respect to the recommendation selection of visitors, as follows:
a) RSVTM framework: each visitor acts as a stochastic learning automaton that learns through
past actions and makes the most beneficial recommendation selection via the RSVTM algo-
rithm, b) Random Scenario: each visitor randomly selects a recommendation, c) Fixed A: all
visitors select Recommendation A, d) Fixed B: all visitors select Recommendation B, e) Fixed
C: all visitors select Recommendation C.
Aiming to provide indicative scalability results for the RSVTM framework while also evaluating
the performance of all the proposed approaches with varying visitor numbers, we considered in-
creasing numbers of visitors within the museum. We performed a detailed Monte Carlo analysis
for the different sets of visitors, running 1000 runs of each comparative scenario. Fig.5.8a and
Fig.5.8b present visitor average QoE and total achieved QoE, respectively, as a function of the
number of visitors in the museum. The results reveal that due to the increased congestion in-
volved in each recommendation when considered in isolation, the fixed recommendation choices,
i.e. Fixed A, Fixed B and Fixed C scenarios, leads to lower average and total QoE values when
compared to the RSVTM framework. The random recommendation choices result in an almost
uniform distribution of visitors among recommendations and thus the corresponding congestion
phenomenon is limited or eliminated. Nevertheless, the random scenario achieves comparable
results, with respect to QoE values, with the Fixed C scenario, (i.e. when all visitors select
the best available recommendation C, in anticipation of the highest possible satisfaction). In
contrast to the other four examined scenarios, the RSVTM framework demonstrates superior
results both regarding average and total QoE values, as it enables visitors to dynamically sense
the congestion involved in each recommendation and choose the recommendation that will
maximize their perceived QoE. Furthermore, as expected, in all the comparative scenarios, the
average QoE decreases as the number of visitors increases, due to the increased congestion, and
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.8: QoE as a function of the number of visitors for all the comparative scenarios (a)
Average QoE, (b) Total QoE
Figure 5.9: Average visiting time as a function of the number of visitors for all the comparative
scenarios
the fact that visitors face the cost of needing to invest more times on their museum tour.
Fig.5.9, lastly, presents the visiting time of visitors as a function of the number of visitors in the
museum. It is observed that the visiting time is quite similar for all the comparative scenarios
since it is the outcome of the visiting time management and optimization approach presented
in Section 5.5.3 (as properly applied to all scenarios). However, Fig.5.8a and Fig.5.8b illustrate
that the relative investment of each visitor, i.e. in visiting time, has a different level of return,
i.e. perceived QoE. Thus, in the RSVTM framework, even if visitors invest in visiting time to a
similar degree as in other comparative scenarios, their QoE values end up greater as a result of
more efficient recommendation selection and more appropriate visitor distribution among the
available recommendation types.
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5.8 Conclusions
The problem of optimizing recommendation selection and visiting time management in muse-
ums is studied under a QoE-driven game theoretic approach. Our work is based on the principle
that a museum is viewed as a Cyber Physical Social System, where visitors act and make deci-
sions in an environment that involves constraints. Each visitor evolves in a physical or virtual
space with others and his/her behavior influences and is influenced by the others.
Specifically in our work, museum visitors are viewed as stochastic learning automaton, who
sense the museum environment (e.g. its congestion, available recommendations, etc.) and gain
knowledge from their past actions in order to make then the most rewarding recommendation
selection. When given corresponding recommendation selections, each visitor aims to maximize
his/her perceived QoE in a distributed manner. The problem of visitor QoE maximization is
formulated as a non-cooperative game among visitors, and the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium is demonstrated. A distributed, iterative and low-complexity algorithm –
RSVTM - is introduced to solve joint recommendation selection and visiting time management
problem. The RSVTM algorithm determines the recommendation selection for each visitor, as
well as the Nash equilibrium point of the visiting time management non-cooperative game. An
extensive evaluation of the proposed RSVTM framework is presented based on realistic param-
eters, and data was collected via a human in the loop experiment and a detailed questionnaire
distributed to museum visitors. The corresponding detailed numerical results indicate the oper-
ational effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach, while comparative results in terms
of achieved QoE confirm the superiority of the RSVTM framework against other alternative
recommendation approaches.
Chapter 6
QoE under a Prospect Theoretic
Perspective
6.1 Introduction
As already mentioned in Chapter 1 modern evolving social systems can be viewed as Cyber-
Physical Social Systems, where users of personalized services evolve in an environment that
induces constraints [1]. An individual evolves in a physical or virtual space with others, where
visitor behavior is influenced and constrained by others [2]. Using behavioral insights and
incorporating behavioral factors into various operating processes and approaches to examine
and improve human social, cultural and living experiences becomes a critical aspect of the
efficiency and effectiveness of various computational methods and optimization approaches [5].
The value and impact of such social systems is typically judged by the overall achieved user
experience, a metric that refers to a subject’s perceptions of system aspects such as utility,
satisfaction, and/or efficiency [46]. QoE is considered subjective and dynamic in nature, since
it is about individual perception and is related to the system the individual belongs to [47],
and the wider context [48].
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6.1.1 Related Work and Motivation
It is true that significant advances have been obtained and observed in the development of effi-
cient computational tools, algorithms and optimization methods for dealing with social systems
[49]. However, the overwhelming majority of them, have not managed to properly address the
fact that individuals in real life do not necessarily behave as neutral expected utility maximiz-
ers, but tend to exhibit risk seeking or loss aversion behavior under uncertainty [50]. In order
to deal with this challenge and integrate risk preferences in the overall optimization process
and evaluation of social systems, we exploit Prospect Theory [51]. The aim is to depict the
deviations in decision making due to gain seeking or loss aversion that traditional models fail
to capture [52]. The case in point is that of cultural heritage spaces [53].
Cultural heritage sites, such as museums, are reflections of society because they are repositories
of historical, precious and significant objects and artifacts [9]. From a theoretical point of
view, observation of the behavior of visitors within a cultural heritage space area makes it
possible to identify some particularly important issues and phenomena that arise during a
touring experience. Among others, they include the time spent at an exhibit, which display
areas are selected to visit, visitor attention-span and the ability of information to retain the
attention of a visitor [28]. As in previous chapters, the emphasis is also placed on the problem
of visitor optimal time management. The aim is to increase visitor satisfaction but under a
prospect theoretic perspective.
The motivation of the aforementioned objective and approach arose from the fact that recent
theories tend to no longer consider visitors as neutral, passive subjects, but rather as dynamic
entities [54]–[56]. The decisions of each visitor may influence the decisions of others, as in a
social competitive environment [57], [58]. However, in a cultural heritage space, unlike in other
social environments, the momentum of the experience is primarily controlled by the visitor
himself. Therefore, the burden of responsibility for making a visiting related decision falls upon
the visitor [59]–[61].
The intuitive principle followed in our consideration and work here can be simply stated as:
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”How to make the most of your cultural heritage space visit”. This in turn can be more
formally expressed as: ”Optimizing the perceived QoE of visitors as expressed through a utility
function that takes several parameters into consideration”. The majority of relevant studies in
the field of cultural heritage space, usually take only physical context parameters (e.g., cultural
heritage space size, placement of the exhibits, etc.) into account. They do not typically
consider and evaluate the impact of the visitor choices and risk behavior patterns, such as
optimal visiting time and reactions to losses and/or gains [62]. Additionally, when considering
the cultural heritage space operator point of view, our observations, evaluations and findings,
contribute significant insights to the following principle: ”Knowledge of your visitors is essential
for building your audience and better planning your services”.
In order to fill the aforementioned research gap, we consider and capture visitor realistic be-
havior as regards their loss aversion and gain seeking characteristics within cultural heritage
spaces, when they are optimally investing their available visiting time at different types of ex-
hibits. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework constitutes the first study that
focus on this area of research in the literature.
6.2 Behavioural Modeling under Prospect Theory
As highlighted before, in order to address visitor subjectivity in decisions under uncertainty
while capturing their gain seeking and loss aversion behaviour within the dynamic cultural
heritage spaces, and formulate their representative QoE functions, the Prospect Theory has
been adopted. Prospect Theory was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979 [51], and it
is a Nobel-prize-winning behavioral economics theory where the individuals make autonomous
decisions under risk and uncertainty of the associated payoff of their choices, which is estimated
with some probability. In contrast to the expected utility theory, where all the individuals are
assumed as risk neutral with respect to their choices, the Prospect Theory embodies individ-
uals’ behavioral patterns, which demonstrate systematic deviations from the expected utility
theory. In a dynamic environment of available choices with uncertain payoff, individuals tend
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to overweight low probability events and underweight high probability events [63]. Prospect
Theory also claims that individuals perceive greater dissatisfaction from a potential outcome
of losses compared to their satisfaction from gains of the same amount.
Prospect Theory has already been applied in various research fields involving decision-making
under uncertainty, e.g., finance, insurance, labor markets, crowd sourcing, etc. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time in the literature that Prospect Theory is adopted and
applied to determine visitor optimal visiting time in cultural heritage spaces, e.g., museum, art
gallery, etc., and evaluate the achieved QoE. In the dynamic environment of cultural heritage
spaces, visitor decision-making in terms of how much time to invest at each exhibit is made
under risk, as their perceived satisfaction, i.e., QoE, is uncertain. It depends on multiple
factors, e.g., congestion, time spent at the exhibit by other visitors, etc. Thus, the problem
of determining the visiting time at an exhibit for each visitor cannot be accurately formulated
simply by the traditional expected utility theory.
The behavioral model of individuals’ decision-making under uncertain outcomes proposed by
Prospect Theory has four fundamental components and characteristics: (a) reference depen-
dence, (b) loss aversion, (c) diminishing sensitivity, and (d) probability weighting.
6.2.1 Reference Dependence
Under Prospect Theory behavioral model, cultural heritage spaces visitors determine their
perceived satisfaction, i.e., QoE, from investing their visiting time at different exhibits based
on the corresponding derived psychological gains or losses, with respect to a reference point.
This reference point is considered as the zero point (i.e., ground truth) of visitor perceived QoE
scale, and it is not necessary synonymous with the status que, i.e., common for all visitors. In
contrast, given that visitors are social humans and have different personalized expectation and
aspiration levels, they have different reference points through which they express their personal
and behavioral characteristics. Given the reference point z0 and visitor time investment at the
exhibits, visitors determine their prospect-theoretic probabilistic payoff, i.e., QoE, from gains
(increased actual utility) or from losses (decreased actual utility), measured relatively to the
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Figure 6.1: (a) Prospect-theoretic QoE and (b) Probability weighting function
reference point and depending on the time investments of all other visitors, as presented in
Fig.6.1a. Visitor actual utility is formally defined in Section 6.3.2.
6.2.2 Loss Aversion
In principle, Prospect Theory models the concept of loss aversion based on the empirical ob-
servation that the loss of x amount typically imposes greater dissatisfaction than the pleasure
from gaining the same amount. The latter is mathematically expressed via the asymmetry in
the slope of the prospect-theoretic utility function around the reference point z0, as presented
in Fig.6.1a. Prospect-theoretic utility is formally defined in Section 6.3.3. In our context, this
empirical observation is mapped to the examined problem, where the visitor prospect-theoretic
utility decreases faster for a specific loss of their actual utility, compared to their corresponding
increase from gaining the same magnitude of actual utility. This observation is well aligned with
the realistic visitor behaviour, where the potential disutility caused to a visitor under certain
circumstances (e.g., missing a popular exhibit due to congestion), will be greater compared to
the corresponding pleasure gained by visiting this exhibit, under the assumption of investing
in both cases the same actual resource (i.e., visiting time).
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6.2.3 Diminishing Sensitivity
The concept of diminishing sensitivity in Prospect Theory is captured in the mathematical
formulation of the prospect-theoretic utility function, as presented in Fig.6.1a. The visitor
prospect-theoretic utility function is concave for positive outcomes, i.e., Cartesian quadrant I,
and steeper convex for negative outcomes, i.e., Cartesian quadrant III. The latter formulation
stems from the empirically human behavioral patterns observed by Kahneman and Tversky
[51]. They concluded that humans demonstrate risk averse behaviour in gains and risk seeking
attitude in losses, as in the latter case they are already in a deteriorated situation and they
are willing to take the risk to reduce losses. The concept of diminishing sensitivity captures
human’s behaviour under risks based on their gains and losses, in contrast to the expected
utility theory which simply assumes that individuals are risk neutral.
6.2.4 Probability Weighting
The last key component of Prospect Theory is the psychological probability weighting of
decision-makers. Specifically, humans do not weight the potential outcomes of their decisions
based on their objective probabilities, as they cannot psychologically confront the extreme pos-
itive or negative outcomes [52]. Therefore, individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of
very low probability event (e.g., observing a popular exhibit under no congestion), thus over-
weighting unlikely outcomes (pippq ą p for small p), while on the other hand underweight the
events that are highly expected to happen (pippq ă p for large p) [64]. The prospect-theoretic
probability weighting function pippq of events with different likelihood to happen is presented in
Fig.6.1b. The prospect-theoretic probability weighting function can be formulated as an inverse
S-shaped function capturing human’s psychology as described above.
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6.3 Optimizing Visitor QoE
As mentioned before, cultural heritage spaces constitute social areas and systems where visitors
mainly gather to observe exhibits and acquire knowledge. The time each visitor invests in his
tour at the cultural heritage space directly affects his own perceived QoE, as well as the QoE
of the rest of the visitors that concurrently navigate through the cultural space and observe
the exhibits. The latter holds true as part of the cultural heritage space may become highly
congested from visitors, whose behavior and satisfaction accordingly become interdependent.
6.3.1 Exhibits: A Common Pool of Resources (CPR)
Usually the exhibits within a cultural heritage space are categorized as two main classes, i.e.,
the most popular and the less popular. The less popular ones are characterized by low visitor
congestion and thus the visitor who selects them enjoys a quite stable satisfaction overall, since
he will not be adversely influenced by too many visitors. Consequently, we claim that he will
perceive a ”safe” QoE, according to the time that he invests. Thus, in the following the less
popular exhibits of a cultural heritage space are characterized as a safe resource from the visiting
time investment perspective of the individuals/visitors. On the other hand, the most popular
exhibits are subject to possibly variable and in some cases high visitor congestion. Therefore,
the most popular exhibits of a cultural heritage space are considered as a common pool of
resources (CPR) given that they are non-excludable, i.e., all visitors have the right to access
and observe them, while simultaneously they are rivalrous or subtractable, i.e., their observation
by one visitor reduces the ability to be observed by another [53]. If visitors selfishly make the
decision to spend an increased visiting time at CPR exhibits, this will result in suboptimal
outcomes for the entire set of visitors that concurrently observe the specific exhibits. The
latter phenomenon will conclude to the ”failure” of CPR exhibits as none of the visitors will be
satisfied. This concept is well-known in the literature as the ”Tragedy of the Commons” [65],
[66].
During a cultural heritage space visit, each visitor has an available actual visiting time tMaxi
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that he is willing to spend towards enjoying his tour via observing the available exhibits, both
CPR and safe. For simplicity in the presentation and without loss of generality, in the following
analysis we consider the normalized visiting time set Ti “ r0, 1s, where the upper bound tMaxi
is assumed to be equal to one for all the considered visitors. Each visitor may invest part of
his overall visiting time, denoted by ti, ti P Ti, to observe CPR exhibits and his remaining time
(tMaxi ´ ti) to visit safe exhibits. The goal of each visitor is to determine in an autonomous
manner the investment of his time to the safe and the CPR exhibits, so as to maximize his
perceived QoE from his visit to the cultural heritage space. Assuming that there exist N
visitors, where ℵ “ t1, 2, ..Nu denotes their set, and following the concept of the Tragedy of the
Commons, the probability of failure of the CPR exhibits is denoted by pptT q, where tT “ řNi“1 ti
is the total investment of all the N visitors at the CPR exhibits.
Assumption 1. The CPR exhibits are characterized by the following properties:
1. The probability of failure pptT q is convex, strictly increasing and twice continuously differ-
entiable with respect to the aggregate investment by the visitors tT P r0, 1s with pp1q “ 1
and pptT q “ 1, @tT ě 1.
2. Visitor’s i strategy set of visiting time to the CPR exhibits is Ti “ r0, 1s, @i P ℵ.
Some examples of CPR exhibits probability of failure are the linear function (i.e., pptT q “ tT )
or the exponential function (i.e., pptT q “ tgT , where g is a positive real constant) and can be
chosen based on the sensitivity of the CPR exhibits to the failure. It is noted that if CPR
exhibits fail due to over-investment by the visitors then none of them will receive any benefit
from the CPR. Thus, their perceived QoE from visiting the CPR exhibits will be zero.
6.3.2 Actual Utility
In this section, the visitor actual utilities from investing his available visiting time at CPR and
safe exhibits are formulated. The perceived visitor actual utility from each type of exhibits is
differentiated given the characteristics and nature of the exhibits. Specifically, the actual utility
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gained from safe exhibits is proportional to the invested visiting time by the visitor, under the
realistic assumption that those exhibits are not congested due to their nature and the more
time the visitor spends to those exhibits, the more satisfaction he gets. On the other hand,
CPR exhibits are co-shared among multiple visitors, thus each visitor’s actual utility depends
on the visiting time of all the visitors that concurrently observe the CPR exhibits.
Based on the above discussion, the visitor’s i perceived actual utility ziptiq from safe exhibits
is a linear function with respect to visitor’s invested time ptMaxi ´ tiq at the safe exhibits, and
is given as follows:
zSAFEi ptiq “ wiptMaxi ´ tiq (6.1)
where wi “ ewIi expresses the overall importance of safe exhibits with respect to visitor i, as
the combined effect of the following two factors. The first one denoted by ew, ew P r0, 1s refers
to safe exhibits weight, reflecting their historical importance, as dictated by cultural heritage
experts. The second one, denoted by Ii, Ii P r0, 1s, represents the visitor’s subjective interest
in the specific safe exhibits.
With respect to CPR exhibits, visitor actual utility depends on both the time invested to observe
them by visitor i and the corresponding invested time of the rest of the visitors. Therefore, the
visitor’s i actual utility from CPR exhibits is given as follows:
zCPRi ptiq “ wci titT F ptT q (6.2)
where as before ti refers to the visiting time invested by visitor i, i P ℵ at CPR exhibits,
tT “ řNi“1 ti is the total invested time at CPR exhibits by all visitors and F ptT q is the production
function expressing the return of CPR exhibits to visitors based on their total investment, and is
specifically defined below. Please note also that, wci “ ecwIci expresses the corresponding overall
CPR exhibits importance for user i, and is defined similarly to the corresponding definition of
the safe exhibits importance wi. That is e
c
w, e
c
w P r0, 1s refers to the CPR exhibits’ weight, while
6.3. Optimizing Visitor QoE 85
Ici , I
c
i P r0, 1s, represents the visitor’s subjective interest in the specific CPR exhibits.
Assumption 2. The production function F ptT q is assumed to be concave [67] with respect to
the total time investment tT , with F p0q “ 0, F 1p0q ą wi and F 1pNtMaxi q ă 0.
The above assumption states that the initial investment of visiting time ti at CPR exhibits
is more appealing to visitors compared to safe exhibits, as the first ones provide larger actual
utility to visitors for small invested visiting time. On the other hand, if visitors as a whole
invest increased visiting time at CPR exhibits, this strategy leads to suboptimal outcomes,
as the perceived actual utility decreases due to F
1pNtMaxi q ă 0. In other words, if the total
investment of visiting time tT by all visitors at CPR exhibits exceeds a threshold, then it
becomes less attractive to visitors to invest their time at CPR exhibits. Based on the above,
we define the rate of return function, as follows:
rptT q “ F ptT q
tT
(6.3)
Assumption 3. The rate of return function rptT q is non-increasing, monotonic, concave, twice
continuously differentiable with respect to tT , tT P r0, 1s and rptT q ą 1.
CPR exhibits are typically the most popular exhibits of a cultural heritage space thus experts
have identified their great historical importance, i.e., we can consider ecw “ 1, and visitors have
also great interest in visiting them, i.e., Ici “ 1, @i P ℵ. Therefore, in the following, we assume
for CPR exhibits that wci “ 1, @i P ℵ. Based on this and combining Eq.6.2 and Eq.6.3, we
conclude to the following simplified form of visitor actual utility from CPR exhibits:
zCPRi ptiq “ tirptT q (6.4)
The total actual utility that a visitor perceives is a linear combination of the utility gained by
observing both safe and CPR exhibits. Thus, the total actual utility can be formulated via
combining Eq.6.1 and Eq.6.4 as follows:
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ziptiq “ zSAFEi ptiq ` zCPRi ptiq
“ wiptMaxi ´ tiq ` tirptT q
(6.5)
6.3.3 Prospect-theoretic Utility
The prospect-theoretic utility of visitor i, i P ℵ in a cultural heritage space is defined as follows:
uipziq “
$’’&’’%
pzi ´ z0qai , zi ě z0
´kipz0 ´ ziqbi , zi ă z0
(6.6)
where zi is the visitor’s i, i P ℵ actual utility as defined above in Eq.6.5 and z0 denotes the
reference point of visitor’s perceived prospect-theoretic utility. We define the reference point z0
for each visitor i, i P ℵ as the actual utility that he gets from investing his total visiting time
at safe resources, as follows:
z0 “ witMaxi (6.7)
Please note that for simplicity in the presentation and without harming the validity of our
analysis, we have dropped ti from the notation of ziptiq. Moreover, the parameters ai, bi where
ai, bi P p0, 1s express the sensitivity of visitors to the gains and losses of their actual utility zi,
respectively. Specifically, small values of parameter ai reflect greater increase of the prospect-
theoretic utility ui for small values of the actual utility zi. Therefore, a visitor i with smaller
value of parameter ai experiences superior prospect-theoretic utility ui compared to a visitor j
who has larger value of aj, ai ă aj considering the same amount of actual utility. Thus, the
risk seeking behaviour of a visitor in losses and his risk averse behaviour in gains is reflected
by small values of parameter ai in his prospect-theoretic utility ui. Following similar reasoning,
the small values of parameter bi imply higher decrease of visitor prospect-theoretic utility for
small values of zi and close to the reference point z0. In this research work, we consider that
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visitors follow analogous behaviour in losses and gains, i.e., ai “ bi.
Furthermore, the parameter ki, ki P r0,8q reflects the impact of losses compared to gains in
visitor’s prospect-theoretic utility. Specifically, if ki ą 1, the visitor weights losses more than
gains, thus he illustrates a loss averse behaviour as he is resistant to lose part of his actual
utility zi. The exact opposite holds true when 0 ď ki ď 1, where the visitor weights gains more
than losses, thus presenting an aggressive gain seeking behaviour. Please note that the use of
different parameters ai, ki for various visitors allows taking into account with high granularity
all personal characteristics of every visitor. If a homogeneous population is assumed then we
would consider ai “ a and ki “ k for every visitor i, i P ℵ.
If CPR exhibits do not fail due to over-investment of visitor time, then each visitor perceives
an actual utility given by Eq.6.5. In this case, the actual perceived utility is greater than the
reference point z0, i.e., zi ě z0 as at the reference point the visitor i makes zero time investment
at CPR exhibits, i.e., ti “ 0. Therefore, via subtracting the reference point z0 “ witMaxi from
Eq.6.5 and shaping the result according to first branch of Eq.6.6, we have uipziq “ rtiprptT q ´
wiqsai . On the other hand, if CPR exhibits fail to serve visitors due to very high congestion, the
second term of Eq.6.5 is zero and the visitor’s actual utility zi stems only from the perceived
satisfaction from safe resources. Therefore, the visitor’s perceived actual utility is written as
ziptiq “ wiptMaxi ´ tiq and it is less than the reference point z0, i.e., z ă z0, where z0 “ witMaxi .
Thus, the second branch of Eq.6.6 can be written as uipziq “ ´kipwitiqa.
Following the aforementioned argumentation we can readily conclude that the visitor’s prospect-
theoretic utility as presented in Eq.6.6, can be rewritten as:
uipziq “
$’’&’’%
rtiprptT q ´ wiqsai , zi ě z0
´kipwitiqai , zi ă z0
(6.8)
Moreover, by defining rptT q ∆“ prptT q ´ wiqai for notational convenience, Eq.6.8 can be written
as:
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uipziq “
$’’’&’’’%
taii rptT q, zi ě z0
´kipwitiqai , zi ă z0
(6.9)
CPR exhibits failure depends on the total invested visiting time at them by all visitors. Given
that the probability of CPR exhibits failure is pptT q as defined before, then the probability to
survive and serve the visitors is p1 ´ pptT qq. Therefore, considering the probability of CPR
exhibits failure pptT q, Eq. 6.9 can be written equivalently as follows:
uipziq “
$’’&’’%
taii rptT q, with probability 1´ pptT q
´kipwitiqai , with probability pptT q
(6.10)
Accordingly, each visitor’s expected prospect-theoretic utility based on the visiting time invest-
ment of all visitors, t “ rt1, t2, ..., ti, ..., tN s is given below:
Epuiq “ taii rptT qp1´ pptT qq ` p´kipwitiqaiqpptT q
“ taii rrptT qp1´ pptT qq ´ kiwaii pptT qs
∆“ taii fiptT q
(6.11)
where fiptT q ∆“ rptT qp1´pptT qq´kiwaii pptT q is defined as the effective rate of return of CPR ex-
hibits. The impact of visitor related personalized parameters ai and ki, where ai P p0, 1s and ki P
r0,8q, on the final decision making process is exploited in detail later in Section 6.5.
6.3.4 QoE optimization: Problem Formulation
The goal of each visitor i within a cultural heritage space is to maximize his perceived QoE
from his tour via sophisticatedly and selfishly investing his visiting time ti and ptMaxi ´ tiq
at CPR and safe exhibits, respectively. Based on Eq. 6.11 this problem can be formulated
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as a maximization problem of each visitor’s prospect-theoretic utility function considering the
physical limitations of his visiting time, as follows:
max
tiPTi
Epuiq “ taii fiptT q (6.12)
The above maximization problem can be confronted as a non-cooperative game among visitors
who act as rational players making the optimal decisions about themselves in a selfish and
distributed manner. Let G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus denote the non-cooperative game among the N
visitors, where each visitor’s strategy space is Ti and his payoff is his expected utility function
Epuiq. Towards solving the non-cooperative game, the concept of Nash equilibrium is adopted.
The Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative G is the vector of visitor visiting time at CPR
exhibits t˚ “ rt1˚ , t2˚ , ..., ti˚ , ..., tN˚ s, where no visitor has the incentive to change his own strategy
given the strategies of the rest of the visitors. In the following, we adopt the notation Ăt˚´ i “
rt1˚ , t2˚ , ..., ti˚´1, ti˚`1, ..., tN˚ s to refer to the visiting time vector of all visitors except visitor i at
the equilibrium point.
Definition 6.1. The visiting time vector at CPR exhibits t˚ “ rt1˚ , t2˚ , ..., ti˚ , ..., tN˚ s P T, T “
T1 ˆ T2 ˆ ... ˆ TN is a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus if
for every i, i P ℵ holds Epuipti˚ , Ăt˚´ iqq ě Epuipti, Ăt˚´ iqq for all ti˚ P Ti.
6.4 Existence & Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we analytically seek the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
point of the non-cooperative game G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus. The Nash equilibrium point is the
visiting time vector t˚ “ rt1˚ , t2˚ , ..., ti˚ , ..., tN˚ s that visitors invest to observe CPR exhibits. In
the following, we use the notation t´i “ řNj“1,i‰j tj for the total visiting time of all visitors
except visitor i. Also, ĎT´i “ T1 ˆ ... ˆ Ti´1 ˆ Ti`1 ˆ ... ˆ TN denotes the strategy set of all
visitors excluding visitor i. Let us denote the best response strategy Bipt´iq : ĎT´i Ñ Ti of
visitor i, as follows:
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Bipt´iq “ arg max
tiPTi
Epuipti, t´iqq, t´i P ĎT´i (6.13)
Theorem 1. A pure Nash equilibrium ti˚ “ Bipt´iq of the non-cooperative game G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus
exists and the following properties hold true.
1. Bipt´iq “ 0 if and only if there exists a threshold value tthres P r0, 1s such that t´i ě tthres.
2. 0 ă Bipt´iq ă 1 and Bipt´iq ` t´i ă tthres, if there exists an interval I Ă r0, tthresq such
that fptthresq “ 0 and t´i ă tthres.
3. For tT “ řNi“1 ti P I then fptT q ą 0 and f 1ptT q ă 0 hold true.
Proof. Towards proving the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium ti˚ “ Bipt´iq, ti˚ P r0, 1q of
the non-cooperative game G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus, initially we clarify that the visitor’s i, i P ℵ
best response strategy Bipt´iq can be either zero, i.e., Bipt´iq “ 0 or a positive value, i.e.,
0 ă Bipt´iq ă 1. The best response strategy can never be equal to 1, i.e., Bipt´iq “ 1 as in that
case pp1q “ 1 (see Assumption 1) and CPR exhibits fail and the visitor’s satisfaction drops.
The first order derivative of the CPR exhibits’ effective rate of return is given as follows.
BfiptT q
BtT “
BrptT q
BtT p1´ pptT qq
´ prptT q ` kiwaii qBpptT qBtT
(6.14)
Based on Assumption 3, the rate of return function rptT q is non-increasing and concave, there-
fore rptT q is concave decreasing, thus BrptT qBtT ă 0. Also p1 ´ pptT qq ą 0. Moreover, rptT q is
positive, concave, decreasing and twice continuously differentiable for any ai P p0, 1s, wi P r0, 1s
because we have defined rptT q “ prptT q ´wiqai where rptT q is concave, decreasing, twice contin-
uously differentiable and greater than 1. The CPR exhibits probability of failure is a strictly
increasing function with respect to visitor time investment tT , thus
BpptT q
BtT ą 0. Therefore, the
effective rate of return function is strictly decreasing, i.e., BfiptT qBtT ă 0.
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CASE A: If fiptT “ 0q ď 0, then the investment of visiting time at CPR exhibits is not
profitable for visitors, thus, Bipt´iq “ 0. In this case, there does not exist a threshold value
tthres P r0, 1s such that t´i ě tthres, as t´i ” tthres “ 0. If fiptT “ 0q ą 0 based on Eq.6.11, we
have fiptT “ 1q “ ´kiwaii ă 0, thus based on the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a
value tthres, tthres P r0, 1s such that fiptthresq “ 0, as presented in Fig.6.2.
Figure 6.2: Effective rate of return function
Thus, when tT ě t´i ą tthres, the best response strategy of visitor i is Bipt´iq “ 0, otherwise, if
he invests part of his visiting time at CPR exhibits, i.e., Bipt´iq ą 0 then his expected prospect-
theoretic utility as expressed in Eq.6.11 will be negative fiptT q ă 0 (see Fig. 6.2). In this case,
i.e., tT ě t´i ą tthres, tthres P r0, 1s the best response strategy is unique, i.e, Bipt´iq “ 0. Thus,
the pure Nash equilibrium exists and is given by ti˚ “ Bipt´iq “ 0.
CASE B: Examining the remaining case, i.e. t´i ď tT ă tthres based on the above analysis and
Fig.6.2 we have fiptT q ą 0. Thus, based on Eq.6.11, we have Epuiq “ taii fiptT q ą 0. Therefore,
the best response strategy is strictly positive, i.e., 0 ă Bipt´iq ă 1, if t´i ď tT ă tthres. Given
the latter constraint, it holds true that rBipt´iq ` t´is P p0, tthresq, @Biptiq P p0, 1q since the
expected prospect-theoretic utility (Eq.6.11) must be positive (i.e., fiptT q ą 0 in case B of
Fig.6.2) at the non zero best response strategy. In this case, i.e., t´i ď tT ă tthres, we prove
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the existence of a positive best response strategy, i.e., 0 ă Bipt´iq ă 1. Thus, the pure Nash
equilibrium exists and ti˚ “ Bipt´iq P p0, 1q.
The third property of the theorem 1 can be easily concluded from the above analysis and it is
illustrated in Fig.6.2.
Based on Theorem 1, we have shown the existence of the pure Nash equilibrium of the game
G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus. In the following, we initially examine the properties of each visitor’s
best response strategy as presented in Eq. 6.13, in order to conclude to the uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The best response strategy Bipt´iq, as presented in Eq.6.13 is single valued for
t´i P T´i.
Proof. Based on Theorem 1, we have shown that the best response strategy is single-valued,
i.e., Bipt´iq “ 0, if tT ě t´i ą tthres, where tthres P r0, 1s. Thus, in the following we examine
the case where t´i ď tT ă tthres, that we have already shown that there exists at least one
best response strategy, i.e., 0 ă Bipt´iq ă 1. Given that there exists at least one best response
strategy Bipt´iq, it should be one of the solutions of the expected prospect-theoretic utility’s
first order derivative, which is given as follows.
BEpuiq
Bti “ ait
ai´1
i fiptT q ` taii BfiptT qBtT
“ rtaii BrptT qBtT ` airptT qt
ai´1
i sp1´ pptT qq
´ taii rptT qBpptT qBtT
´ kiraiwaii tai´1i pptT q ` waii taii BpptT qBtT s
(6.15)
It is noted that ´taii rptT qBpptT qBtT ă 0 and ´kiraiwaii tai´1i pptT q ` waii taii BpptT qBtT s ă 0. Thus in order
to determine the root of Eq. 6.15, it should hold true that:
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rtaii BrptT qBtT ` airptT qt
ai´1
i s ą 0 (6.16)
Calculating the second derivative of Epuiq we have the following expression.
B2Epuiq
Bt2i
“ rtaii B
2rptT q
Bt2T
` 2aitai´1i BrptT qBtT sp1´ pptT qq
´ 2rtaii BrptT qBtT ` ait
ai´1
i rptT qsBpptT qBtT
´ taii rptT qB
2pptT q
Bt2T
´ kir2aiwaii tai´1i BpptT qBtT ` w
ai
i t
ai
i
B2pptT q
Bt2T
s
` aipai ´ 1qtai´2i rrptT qp1´ pptT qq ´ kiwaii pptT qs
(6.17)
Given that 0 ă ai ď 1, fiptT q ą 0 and rptT q is concave decreasing, we conclude from Eq.6.17 that
BEpuiq2
Bt2i ă 0, thus the expected prospect-theoretic utility is concave with respect to ti. Moreover,
given that rptT q is concave decreasing, the function from the inequality Eq.6.16, i.e., taii BrptT qBtT `
airptT qtai´1i , is decreasing with respect to ti. For small values of ti, i.e., ti Ñ 0 and t´i ă tthres it
holds true that taii
BrptT q
BtT `airptT qtai´1i ą 0. We define s
∆“ sup
!
ti P r0, 1q|taii BrptT qBtT ` airptT qt
ai´1
i ą 0
)
thus the inequality Eq.6.16 holds true only in the interval r0, ss. Thus, the expected prospect-
theoretic utility function has a unique maximum in the interval r0, ss Ď r0, 1q. Therefore, the
best response strategy is single-valued.
Based on Lemma 1, we have shown that the best response strategy Bipt´iq is single-valued and
it should satisfy the first order condition of Epuiq, as follows.
BEpuiq
Bti “ ait
ai´1
i fiptT q ` taii BfiptT qBtT “ 0 (6.18)
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Based on Eq.6.18, we define the function
giptT q ∆“ ´aifiptT qBfiptT q
BtT
“ ti (6.19)
which should be satisfied by the best response strategy.
Theorem 2. The pure Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game G “ rN, tTiu, tEpuiqus is
unique.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the reduction to absurdity. We assume that there
exist two pure Nash equilibria for each visitor, i.e., ti˚,1 and ti˚,2 resulting in two different total
investments tT˚,1 and tT˚,2. Without loss of generality, we assume that tT˚,1 ă tT˚,2. Similar
analysis can be followed if tT˚,1 ą tT˚,2. We define the set S ∆“ ti P ℵ | tT˚ ă tthresu, i.e., the
set of all visitors with positive best response strategy. Thus, we have S2 Ď S1. Therefore,
based on Eq.6.19, we have
ř
iPS1 giptT˚,1q “ tT˚,1 and
ř
iPS2 giptT˚,2q “ tT˚,2. Given that S2 Ď S1
we can rewrite
ř
iPS1 giptT˚,1q “ tT˚,1 as
ř
iPS2 giptT˚,1q `
ř
iPS1zS2 giptT˚,1q “ tT˚,1. Thus, we haveř
iPS2 giptT˚,1q ď tT˚,1 ă tT˚,2 “
ř
iPS2 giptT˚,2q. Based on Lemma 1, we conclude to giptT˚,1q ą
giptT˚,2q @i P S2, if tT˚,2 ą tT˚,1, which is a contradiction. Thus, the pure Nash equilibrium is
unique.
6.5 Evaluation and Numerical Results
In this section, we provide a series of extensive numerical results evaluating the performance
and the inherent attributes of the proposed visitor-centric investment decision making frame-
work under prospect theory. Initially, and in order to gain some insight into the impact of the
various prospect theoretic key parameters related to visitor behavior, in terms of optimal time
management and obtained satisfaction, we focus on a basic scenario where all visitors exhibit
common risk preferences (i.e. homogeneous population). In the same basic setting, a com-
parative study of the proposed optimal solution demonstrates its superiority and benefits over
alternative strategies. Subsequently, we investigate how visitor heterogeneity in terms of both
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loss aversion and sensitivity parameters (i.e. heterogeneous population) impact user satisfac-
tion, influence the overall decision making process of visitors, and drive their final investment
at CPR and safe exhibits accordingly.
Before proceeding with the presentation of the obtained numerical results of our extensive eval-
uation, and in order to get more realistic observations, we describe the representative functions
utilized, as they were properly parameterized through a detailed research experimentation based
on data that were collected through a detailed questionnaire [68]. Specifically, the question-
naire was circulated to experts in the field of cultural heritage spaces (especially in the fields
of museums and art galleries) to identify the most influential parameters on visitor Quality
of Experience [68]. According to the collected and analyzed data, the key parameters that
significantly impact visitor QoE could be classified in two basic sets: those that are completely
controlled by a cultural heritage space (i.e. mainly related to the physical layout of exhibits),
and the ones that are also related to visitors behavior and their interdependence, such as crowd
density. The latter parameters are the ones of specific interest to our present study.
Please note that crowd density is closely related to and influenced by, the time invested and
spent by visitors at the exhibits.
Consequently the corresponding data obtained by the questionnaire were primarily exploited
to shape and formulate the production function F ptT q and the rate of return function rptT q.
The production function F ptT q is a concave function with respect to the total visiting time
investment tT (see assumption 2). Accordingly, for demonstration purposes and without loss of
generality, in our experimentation we considered the quadratic function F ptT q “ ct2T`dtT , where
c ă 0. Representative values of the parameters c and d were obtained based on the statistical
analysis of the questionnaire’s answers and data, primarily with respect to crowd density (i.e.
number of simultaneous visitors per square meter) and its impact on the respective achieved user
satisfaction. Therefore we concluded to the following production function F ptT q “ ´2t2T ` 3tT
and rate of return rptT q “ ´2tT ` 3, which is consistent with assumption 3 as well.
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6.5.1 Homogeneous population
Basic Properties
In this section, we initially examine visitor investment at each exhibit type (CPR or safe),
considering common sensitivity and loss aversion parameters (ai “ a, ki “ k). The same
interest in safe exhibits is assumed for each visitor, that is pwi “ wq, unless otherwise explicitly
stated. This suggests an homogeneous perception of visitors against potential resource failure.
The objective of this evaluation is to study the properties and operation of the prospect-
theoretic investment process between CPR and safe exhibits, by illustrating how homogeneity
in visitor risk attitudes influence their time investment at CPR and corresponding expected
prospect-theoretic utility.
Fig. 6.3 illustrates visitors optimal investment and expected prospect-theoretic utility as a
function of loss aversion parameter k (horizontal axis) for different indicative values of sensitivity
parameter a and parameter w. It can be clearly observed that there is a decrease in both visitor
optimal investment and expected prospect-theoretic utility as loss aversion index increases, for
all different values of w and sensitivity parameter a. The time investment falls gradually as loss
aversion grows because visitors become more loss averse, meaning that they weight losses more
than gains. This behavior makes “gambling” less appealing to them, and consequently they
push their investment at CPR exhibits down due to their fear for loss. The visitor expected
prospect-theoretic utility shows a continuous slight decrease as a result of the corresponding
drop of the investment. As the visitors invest less at CPR, it is reasonable to receive less joy
from observing it. Fig. 6.3 also demonstrates that the lower the interest of the visitor in safe
exhibits (as expressed via parameter w), the higher are both the investment at CPR and the
respective utility, as expected. Small values of w declare small interest in safe exhibits, which
in turn leads to higher investments at CPR exhibits.
Furthermore, the curves also depict that though a significant increase in visitors investment is
observed as a result of the rise of the sensitivity parameter a, on the contrary, the expected
prospect-theoretic utility dropped dramatically. As explained before, smaller values of a indi-
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Figure 6.3: Visitor optimal investment (left graph) and visitor expected prospect-theoretic
utility (right graph) as function of loss aversion index k - homogeneous population
cate sharper increase of prospect-theoretic utility for small values of perceived actual utility.
Consequently, visitors with smaller a become more prospect theoretic, or in other words become
risk seeking in losses and risk averse in gains. In a nutshell, visitors with smaller a become
happier compared to visitors with higher a for the same gain, or equivalently visitors with
smaller a though they may invest less at CPR, they get higher satisfaction. Similar observa-
tions are confirmed from the results presented in δ that illustrate visitor optimal investment
and expected prospect-theoretic utility as a function of sensitivity parameter a, for different
indicative values of parameter w. All the scenarios have been executed with visitors having
identical loss aversion indices k “ 2.25.
Fig. 6.5 presents the average values of optimal investment time, expected prospect-theoretic
utility and perceived actual utility of five visitors with identical prospect theoretic characteris-
tics. The figure depicts three groups of bar charts, each one representing a different loss aversion
value k applied to all visitors. As can be seen from this figure, visitors with higher loss aversion
spend less time in the CPR, while their expected prospect-theoretic utility is only slightly lower
when compared to visitors with smaller loss aversion. Consequently, from a cultural heritage
site operator point of view visitors with high loss aversion indices, would be more preferable
and attractive, as they achieve almost the same utility (i.e. satisfaction) without congesting
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Figure 6.4: Visitor optimal investment (left graph) and visitor expected prospect-theoretic
utility (right graph) as function of sensitivity parameter a - homogeneous population
the museum, since they spend less time in CPR exhibits of high popularity.
Comparative Results
Fig. 6.6 compares the performance of the proposed prospect-theoretic approach (in the fol-
lowing we also refer to as PT strategy) according to the optimal Nash Equilibrium solution,
with four alternative strategies. Specifically, the first alternative strategy (strategy 1) claims
that all visitors invest their entire time at safe exhibits, which provides a baseline scenario for
benchmarking purposes. The second alternative (strategy 2) divides the total optimal invest-
ment time at CPR exhibits as obtained by the Nash Equilibrium of the PT approach, by the
number of visitors in a uniform manner. The next alternative (strategy 3) divides the total
available time of each visitor in a static manner. In particular, each visitor allocates 20% of his
time to CRP exhibits and the rest 80% to safe exhibits. In the last strategy (strategy 4), each
visitor allocates to CPR exhibits random time within the interval p0, tthreshq and accordingly
the remaining of his available time to safe exhibits. Fig. 6.6 clearly shows that the proposed
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Figure 6.5: Optimal investment at CPR, expected prospect-theoretic utility and actual utility
for different values of loss aversion parameter k - homogeneous population
PT strategy outperforms all the rest strategies. We consider strategy 1 as a reference point
because both the investment time at CPR and the expected prospect-theoretic utility are zero.
Regarding strategy 2, even though the total optimal time investment at CPR is considered the
same with the proposed PT strategy, the latter outperforms the former with respect to the
achieved expected prospect-theoretic utility by approximately 27%, which is explained by the
fact that the two strategies differ in the distribution of the invested time at the CPR exhibits
among the visitors. In the proposed PT strategy, the time allocated to the CPR by each visitor
corresponds to the optimal time ti˚ that maximizes his prospect-theoretic utility, while in strat-
egy 2 each visitor time investment at the CPR is obtained by diving the total optimal time tT
by the number of visitors. Furthermore, both strategy 3 and strategy 4 result in negative values
of the expected prospect-theoretic utilities as in both scenarios the total time investment tT
at the CPR exhibits exceeds the tthresh value. As a consequence, the effective rate of return is
negative (see Fig. 6.2), meaning that CPR exhibits return a non-positive payoff to visitors and
in accordance to Eq. 6.11 a negative value of expected-prospect theoretic utility is obtained.
Fig. 6.7 further demonstrates the achieved expected prospect-theoretic utility as a function of
the total time tT invested at CPR exhibits by all visitors. The key objective of this experiment
100 Chapter 6. QoE under a Prospect Theoretic Perspective
PT strategy strategy 1 strategy 2 strategy 3 strategy 4
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Optimal investment (time) in CPR
Expected prospect-theoretic utility
**
Figure 6.6: Comparison of PT strategy with alternative time management strategies - homo-
geneous population
and study is to demonstrate that the proposed approach (PT strategy) properly identifies the
optimal time decision making and distribution among the various visitors, in order to maximize
their expected prospect-theoretic utility. The most left point in the horizontal axis corresponds
to the case where visitors invest only at safe exhibits, whereas the most right point refers to the
case where all visitors invest their total time at CPR exhibits. The results show that expected
prospect-theoretic utility increases gradually as visitors total investment increases, reaching a
maximum value at the point predicted by the prospect-theoretic approach (i.e., tT “ 0.367).
Afterwards the corresponding utility experiences a dramatic drop, while as explained above
when the total time investment tT exceeds the tthresh, the expected prospect-theoretic utility
obtains negative values.
Increasing number of visitors
The following Fig. 6.8 compares three different scenarios with increasing number of visitors
(i.e. five, fifteen and twenty visitors), in terms of the average optimal visiting time per visitor
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Figure 6.7: Expected prospect-theoretic utility versus total investment (time) at CPR - homo-
geneous population
and corresponding expected prospect-theoretic utility. The same sensitivity parameter a “ 0.2
has been assumed for all visitors and for all three scenarios. The graph demonstrates that even
when the number of visitors significantly increases, CPR does not fail as visitors properly adapt
their decisions. Therefore an increased number of visitors can still be supported. However, this
does not come at zero cost. We notice that, as the number of visitors increases, both the
average optimal time investment at CPR exhibits and the expected prospect-theoretic utility
of each visitor decrease, indicating that visitors should decrease their visiting time in order for
more subjects to have access to CPR.
Moreover, Fig. 6.9 illustrates how sensitivity parameter a influences visitor behavior and cor-
responding expected prospect-theoretic utility. The overall experimental setup is similar to the
previous one, however now the scenarios differ not only with respect to the number of homoge-
neous visitors, but also with respect to the corresponding sensitivity parameter a. Specifically,
the first scenario is executed with five homogeneous visitors of high sensitivity parameter a,
whereas in the second scenario the number of visitors is tripled but they present lower a, and
in the third scenario the number of visitors is further increased (quadrupled with respect to the
baseline scenario) while still maintaining low sensitivity parameter a. As can be seen from the
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Figure 6.8: Optimal investment at CPR and expected prospect-theoretic utility vs. no. of
visitors - homogeneous population
graph, the decrease of a resulted in a significant reduction of optimal investment time and an
equivalent remarkable growth of the expected prospect-theoretic utility. The increased visitor
sensitivity parameter causes the rise of investment in the expectation of improving the ob-
tained satisfaction. Nevertheless, the increased visitor sensitivity parameter keeps the expected
prospect-theoretic utility to low levels, whereas significant increase in the expected prospect-
theoretic utility is observed for the cases with low visitor sensitivity.
In order to further study the effect on competition for CPR exhibits between a single and
several self-interested visitors, we use the Fragility under Competition (FuC) metric defined as
the ratio of the fragility of CPR when there are several visitors to the fragility of CPR when
there is only one visitor [65]. The fragility of CPR exhibits is expressed by the failure probability
function, pptT q which steadily increases as visitor total investment tT increases. Specifically,
the Fragility under Competition is given by FuC “ ppt˚T q
ppt˚i q , where pptT˚ q is the failure probability
function when the total investment at the CPR at the Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) point
of N , N ě 2q homogeneous visitors is tT˚ whereas ppti˚ q is the failure probability function of a
visitor i, i P ℵ with N “ 1 who has the same risk preferences as the homogeneous group and
his optimal investment at CPR is ti˚ .
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Figure 6.9: Optimal time investment at CPR, expected prospect-theoretic utility and actual
utility for varying number of visitors and sensitivity parameter a - homogeneous population
Fig. 6.10 depicts that the FuC of CPR exhibits rises as the number of visitors grows, then
depending on the sensitivity parameter a, it reaches a peak and after that remains stable,
regardless of the number of visitors. Based on Theorem 1 the total investment at CPR at the
PNE is smaller than tthres, ptT˚ ă tthresq, while assumption 1 states that failure probability is an
increasing function of tT , and thus pptT˚ q ă pptthresq. As a consequence, FuC is upper bounded
by the factor pptthresq
ppt˚i q which is clearly confirmed by our numerical evaluation results. Fig. 6.10
also illustrates that the FuC bound increases when visitors have a smaller sensitivity parameter
a, thus becoming more risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses. This is justified by the
fact that the bounds are only influenced by the sensitivity parameter and they are independent
of the loss aversion index and CPR characteristics.
6.5.2 Heterogeneous population
In this section, we move away from the homogeneity assumption with respect to visitor behavior,
and investigate their decision making process under the presence of heterogeneity in their
behavioral pattern in terms of loss aversion and sensitivity. Specifically, we evaluate the visitor
satisfaction as expressed via the expected prospect-theoretic utility under such mixed and more
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Figure 6.10: Fragility under competition as a function of number of visitors - homogeneous
population
realistic scenarios, and investigate how these visitor behavioral parameters influence and guide
their final decision about the optimal time investment.
Heterogeneity in loss aversion
Fig. 6.11 demonstrates how heterogeneity in loss aversion influences visitor investment at CPR
exhibits, by considering and observing five visitors for whom though the sensitivity parameter
a is identical, they still differ in their attitudes towards loss. The horizontal axis corresponds
to the five different visitors with increasing value of their loss aversion parameter k.
The results demonstrate that both visitor investment at CPR and corresponding expected
prospect-theoretic utility steadily decreases as loss aversion increases. This trend is caused by
the growing importance the visitor assigns to losses as k increases. Furthermore, the results
confirm that if a visitor has lower loss aversion than another visitor, then the investment of
the former will be at least as high as the latter visitor’s investment. This is justified by the
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Figure 6.11: Visitor optimal investment (left graph) and visitor expected prospect-theoretic
utility (right graph) vs. loss aversion index k - heterogeneous population
fact that the effective rate of return f and its derivative f
1
are decreasing as influenced by
the loss aversion index. Moreover, it is clearly illustrated that visitors with higher sensitivity
parameter a, invest noticeably higher amount of time at CPR exhibits while gaining significantly
less satisfaction compared to visitors with lower sensitivity parameter a. It is also interesting to
notice that the impact of parameter a is greater for visitors with higher loss aversion. Finally,
it can be observed that the visitor who has low interest in safe exhibits while has increased
both sensitivity and loss aversion parameters, prefers to invest entirely at safe sources. In other
words, loss averse visitors get driven out of the CPR by gain seeking visitors.
Fig. 6.12 illustrates how visitor heterogeneity in loss aversion affects the fragility of a CPR. The
results presented in this figure compare a scenario where five visitors have identical both risk
parameters a and k (homogeneous scenario), against a scenario where the five visitors though
have identical sensitivity parameter a, they have different loss aversion indices (heterogeneous
scenario). For a fair comparison, in the homogeneous group of visitors (former scenario), we
use the mean loss aversion index of the heterogeneous society. Based on the corresponding
results, we observe that the investment at a CPR is slightly increased when the visitors have
different attitude towards losses compared to the case that all visitors have the same value for
parameter k. Consequently, we can argue that the fragility of a CPR increases when visitors
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Figure 6.12: CPR fragility for visitors with heterogeneous versus homogeneous loss aversion
indices
are heterogeneous in loss aversion.
Heterogeneity in sensitivity
Fig. 6.13 shows how heterogeneity in sensitivity parameter a influences visitor investment at
a CPR as well as corresponding visitor expected prospect-theoretic utility. We consider five
visitors who have identical loss aversion, but are characterized by different sensitivity parameter
a (horizontal axis). The results depict that visitors with higher parameter a, invest more at
a CPR and consequently obtain higher utility. As far as parameter k is concerned, we notice
that as k increases, both time investment and expected prospect utility decrease.
Finally, Fig. 6.14 demonstrates how heterogeneity in sensitivity parameter a influences the
fragility of CPR exhibits. The results presented in this figure compare a scenario of five homo-
geneous visitors (i.e same parameters a and k for all visitors) against a scenario where the five
visitors have identical loss aversion index k, but different sensitivity parameter values. For a
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Figure 6.13: Visitor optimal investment (left graph) and expected prospect-theoretic utility
(right graph) vs. sensitivity parameter a - heterogeneous population
fair comparison, all the visitors of the homogeneous group are assigned a sensitivity parameter
equal to the average sensitivity parameter value of all the members of the heterogeneous group.
The graph illustrates that the heterogeneity in sensitivity parameter a causes an increase in the
CPR investment and consequently an increase in the CPR fragility. Therefore the heterogeneity
in either loss aversion k or sensitivity parameter a, leads to the increase of the fragility of CPR
exhibits.
6.5.3 Conclusions
Based on the results we obtained, we concluded to the following outcomes and guidelines
reflecting both the cultural heritage site point of view and the individual visitor behavior and
satisfaction from their visiting experience:
1. From the cultural heritage site operator point of view, it is clearly more beneficial to have
visitors with small sensitivity parameter a, as they gain high satisfaction though they tend to
invest less time in their visit at a CPR. As a natural intuitive outcome of such an observation,
under the assumption of population with smaller sensitivity parameter a, a larger number of
visitors can be supported and served, still completing the tour with high satisfaction. People
with high sensitivity parameter a present overall a more risk neutral behavior. Consequently,
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Figure 6.14: CPR fragility for visitors with heterogeneous versus homogeneous sensitivity pa-
rameter a
their increased time investment at CPR exhibits results in reduced availability of CPR exhibits
to the rest of the visitors, thus increasing the probability of its failure, which in turn leads to
a large number of unsatisfied visitors.
2. With reference to loss aversion parameter k, a cultural heritage site should be more keen
on servicing visitors with medium loss aversion values. Nevertheless, having to choose between
visitors with high and low loss aversion values, the results reveal that the former visitors are
more profitable for the cultural heritage site operator. They do significantly shorter visits,
while their expected prospect-theoretic utility is comparable to the latter visitors who spend
more time observing CPR exhibits, thus causing higher congestion.
3. A significant diversity of visitor interest in safe exhibits, causes CPR failure especially in
the case that visitors are characterized by high sensitivity parameter a. The CPR failure can
be better prevented, if accommodating visitors with lower sensitivity parameter a, since in
that case visitors tend to invest less amount of time at the CPR exhibits. It is interesting to
note that CPR failure cannot be avoided, if visitors experience higher loss aversion (as denoted
through parameter k), instead of lower sensitivity parameter a, because though the total time
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investment at CPR decreases, the social optimum tthres, decreases as well.
4. Visitor heterogeneity in either loss aversion or sensitivity parameter increases the probability
of CPR failure.
5. An interesting outcome of our model and study is the observation that when a visitor i has
lower loss aversion than a visitor j, that is: ki ă kj, then the investment of the former will be
at least as high as the latter visitor’s investment, ti ě tj.
6. A visitor with high loss aversion k experiences significant disutility in case of a loss, and
consequently this dissatisfaction prevents him from investing in more risky options. Such a
type of visitor prefers to invest a limited amount of time at CPR exhibits, and the rest of the
his time at safe exhibits.
7. A visitor with high sensitivity parameter a becomes more difficult to be satisfied compared
to a visitor with lower sensitivity parameter. Assuming that the former visitor apart from
the increased sensitivity parameter, is also characterized by low interest w in safe exhibits -
which essentially denotes that he gets relatively low satisfaction from them - he will invest a
considerable amount of time at CPR exhibits in order to increase his satisfaction.
Chapter 7
A Socio-Technical Approach to the
Museum Congestion Management
Problem
7.1 Introduction
As already mentioned in Chapter 6, the understanding of inter-dependencies among visitors
is crucial in order to design computationally efficient decision making approaches that will
positively influence visitor touring and museum congestion. Congestion (or overcrowding) may
result in uncomfortable situations for visitors, such as queuing, noise, and challenges when
viewing popular exhibits, which in turn negatively affect visitor QoE [69].
Considering the aforementioned challenges, in Chapter 6 and in [70], a realistic approach to
museum congestion management problem is introduced, and the impact of visitor behavioral
factors is analyzed and assessed. It is explained in detail how exhibits, especially popular ones,
should be treated as potentially congestible resources because they are both non-excludable
(i.e., any visitor may access them) and subtractable (i.e., viewing by one visitor reduces the
ability of another to view the exhibit). This consideration is related to the concept of resource
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fragility, which is associated with resource collapse probability when there is over-exploitation.
It led us to introduce pricing as a means to further guide visitor behavior and decisions in order
to achieve more efficient operation for a museum and more positive experiences for visitors.
In this chapter, we integrate the concepts of visitor time investment, resource fragility, and
pricing, under a common umbrella. We utilize the principles of Prospect Theory because it
considers visitor subjectivity in decision making and thus provides a socio-technical perspective.
Our research work aims to shed some light on the impact of visiting pricing mechanisms on both
visitor QoE and the fragility of exhibits. We argue that the adoption of pricing constitutes a
valid measure against overcrowding. It drives visitors to take decisions that prevent them from
over-exploiting exhibits, thus reducing the likelihood of exhibit failure and preserving museum
operation stability.
7.2 System Model
7.2.1 Assumptions and Motivation
Visitor decisions about which exhibits to view and how much time to spend at each one consti-
tute decisions that entail risk. The outcome of visiting a popular exhibit (CPR exhibit) is nei-
ther guaranteed nor always positive. A CPR may experience ”failure” due to over-exploitation,
with a probability that increases as visitors total time invested at CPR increases.
To prevent over-exploitation of CPR exhibits, we adopt a pricing mechanism where visitors
are charged according to how much time they invest at CPR exhibits [69], [71]. In several
computational, technical and physical social systems, pricing has been considered, as a flexible
and effective mechanism, which drives user decisions and actions towards more efficient museum
operation, from a social welfare point of view [72]–[75]. A survey conducted via questionnaire
in the British Museum revealed that only 1% of respondents visited the museum because it was
free, while more than 15% claimed that congestion was what they disliked the most in relation
to their visiting experience, and were willing to pay higher charges so as to obtain improved
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QoE [69].
7.2.2 Utility Function Modeling with Pricing
In our model, we consider N visitors, where ℵ “ t1, 2, ..Nu denotes their set, and each visitor
has an available actual visiting time tMaxi . Part of the time, ti, is invested in observing CPR
exhibits and the remaining, ti
max ´ ti, in visiting safe exhibits. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, in the following analysis we consider the normalized visiting time set Ti “ r0, 1s,
where the upper bound tMaxi is assumed to be equal to one for all visitors. Visitor perceived
actual utility gained from safe exhibits is a linear function with respect to visitor invested time,
ti
max ´ ti, at safe exhibits and is given as follows:
zSAFEi ptiq “ wi ¨ ptmaxi ´ tiq (7.1)
where wi expresses the overall importance of safe exhibits for visitor i and is defined via the
combination of safe exhibit historical importance ew P r0, 1s and visitor subjective interest
Ii P r0, 1s in the specific safe exhibits, i.e., wi “ ew ¨ Ii.
Regarding visitor perceived actual utility gained from CPR exhibits, we investigate the impact
of an exponential charge as a means to avoid exhibit failure and resulting visitor dissatisfaction.
Therefore, if a visitor i invests ti time at CPR exhibits, they are charged proportionally to their
invested time, i.e., c ¨ tiy [76], [77]. The parameters c, y are configurable and positive, with
y ě 1 and c P r0, 1s, and they are elaborated on later in the article. Consequently, visitor’s i
perceived actual utility from CPR exhibits is given as:
zCPRi ptiq “ wic ¨ titT ¨ F ptT q ´ c ¨ t
y
i (7.2)
The first part of Eq. 7.2 reveals that visitor perceived actual utility at CPR exhibits depends
not only on time invested but also on total invested time by all visitors, tT “ řNi“1 ti (which
implicitly reflects congestion). The production function F ptT q signifies the return for visitors
7.2. System Model 113
from CPR exhibits and depends on total invested time, tT , at CPR exhibits. Following on
from existing literature [67], [70], F ptT q is assumed to be concave with F p0q “ 0, F 1p0q ą wi
and F 1pN ¨ tmaxi q ă 0. The parameter wci P r0, 1s signifies the importance of CPR exhibits
for visitor i, while for simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that, wci “ 1, due
to the importance of those exhibits. To simplify the above equation, we define the rate of
return function rptT q “ F ptT qtT , which is non-increasing, monotonic, concave, twice continuously
differentiable with respect to the normalized total investment time tT , tT P r0, 1s and rptT q ą 1.
Therefore, visitor i perceived actual utility from CPR exhibits is obtained as:
zCPRi ptiq “ ti ¨ rptT q ´ c ¨ tyi (7.3)
Combining Eq. 7.1 and Eq. 7.3, visitor total perceived actual utility becomes:
ziptiq “ wi ¨ ptmaxi ´ tiq ` ti ¨ rptT q ´ c ¨ tyi (7.4)
7.2.3 Prospect Theoretic Framework under Pricing
The key to improving visitor museum experience is to understand unknown visitor behavior.
When visitors need to make risky choices, they tend to exhibit risk seeking or risk averse
behavior according to their personal characteristics. A visitor’s decision about how much time
to invest at a CPR exhibit involves risk because a CPR may be congested in which case the
visitor may gain no satisfaction from it. We exploit the principles of Prospect Theory to
properly formulate visitor QoE while taking visitor risk-aware behavioral characteristics into
account. The prospect-theoretic utility function of a visitor i is given as:
uipziq “
$’’&’’%
pzi ´ z0qai , zi ě z0
´kipz0 ´ ziqai , zi ă z0
(7.5)
where zi is the visitor’s perceived actual utility as defined in Eq. 7.4 and z0 denotes the reference
point of the visitor’s prospect-theoretic utility. People typically tend to evaluate gains and losses
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not as absolute values but with respect to a reference point. In our work, the reference point
for a visitor i, is defined as the perceived actual utility that they get if all their available time,
tmaxi , is invested at safe exhibits, and it is given as follows:
z0 “ wi ¨ tmaxi (7.6)
The parameter ai P p0, 1s is the sensitivity parameter and expresses the sensitivity of a visitor
towards gains and losses. Smaller values of ai indicate a higher increase in prospect utility for
small values of actual utility, as well as a greater decrease in prospect utility for values close
to the reference point z0. In addition, parameter ki P r0,8q signifies the importance someone
places on gains and losses.
Specifically, if ki ą 1, then a visitor is loss averse and weights losses more than gains, whereas
when 0 ď ki ď 1, the visitor is gain-seeking and weights gains more than losses.
Combining Eq.7.4, Eq.7.5 and Eq.7.6, the prospect-theoretic utility function for a visitor i can
be rewritten as:
uipziq “
$’’&’’%
taii ¨ prptT q ´ wi ´ c ¨ ty´1i qai , zi ě z0
´ki ¨ taii ¨ pc ¨ ty´1i ` wiqai , zi ă z0
(7.7)
In the case of CPR failure, (i.e., zi ă z0), visitor i gains satisfaction only from observing
safe exhibits. However, even if visitor gains no utility from CPR exhibits, they still have
to pay for the cost of visiting them. The probability of CPR failure is denoted by pptT q
and according to the concept of the Tragedy of the Commons [70], [78], it is assumed to be
convex, strictly increasing, and twice continuously differentiable with respect to tT P r0, 1s
with pptT q “ 1, @tT ě 1. For demonstration purposes and in line with the aforementioned
assumptions we select pptT q “ tT (i.e., linear function).
Accordingly, based on Eq. 7.7 and taking into account the uncertainty introduced by the
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probability of failure, the expected prospect-theoretic utility of visitor i is given by:
Epuiq “ taii ¨ fptiq (7.8)
where fptiq ∆“ rptT q ¨ p1´pptT qq´ki ¨pptT q ¨ pc ¨ ty´1i `wiqai is the effective rate of return of CPR
exhibits for the visitor i and rptT q “ prptT q ´ wi ´ c ¨ ty´1i qai . The function rptT q is decreasing,
concave, and positive with respect to visitor time investment. The more time visitors spend, the
more congested the museum becomes and the more visitor expected prospect-theoretic utility
decreases.
Analyzing the properties of function rptT q and after proper mathematical derivations, we con-
clude with the constraint (assuming c ‰ 0):
ti ă y´1
c
1´ wi
c
, wi P r0, 1s (7.9)
7.3 Problem Formulation and Optimization
7.3.1 Formulation
Every visitor wishes to maximize their QoE without considering the impact of their decisions
(i.e., investment time at exhibits) on others. The goal of this study is to find the optimal
invested time at CPR exhibits for each visitor in order to maximize their expected prospect-
theoretic utility, under the considered general pricing framework. It is noted that pricing as a
means of controlling exhibit fragility under probabilistic uncertainty has not been investigated
in the context of Prospect Theory modeling in relevant works (e.g., [70]). The contribution of
our work is to fill this research gap, and demonstrate that a pricing mechanism reduces CPR
exhibit failure probability. It is achieved via a mathematical formulation of the corresponding
problem based on the theory of S-modular Games [79], [80], as detailed below.
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Based on Eq.7.8, the problem is formulated as a maximization problem of the expected prospect-
theoretic utility of each visitor i, while considering visiting time limitations, ti P Ti “ r0, 1s as
well as the constraint Eq. 7.9:
max
tiPTi
Epuiq “ taii fiptiq (7.10)
7.3.2 Solution
The above maximization problem can be considered as a non-cooperative game among visi-
tors who act as rational players making optimal decisions about themselves in a selfish and
distributed manner. Let G “ rℵ, Ti,Epuiqs denote the non-cooperative game among N visitors
where Ti “ r0, 1s, @i P ℵ indicates the strategy space of each visitor i and Epuiq indicates the
expected prospect-theoretic utility each visitor i gains from game G. As mentioned before, the
class of S-modular Games is adopted to treat this problem. In particular, sub-modular games
are characterized by strategic substitutes, which means that an increase in the actions of one
player leads other users to decrease their actions accordingly. Sub-modular games are well
aligned with the problem of optimizing investment and pricing in Fragile CPR problems, since
user strategies are shaped with respect to the probability of CPR fragility and the visiting cost
due to pricing. Towards solving this non-cooperative game, the Nash equilibrium concept is
adopted.
We will first prove that the game is sub-modular and thus that there exists a Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 7.1. (Sub-Modular Function) If the function Epuiq has derivatives of all orders,
then Epuiq is a sub-modular function, if and only if the following holds true @i P ℵ:
B2Epuiq
BtiBtj ď 0 (7.11)
Definition 7.2. (Sub-Modular Game) A strategic game G is said to be sub-modular if:
1. @i P ℵ, Ti is a compact subset of the Euclidean space.
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2. The function Epuiq is sub-modular in ti for each fixed tj, @j P ℵ.
Theorem 1. (Existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium) The non-cooperative game G with
pricing is a sub-modular game, thus it has at least one Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE).
Proof. Initially, it is evident that the set Ti “ r0, 1s is a compact subset of the Euclidean space.
Then, we calculate: B
2Epuiq
BtiBtj “ tai´1i hptiq, where hptiq “ ´airptT q ´ kiaipcty´1i ` waii q ` tip1 ´
tT qB2rptT qBtiBtj ´ kiaicpy ´ 1qty´1i pcty´1i ` wiqai´1 ` paip1 ´ tT q ´ tiqBrptT qBtj ´ ti BrptT qBti . Given that the
function rptT q is decreasing, concave, and positive, we conclude that the first four terms of hptiq
are negative. We set φptT q “ paip1´tT q´tiqBrptT qBtj ´ti BrptT qBti . By applying the Intermediate Value
Theorem, we have: φptT “ 0q “ ai BrptT qBtj ă 0 and φptT “ 1q “ ´ti BrptT qBtj ´ ti BrptT qBti ą 0. Thus,
there exists at least one value µ P Ti “ r0, 1s, @i P ℵ, such that hpµq “ 0. Given that φptT “
0q ă 0, then hptT q ă 0, @ti P p0, µq. Based on the above analysis and Eq. 7.9 (assuming c ‰ 0 ),
we conclude that the game G is sub-modular ti P p0, λq, where λ “ mintµ, y´1
b
1´wi
c
u, wi P r0, 1s,
thus there exists at least one PNE ti˚ P p0, λq, @i P ℵ.
7.4 Evaluation and Results
In this section, we present a series of numerical results to evaluate the impact of pricing on both
visitor experience (expressed via the expected prospect-theoretic utility) and museum operation
stability (in terms of CPR failure probability) under different visitor behavioral parameters sce-
narios. For purposes of comparison, three different pricing alternatives are evaluated, referring
to different configurations of the parameter y of the pricing function, c ¨ tiy, as follows: (a) a low
charge: minimal pricing, reflected by a higher value of y “ 1.8, (b) a medium charge: average
pricing, reflected by y “ 1.3, (c) a high charge: aggressive pricing, reflected by a lower value
of y “ 1. In all the above cases, parameter c is assumed equal to 0.2. Also, the ”no charge”
option refers to a baseline scenario where only prospect-theory is applied without pricing (i.e.,
c “ 0 in Eq. 7.2). Similarly to [70] and for demonstration only purposes, we have considered
the following production function F ptT q “ ´2t2T ` 3tT for all cases.
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Figure 7.1: Impact of different pricing alternatives on visitor time investment and expected
prospect-theoretic utility for two different sensitivity parameters a
Fig. 7.1 illustrates how different pricing alternatives influence visitor time investment at CPR
exhibits and visitor expected prospect-theoretic utility. Two different scenarios have been
considered with respect to the sensitivity parameter (low where a “ 0.2 and high where a “
0.8). It can be observed that as the charging becomes more aggressive (i.e., lower value of
y), both visitor time investment and expected prospect-theoretic utility decrease. Based on
the framework operation it is noted that a lower visitor investment at CPR exhibits induces a
corresponding drop in CPR failure probability.
Furthermore, the results indicate that visitors who have a lower sensitivity parameter a are less
affected by the application of pricing (see bars labeled ”charge” that represent the total charge
per visitor based on their time investment). This is explained by their tendency to invest a
smaller portion of their available time at CPR exhibits, despite gaining higher satisfaction from
their visit. Moreover, it can be seen that pricing influences visitor time investment more and
corresponding expected prospect-theoretic utility less. This observation is key to improving
operation efficiency for cultural heritage space operators.
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Figure 7.2: (a) Optimal investment time at CPR and (b) Expected prospect-theoretic utility
for different loss aversion values and pricing policies
The line graphs in Fig. 7.2a and Fig. 7.2b illustrate the impact of different pricing mechanisms
on visitor investment and expected prospect-theoretic utility, for various loss aversion values k.
Both metrics decrease significantly as pricing increases and becomes more aggressive, and this
trend is similar for the different loss aversion values k.
Fig. 7.3a demonstrates CPR probability failure for different pricing levels as a function of
increasing numbers of visitors. We observe that, as expected, CPR failure probability increases
as the number of visitors increase, whereas it decreases as the price increases. In particular, we
observe that for the high charge option, the decrease in failure probability when compared with
the ”no charge” option ranges approximately from 12% to 14%, depending on the number of
visitors. Respectively, for the medium pricing option, the corresponding benefits are 5% to7%,
with an overall increasing trend as the number of visitors increases.
Fig. 7.3b also reveals that, although visitor expected prospect-theoretic utility drops as the
number of museum visitors increases, the influence of charging on visitor expected prospect-
theoretic utility remains very small. Taking into account that probability of failure is a sig-
nificant operation parameter that influences both visitor satisfaction and exhibit fragility, it is
evident that pricing is a valid and effective tool for reducing this probability. It drives visitors
to a more social stable operation point, without excluding them from visiting popular exhibits.
As a result, a museum can accommodate a larger number of visitors at any given time in a
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Figure 7.3: (a) CPR probability failure and (b) Expected prospect-theoretic utility values, for
increasing number of visitors
satisfactory manner.
Below, we present Pricing-Fragility under Competition (PFuC), a socio-technical metric that
allows to further study the effect of competition on CPR exhibits between a single and several
self-interested visitors. Specifically, PFuC is defined here as the ratio of the fragility of CPR
under pricing when there are several visitors, to the fragility of CPR when there is only one
visitor. The fragility of CPR exhibits is expressed by the failure probability function, pptT q
which increases as visitor total investment tT increases. In particular, the Pricing-Fragility
under Competition is given by PFuC “ ppt˚T q
ppt˚i q . The failure probability function, pptT˚ q is the
total investment, tT˚ , at the CPR at the Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) point of N homogeneous
visitors,pN ě 2q under the applied pricing policy. ppti˚ q is the failure probability function of
visitor i, i P ℵ who has the same risk preferences as the group and their optimal investment at
the CPR is ti˚ in cases of no pricing.
Fig. 7.4 depicts that PFuC of CPR exhibits rises as the number of visitors grows, after which de-
pending on sensitivity parameter α, it reaches a peak and then remains stable (upper bounded),
regardless of the number of visitors, for all pricing policies. It is also clearly noted that, as pric-
ing increases and becomes more aggressive, the value of the PFuC decreases, which basically
quantifies and confirms the impact of pricing on the potential failure of the CPR. Furthermore,
the results illustrate that the PFuC bound increases when visitors have a smaller sensitivity
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Figure 7.4: Pricing-Fragility under Competition as a function of number of visitors
parameter a, meaning that they become more risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the problem of congestion management in museums is treated from a socio-
technical perspective. Museums are considered as dynamic social environments presenting
constraints and inter-dependencies among the involved subjects and their behaviors thereof.
This stimulates the need for the design of computationally efficient and distributed optimization
and decision making approaches regarding visitor touring choices. We have adopted a real-
life modeling approach regarding the museum visitor behavior characteristics and reactions,
and in particular visitors’ behavioral risk attitudes with respect to their decisions in resource
sharing settings (i.e. different types of museum exhibits to be visited), have been captured and
represented by the use of prospect theory.
122Chapter 7. A Socio-Technical Approach to the Museum Congestion Management Problem
Motivated by several studies that position pricing as a mechanism to prevent overcrowding
in museums, we have analyzed and studied the effect and impact of potential pricing on the
decisions and strategies of visitors when acting as prospect-theoretic decision-makers. Based
on the obtained results, we have concluded that appropriate pricing policies constitute a valid
and efficient measure that drive visitor decisions with respect to their time investment at
popular and crowded exhibits, to more effective points from a social welfare point of view.
Overall, when appropriate pricing is applied, the adapted visitor decisions and strategies can
significantly improve overall museum stability by reducing exhibit failure probability, without
noticeably affecting the expected visitor experience.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Concluding Remarks
This PhD thesis focused on visitor QoE optimization in cultural heritage spaces and specifically
in museums. We suggested several approaches to determine the optimal time visitors should
invest in a museum visit in order to maximize their perceived satisfaction while preserving
museum operation stability.
These days cultural heritage spaces, and particularly museums, are becoming dynamic envi-
ronments in the service of the society which aim to reconnect with the public and demonstrate
their value and relevance to contemporary life. Museums are informal learning environments
and visiting them should be nothing but beneficial, as people always gain useful information
and positive experiences from a visit. However, new techniques are required in order to ac-
tively engage museum visitors in a participatory manner and enhance their personalized visiting
experience.
In our research work, therefore, we considered cultural heritage spaces as Cyber Physical Social
Systems where visitors evolve in an environment that induces several constraints and inter-
dependencies. Visitor perceived satisfaction is also a subjective metric that depends on both
visitor personal characteristics and characteristics of the system the visitor belongs to. As a
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result, we adopt a socio-techical perspective in order to address the aforementioned challenges.
Briefly, throughout our research, we properly modeled visitor QoE (both qualitatively and quan-
titatively), improved several aspects of the cultural heritage touring experience, studied visitor
unknown behavior tendencies-especially in terms of decision making under risk or uncertainty
and addressed the problem of congestion management in museums.
A summary of our findings and the resulting conclusions are presented below:
• The main parameters that influence visitor QoE were identified and different weights
were determined for each of these parameters. Different QoE functions were formulated
for each parameter and visiting style (ant, butterfly, fish and grasshopper) as well as a
total QoE function with respect to all parameters, visiting styles and parameter weights.
The problem of determining the optimal values for these parameters in order to maximize
visitor QoE was formulated and solved.
• A social recommendation and personalization analysis was presented. The suggested
framework exploited common characteristics and interests among visitors, created visitor
profiles and recommended the most interesting exhibits for each visitor. Moreover, the
shortest path to follow in a museum in order to view recommended exhibits was proposed.
The fundamental novelty of our proposed routing approach is that the algorithm takes
the parameters that influence visitor QoE into consideration and not simply distances or
other physical constraints only.
• The joint problem of optimizing the recommendation selection and the visiting time
management in museums was studied under a QoE-driven game theory approach. Vis-
itors were considered as learning automata, who sense the museum environment, gain
knowledge from their past actions and are finally able to make more personally beneficial
selections in the future. The demonstrated numerical results revealed the effectiveness
and efficiency of the proposed algorithm and the comparative results that were presented
confirmed its superiority relative to other recommendation approaches.
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• Cultural heritage spaces are considered as Cyber-Physical Social Systems where visitors
evolve in an environment that induces constraints and their behaviour and decisions
influence and are influenced by others. Therefore, QoE function was reformulated into
two parts: (a) the pure QoE function and (b) the congestion control function. The pure
QoE function reflects the trade-off between the QoE a visitor gains during a museum visit
and the duration of a visit. The congestion control function was sophisticatedly selected
in order to achieve fairness among museum visitors with respect to accessing exhibits and
time spent in a museum.
• Museum visitors are not neutral utility maximizers as has been assumed in the past. On
the contrary, they tend to exhibit risk seeking or loss averse behaviour under uncertainty or
risk. In order to capture and model visitor behaviour and decision making under potential
risk or uncertainty, the principles of Prospect Theory and the Tragedy of Commons were
adopted.
• QoE function was reevaluated from the perspective of a more pragmatic modeling with
respect to visitor behavioral characteristics and risk preferences. Thus, QoE function
was replaced by visitor prospect-theoretic utility function, which considers visitor actual
utility, visitor available visiting time and visitor reflection on gains and losses.
• The exhibits in a cultural heritage space are organized into two main groups: a) safe
exhibits that typically correspond to less congested ones, where the visitors are assumed
to receive guaranteed satisfaction proportionate to the visiting time invested, and b)
Common Pool of Resources (CPR) exhibits, which are the most popular exhibits with
likely increased congestion and uncertain outcomes in terms of visitor satisfaction. The
satisfaction a visitor gains from a CPR exhibit depends not only on their time invested
at it, but also on the time invested by the rest of the visitors.
• The problem of visitor prospect-theoretic utility maximization, which considers the phys-
ical limitations of visitor visiting time, was formulated as a non-cooperative game among
the visitors and solved in a distributed manner by determining its Nash equilibrium
point. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point demonstrated the
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stable operation of the considered social system at the equilibrium point. At that point,
visitor satisfaction is guaranteed with optimal investment of available visiting time at
corresponding exhibits.
• From the cultural heritage site operator point of view, it is more beneficial to have visitors
with a small sensitivity parameter a, as they gain considerable satisfaction despite tending
to invest less time at a CPR exhibit. As a natural intuitive outcome of such an observation,
a larger number of such visitors can be supported and served, while still completing their
tour with a high level of satisfaction. On the other hand, people with a high sensitivity
parameter a generally present a more risk neutral behavior. Consequently, their greater
time spent at CPR exhibits results in reduced availability of CPR exhibits for other
visitors, thus increasing the probability of an exhibit failure, which in turn leads to a
larger number of unsatisfied visitors.
• A cultural heritage site should prefer visitors with medium loss aversion values. However,
if visitors demonstrate high or low loss aversion values, the numerical results revealed that
the former visitors are more profitable for the cultural heritage site operator. Although
they spend less time visiting, their expected prospect-theoretic utility is comparable to the
latter visitors who spend more time observing CPR exhibits, causing greater congestion.
• A variety of levels of interest in safe exhibits among visitors causes CPR failure especially
when visitors are characterized by a high sensitivity parameter a. CPR failure can be
prevented, if visitors possess a lower sensitivity parameter a since they tend to invest less
time at the CPR exhibits. However, if instead of visitors with a lower sensitivity parameter
a, there are visitors with higher loss aversion k, CPR failure can not be avoided.
• Visitor heterogeneity in either loss aversion or sensitivity parameters increases the prob-
ability of CPR failure.
• When a visitor i has lower loss aversion than a visitor j, that is: ki ă kj, then the
investment of the former will be at least as high as the latter visitor’s investment, ti ě tj.
• A visitor with high loss aversion k experiences significant disutility in case of a loss, and
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consequently this dissatisfaction prevents him from investing in more risky options. Such
a type of visitor prefers to invest a limited amount of time at CPR exhibits, and remaining
time at safe exhibits.
• A visitor with a high sensitivity parameter a becomes more difficult to satisfy compared
to a visitor with a lower sensitivity parameter. Assuming that the former visitor is
characterized not only by a higher sensitivity parameter, but also by a low interest w in
safe exhibits - which essentially denotes a relatively low satisfaction gained from them -
the visitor will invest a considerable amount of time at CPR exhibits in order to increase
perceived satisfaction.
• We studied and analyzed the effect and impact of potential pricing on visitor decisions
when visitors act as prospect-theoretic decision-makers. The numerical results presented
revealed that pricing constitutes a valid mechanism to prevent museum crowd density and
improve museum stability. Adapted visitor decisions reduce exhibit failure probability
without noticeably affecting the expected visitor experience.
8.2 Recommendations for further research
Despite considerable and extended research interest in cultural heritage, the problem of mu-
seum congestion has not been resolved. It still remains an issue of significant practical and
research interest as crowd density has been shown to be one of the most influential factors
that negatively affect visitor QoE. Therefore, future studies could explore this issue further by
exploiting Cumulative Prospect Theory and Framing Effects.
In contrast to Prospect Theory, Cumulative Prospect Theory allows probabilities to enter the
utility function non linearly with the use of a weighting function that considers the tendency
of people to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. Therefore
Cumulative Prospect Theory can be claimed to produce more pragmatic results.
Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory, one of the issues that could be researched is the desig-
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nation of a museum routing mechanism which would investigate visitor choices when congestion
information is provided. Electronic devices installed at specific junctions in the museum would
inform visitors about the overcrowding they would meet. Under that setting, visitors would
only have to deal with a choice under risk, rather than under uncertainty, because the proba-
bilities of the possible outcomes would be known. Similar studies have already been conducted
in other fields where numerical results revealed that people become risk seeking when outcome
probabilities are high, and risk averse when outcome probabilities are lower.
Moreover, another idea for future research is the exploitation of framing effects which is part
of the development of Prospect Theory. We consider framing effects as a promising approach
for the reduction of congestion as it is based on the potential of properly influencing visitor
decisions so that they can be redirected to different floors, rooms or buildings of a museum
during busy days or peak hours. Specifically, it highlights either the positive or the negative
aspects of the available choices of a decision problem (e.g. either presenting the museum as
75% full or as 25% empty). Thus, risky prospects can be respectively framed as either gains
or losses. The available choices and the potential outcomes are always the same. However,
the way available choices are framed or described lead visitors to make potentially different
decisions. Although changing the description of a prospect should not change the decision in
principle, framing effects illustrate that not only is it possible but, more importantly, it can
also be predicted.
Furthermore, it would be of great research interest to conduct real experiments with actual mu-
seum visitors in order to evaluate the impact of visitor risk preferences on perceived satisfaction
and museum congestion, as well as the influence of pricing policies on museum operation stabil-
ity. The results of such experiments would validate the frameworks proposed in this dissertation
as well as their applicability under realistic conditions.
Finally, an alternative plan for future study involves the realization of our proposed pricing
mechanism in other fields of shared resources, such as in the management of traffic congestion
and the mobile edge computing environment, where the available resources are of shared nature,
while the user actions and behaviors are strongly interdependent.
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Extensive Summary in Greek
Εκτεταμένη Περίληψη στα Ελληνικά
Η piαρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή piραγματεύεται το piρόβλημα της βελτιστοpiοίησης της piοιότητας
της εμpiειρίας του χρήστη σε δυναμικά «κυβερνο-φυσικά» κοινωνικά συστήματα και συγκεκριμένα
σε χώρους piολιτισμού, όpiως είναι τα μουσεία. Εξετάζονται θέματα piου αφορούν τις βέλτιστες
αpiοφάσεις των εpiισκεpiτών σχετικά με το χρόνο εpiίσκεψης και τις στρατηγικές piεριήγησής τους
σε ένα μουσείο ή χώρο piολιτισμού, με αpiώτερο στόχο τη μεγιστοpiοίηση της ευχαρίστησης piου
λαμβάνουν και την αντιμετώpiιση της συμφόρησης των μουσείων.
Οι χώροι piολιτισμικής κληρονομιάς και ειδικότερα τα μουσεία αpiοτελούν έναν ειδικό τύpiο κοινωνικο-
φυσικών συστημάτων γιατί σε αντίθεση με άλλα κοινωνικά συστήματα όpiως είναι τα σχολεία ή
οι εκκλησίες, η εμpiειρία του χρήστη εξαρτάται κυρίως αpiό τον ίδιο. Ο χρήστης είναι αυτός piου
εpiιλέγει το χρόνο piου θα αφιερώσει σε κάθε έκθεμα, το συνολικό χρόνο piου θα διαρκέσει η ε-
piίσκεψή του ή τα εκθέματα piου θα εpiισκεφτεί μέσα σε ένα μουσείο. Εpiίσης οι χώροι piολιτισμού
εμpiεριέχουν εκτός αpiό φυσικούς και τεχνικούς piεριορισμούς, piεριορισμούς piου piροέρχονται αpiό
ανθρώpiινες συμpiεριφορές. Η συμpiεριφορά και οι αpiοφάσεις ενός εpiισκέpiτη, όpiως ο χρόνος piου
piαρατηρεί ένα έκθεμα, εpiηρεάζουν αυτές των υpiολοίpiων. Για το λόγο αυτό, υιοθετείται αpiό την
piαρούσα εργασία μία κοινωνικο-τεχνική piροσέγγιση με στόχο τη βελτιστοpiοίηση της εμpiειρίας
του χρήστη.
Η piαρούσα μελέτη εpiικεντρώνεται σε δύο βασικούς ερευνητικούς άξονες, piροκειμένου να αντιμετω-
piιστούν οι piαραpiάνω piροκλήσεις και να piροσφερθεί στους εpiισκέpiτες των μουσείων μία βέλτιστη,
piροσωpiοpiοιημένη εμpiειρία. Ο piρώτος άξονας αφορά την piοιοτική και piοσοτική μοντελοpiοίηση
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της piοιότητας της εμpiειρίας του χρήστη καθώς εpiίσης και την piαρουσίαση μεθοδολογιών piου βελ-
τιώνουν την piεριήγηση του εpiισκέpiτη στο μουσείο, εpiομένως και τη λαμβανόμενη εμpiειρία του.
Ο δεύτερος άξονας εpiικεντρώνεται στη μελέτη της συμpiεριφοράς των εpiισκεpiτών και ειδικότερα
όταν καλούνται να λάβουν αpiοφάσεις piου ενέχουν ρίσκο ή αβεβαιότητα, όpiως συνήθως συμβαίνει
σε ρεαλιστικά δυναμικά κοινωνικά συστήματα.
Κεφάλαιο 2
Αναλυτικότερα, στο Κεφάλαιο 2 της διατριβής, piαρουσιάζεται η μοντελοpiοίηση της piοιότητας της
εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη ενός μουσείου, η οpiοία βασίζεται σε φυσικές piαραμέτρους piου εpiηρεάζουν
κατά κύριο λόγο τη λαμβανόμενη ευχαρίστησή του. Συγκεκριμένα, οι piαράμετροι αυτοί είναι: η
αpiόσταση μεταξύ του εpiισκέpiτη και του εκθέματος, η αpiόσταση μεταξύ δύο διαδοχικών εκθεμάτων,
ο χρόνος piου piερνά ένας εpiισκέpiτης με ένα ξεναγό του μουσείου, το μέγεθος του μουσείου και
η συμφόρηση (εφόσον υpiάρχει) στο μουσείο. Ενδεικτικές τιμές για τις μεταβλητές αυτές piήραμε
μέσω ερωτηματολογίου piου διανεμήθηκε σε ανθρώpiους σχετικών ειδικοτήτων, όpiως αρχαιολόγους
και κριτικούς τέχνης. Για κάθε μία αpiό αυτές τις μεταβλητές, ορίσαμε διαφορετική συνάρτηση για
την piοιότητα εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη, οι οpiοίες λαμβάνουν υpiόψιν τους και τα διαφορετικά είδη
εpiισκεpiτών.
Στη βιβλιογραφία, οι εpiισκέpiτες ανάλογα με τον τρόpiο piου piεριηγούνται σε ένα μουσείο, κα-
τηγοριοpiοιούνται σε τέσσερα διαφορετικά είδη: στους “εpiισκέpiτες μυρμήγκια”, τους “εpiισκέpiτες
piεταλούδες”, τους “εpiισκέpiτες ψάρια” και τους “εpiισκέpiτες ακρίδες”. Οι “εpiισκέpiτες μυρμήγκια”
ενδιαφέρονται για όλα τα εκθέματα του μουσείου και για τις λεpiτομέρειές τους. Για το λόγο αυτό,
ακολουθούν ένα μονοpiάτι κοντά στα εκθέματα, αpiοφεύγοντας το κέντρο κάθε αίθουσας. Χαίρο-
νται να piερνούν χρόνο με ξεναγό γιατί τους δίνει εpiιpiρόσθετες piληροφορίες για τα έργα τέχνης.
Η συμφόρηση piου μpiορεί να συναντήσουν δεν τους εpiηρεάζει όσο άλλα είδη εpiισκεpiτών καθώς
είναι διατεθειμμένοι να piεριμένουν.
Αντίθετα οι “εpiισκέpiτες ψάρια” piροτιμούν να κινούνται στο κέντρο κάθε αίθουσας γιατί ενδια-
φέρονται για τη μεγαλύτερη εικόνα των εκθεμάτων ενώ piαράλληλα τους αρέσει να piαρατηρούν
piερισσότερα αpiό ένα εκθέματα. Δεν ενδιαφέρονται για τις λεpiτομέρειές των εκθεμάτων ούτε
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θέλουν να piερνούν ιδιαίτερο χρόνο με ξεναγό. Ο αυξημένος αριθμός εpiισκεpiτών εpiηρεάζει δρα-
ματικά την ευχαρίστηση piου λαμβάνουν γιατί η οpiτική τους εpiαφή εύκολα piεριορίζεται λόγω της
μακρινής αpiόστασης piου έχουν αpiό τα εκθέματα.
Οι “εpiισκέpiτες ακρίδες” έχουν μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον για piολύ συγκεκριμένα εκθέματα. Γνωρίζουν
piολλές piληροφορίες piροτού τα εpiισκεφτούν και για αυτό δεν εpiιθυμούν να piερνούν piολύ χρόνο
με ξεναγό. Η ύpiαρξη piολλών εpiισκεpiτών εpiηρεάζει σημαντικά την ευχαρίστησή τους λόγω του
piολύ ισχυρού και στοχευμένου ενδιαφέροντος piου έχουν.
Τέλος, οι “εpiισκέpiτες piεταλούδες” μοιάζουν piολύ με τους “εpiισκέpiτες μυρμήγκια” γιατί θέλουν
να δουν σχεδόν όλα τα εκθέματα του μουσείου, ενδιαφέρονται για τις λεpiτομέρειές τους και θέλουν
να λάβουν piερισσότερες piληροφορίες για αυτά αpiό κάpiοιο ξεναγό. Διαφοροpiοιούνται αpiό τους
“εpiισκέpiτες μυρμήγκια”, όσον αφορά την εpiιρροή τους αpiό το αυξημένο piλήθος εpiισκεpiτών, το
οpiοίο δε τους εpiηρεάζει ιδιαίτερα, καθώς αν συναντήσουν κόσμο μpiροστά αpiό κάpiοιο έκθεμα ή
αίθουσα, αλλάζουν τη διαδρομή της piεριήγησής τους μέσα στο μουσείο.
Εpiίσης σε αυτό το κεφάλαιο ορίζονται βάρη για τις piέντες piαραμέτρους piου εpiηρεάζουν την ευχα-
ρίστηση των εpiισκεpiτών, τα οpiοία piροκύpiτουν αpiό τη στατιστική ανάλυση των αpiαντήσεων του
ερωτηματολογίου. Ακόμα, ορίζεται μία συνολική συνάρτηση για την piοιότητα της ευχαρίστησης
των εpiισκεpiτών piου piεριλαμβάνει τις piέντε piαραμέτρους με τα βάρη τους καθώς και τα διαφορε-
τικά είδη των εpiισκεpiτών. Τέλος, piαρουσιάζεται και εpiιλύεται το piρόβλημα της μεγιστοpiοίησης
της piοιότητας της εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη, με την εύρεση των βέλτιστων τιμών των εpiιμέρους
piαραμέτρων.
Κεφάλαιο 3
Το Κεφάλαιο 3 piαρουσιάζει έναν piροσωpiοpiοιημένο μηχανισμό ο οpiοίος piροτείνει σε κάθε εpiι-
σκέpiτη τα piιο κατάλληλα για αυτόν εκθέματα και το piιο σύντομο μονοpiάτι, piου piρέpiει να ακολου-
θήσει μέσα στο μουσείο, piροκειμένου να τα εpiισκεφθεί και να μεγιστοpiοιήσει την piοιότητα της
εμpiειρίας του.
Για την εύρεση των piιο σημαντικών για τον εpiισκέpiτη εκθεμάτων, αναpiτύξαμε μία εφαρμογή piου
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αρχικά ζητά αpiό τους χρήστες να δημιουργήσουν το δικό τους λογαριασμό, εισάγοντας piροαιρετικά
piροσωpiικές piληροφορίες, όpiως όνομα, εpiίθετο, ηλικία, εκpiαίδευση, χώρα και είδος εpiισκέpiτη
(“εpiισκέpiτες μυρμήγκια”, “εpiισκέpiτες piεταλούδες”, “εpiισκέpiτες ψάρια”, “εpiισκέpiτες ακρίδες”).
Στη συνέχεια, οι χρήστες καλούνται να δηλώσουν το ενδιαφέρον τους για διάφορες θεματικές
piεριοχές, οι οpiοίες διαφέρουν ανά μουσείο. Οι βαθμολογίες αυτές αντιστοιχίζονται σε βάρη και
αpiοθηκεύονται στο piροφίλ κάθε χρήστη.
Αφού οι εpiισκέpiτες εpiισκεφτούν ένα έκθεμα το βαθμολογούν με βάση την ευχαρίστηση piου έλαβαν
και τελικά κάθε έκθεμα αpiοκτά ένα συνολικό βαθμό. Ο υpiολογισμός του συνολικού βαθμού κάθε
εκθέματος λαμβάνει υpiόψιν το είδος του εpiισκέpiτη, την ηλικία του και τη θεματική piεριοχή στην
οpiοία ανήκει το έκθεμα.
Εpiίσης piαρουσιάζονται και συγκρίνονται τρεις διαφορετικοί τρόpiοι εύρεσης των piιο κατάλληλων
εκθεμάτων για τον εpiισκέpiτη. Ο piρώτος τρόpiος βασίζεται αpiοκλειστικά στο συνολικό βαθμό
του εκθέματος. Ο δεύτερος τρόpiος βασίζεται μόνο σε φυσικούς piεριορισμούς piου σχετίζονται
με τη λαμβανόμενη ευχαρίστηση του εpiισκέpiτη, όpiως η συμφόρηση του μουσείου και ο χρόνος
ξενάγησης. Ο τρίτος τρόpiος είναι ένας γραμμικός συνδυασμός των piαραpiάνω δύο.
΄Οσον αφορά την εύρεση του piιο σύντομου μονοpiατιού για την εpiίσκεψη των εκθεμάτων, piρο-
τείνονται δύο αλγόριθμοι: ο Held-Karp και ο Nearest-Neighbor. Ο piρώτος αλγόριθμος βρίσκει
το βέλτιστο μονοpiάτι, αλλά έχει αυξημένη piολυpiλοκότητα ενώ ο δεύτερος βρίσκει λύση κοντά
στη βέλτιστη και έχει σημαντικά χαμηλότερη piολυpiλοκότητα. Ο Nearest-Neighbor αλγόριθμος
είναι αpiλούστερος γιατί εpiιλέγει συνεχώς το piιο “κοντινό” έκθεμα, ώσpiου να εpiιλεχτούν όλα τα
εκθέματα ακριβώς μία φορά.
Η piρωτοpiορία της μελέτης μας σχετίζεται με την εύρεση του piιο σύντομου μονοpiατιού και συγκε-
κριμένα ότι το piροτεινόμενο μονοpiάτι δεν είναι το piιο σύντομο αpiό άpiοψη αpiόστασης ή χρόνου
piερpiατήματος, αλλά αυτό piου μεγιστοpiοιεί τη λαμβανόμενη ευχαρίστηση του εpiισκέpiτη. Στον αλ-
γόριθμο, ορίζουμε την αpiόσταση μεταξύ των εκθεμάτων όχι μόνο ως τη φυσική αpiόσταση μεταξύ
των εκθεμάτων αλλά λαμβάνοντας υpiόψιν και piαραμέτρους piου εpiηρεάζουν την ευχαρίστηση των
εpiισκεpiτών. Αpiό τις αpiαντήσεις του ερωτηματολογίου piου piαρουσιάζεται στο Κεφάλαιο 2, κατα-
λήξαμε ότι οι piαράμετροι piου εpiηρεάζουν κυρίως την εμpiειρία ενός εpiισκέpiτη είναι: η αpiόσταση
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μεταξύ δύο εκθεμάτων, ο χρόνος piου piερνά ο εpiισκέpiτης με ένα ξεναγό και η συμφόρηση piου
υpiάρχει στο μουσείο.
Τα αpiοτελέσματα της έρευνας έδειξαν ότι η εμpiειρία του εpiισκέpiτη είναι καλύτερη όταν τα εκθέματα
εpiιλέγονται μόνο με βάση τις piαραμέτρους piου εpiηρεάζουν την ευχαρίστησή του. Δεύτερη κα-
λύτερη εpiιλογή είναι αυτή piου βασίζεται στις piαραμέτρους piου εpiηρεάζουν την ευχαρίστηση του
εpiισκέpiτη και στο βαθμό ενδιαφέροντος των εκθεμάτων. Λιγότερο καλή piροσέγγιση είναι αυτή
piου η εpiιλογή των εκθεμάτων γίνεται μόνο με βάση το ενδιαφέρον των εκθεμάτων. Τα τελευ-
ταία συμpiεράσματα δικαιολογούνται αpiό το γεγονός οι αλγόριθμοι λαμβάνουν υpiόψιν τους τις
piαραμέτρους piου εpiηρεάζουν την piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας των εpiισκεpiτών. Εpiίσης τα αριθμητικά
αpiοτελέσματα piαρουσιάζουν τα αpiοτελέσματα του Nearest-Neighbor αλγορίθμου piολύ κοντά σε
αυτά του Held-Karp και σε συνδυασμό με τη χαμηλή του piολυpiλοκότητα, μpiορεί να θεωρηθεί μία
καλή εpiιλογή για την εύρεση του piιο κατάλληλου μονοpiατιού piου piρέpiει να ακολουθήσει ένας
εpiισκέpiτης σε ένα μουσείο για να δει τα εκθέματα piου τον ενδιαφέρουν.
Κεφάλαιο 4
Στο Κεφάλαιο 4, διατυpiώνεται η χρήση ενός μηχανισμού για τη δημιουργία ομάδων εpiισκεpiτών
με βάση τα ενδιαφέροντά τους, την ηλικία τους και άλλα κοινωνικά χαρακτηριστικά τους. Στόχος
του μηχανισμού αυτού είναι η βελτιστοpiοίηση της piοιότητας της εμpiειρίας των εpiισκεpiτών μέσα
αpiό τη μεταξύ τους εpiικοινωνία και αλληλο-εpiιρροή.
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, για τη δημιουργία των ομάδων, αρχικά ορίζουμε για κάθε εpiισκέpiτη το βαθμό
ενδιαφέροντός του για εpiικοινωνία με τους άλλους εpiισκέpiτες. Ο βαθμός αυτός piροκύpiτει αpiό την
ηλικία του εpiισκέpiτη, το είδος του εpiισκέpiτη (“μυρμήγκι”, “ψάρι”, “ακρίδα”, “piεταλούδα”) και το
ενδιαφέρον του για μία συγκεκριμένη έκθεση. Αν ο βαθμός ενδιαφέροντος μεταξύ δύο εpiισκεpiτών
ξεpiερνά ένα όριο τιμής piου έχουμε ορίσει, θεωρούμε ότι οι εpiισκέpiτες μpiορούν να εpiικοινωνήσουν
και να μpiουν στην ίδια ομάδα εpiισκεpiτών. Εpiίσης ορίζουμε μία συνάρτηση piου εκφράζει τις
εξειδικευμένες γνώσεις των εpiισκεpiτών για μία συγκεκριμένη έκθεση και την piροθυμία τους να
συμμετέχουν σε ομάδες και να μοιραστούν με άλλους τις γνώσεις τους. Για κάθε εpiισκέpiτη
piροκύpiτει μία διαφορετική τιμή αυτής της συνάρτησης, η οpiοία είναι καίριας σημασίας για τη
136 . Extensive Summary in Greek
μετέpiειτα εpiιλογή του αρχηγού της ομάδας. Ο αρχηγός της ομάδας εpiιλέγεται μεταξύ των μελών
της ομάδας και αναλαμβάνει να την καθοδηγήσει μέσα στο μουσείο. Τέλος, για τη δημιουργία μίας
ομάδας είναι αpiαραίτητο να λαμβάνεται υpiόψιν και η φυσική αpiόσταση μεταξύ των εpiισκεpiτών, η
οpiοία δεν piρέpiει να ξεpiερνά ένα piροκαθορισμένο όριο.
Αφού καθοριστούν τα μέλη μίας ομάδας, εpiιλέγεται ένα μέλος ως ο αρχηγός της ομάδας. Η
εpiιλογή αυτή γίνεται με βάση την ειδίκευση του αρχηγού στη συγκεκριμένη έκθεση, την piροθυμία
του να συμμετέχει σε μία ομάδα και να μοιραστεί τις γνώσεις του, το βαθμό ενδιαφέροντος για
εpiικοινωνία με τους υpiόλοιpiους εpiισκέpiτες της ομάδας και τη φυσική αpiόσταση piου έχει αpiό
αυτούς.
Ο αλγόριθμος για την εύρεση του piιο σύντομου μονοpiατιού, όpiως piαρουσιάστηκε στο Κεφάλαιο
3 εpiίσης χρησιμοpiοιείται στο piαρόν μέρος της μελέτης μας. Στα αριθμητικά αpiοτελέσματα piαρου-
σιάζονται και συγκρίνονται τρεις διαφορετικοί τρόpiοι συγκρότησης των ομάδων εpiισκεpiτών. Η
piρώτη βασίζει τη δημιουργία των ομάδων μόνο στο βαθμό ενδιαφέροντος μεταξύ των εpiισκεpiτών,
η δεύτερη μόνο στη φυσική αpiόσταση μεταξύ των εpiισκεpiτών και η τρίτη λαμβάνει υpiόψιν της
και το βαθμό ενδιαφέροντος των εpiισκεpiτών και τη μεταξύ τους αpiόσταση. Τα αpiοτελέσματα
εpiιβεβαιώνουν ότι ο piιο αpiοτελεσματικός τρόpiος για τη δημιουργία ομάδων εpiισκεpiτών είναι ο
τρίτος δηλαδή όταν αυτή στηρίζεται τόσο στο βαθμό ενδιαφέροντος μεταξύ των εpiισκεpiτών όσο
και στη μεταξύ τους αpiόσταση.
Κεφάλαιο 5
Το Κεφάλαιο 5, piαρουσιάζει ένα μηχανισμό piου συνδυάζει την εύρεση της καταλληλότερης μορφής
εpiίσκεψης σε ένα μουσείο (pi.χ. χρήση χάρτη, χρήση ξεναγού στα αγγλικά ή χρήση ξεναγού στη
μητρική γλώσσα του εpiισκέpiτη) και του βέλτιστου χρόνου εpiίσκεψης με στόχο τη μεγιστοpiοίηση
της λαμβανόμενης ευχαρίστησης του εpiισκέpiτη. Η μοντελοpiοίηση και η εpiίλυση του συνδυαστικού
αυτού piροβλήματος βασίζεται στη Θεωρία Παιγνίων.
Για τον καθορισμό της βέλτιστης μορφής εpiίσκεψης χρησιμοpiοιήθηκε ένας μηχανισμός ενισχυμένης
μάθησης. Οι εpiισκέpiτες φτάνοντας στο μουσείο εpiιλέγουν ένα αpiό τους τρόpiους piεριήγησης piου
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piροσφέρει το μουσείο και κρατούν ιστορικό αρχείο με τις εpiιλογές piου έχουν κάνει. Κάθε τρόpiος
piεριήγησης piροσφέρει διαφορετική piοιότητα εμpiειρίας και αpiαιτεί διαφορετικό χρόνο εpiίσκεψης.
Εpiειδή κάθε τρόpiος piεριήγησης piροσφέρει διαφορετική ευχαρίστηση στους εpiισκέpiτες, θεωρούμε
ότι κάpiοιοι τρόpiοι θα έχουν piερισσότερη ζήτηση αpiό κάpiοιους άλλους και εpiομένως θα έχουν
και μεγαλύτερη αναμονή. Η αναμονή αυτή ορίζεται ως piαράμετρος συμφόρησης της εpiιλογής
piεριήγησης και λαμβάνεται υpiόψιν κατά τη μοντελοpiοίηση της piοιότητας εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη,
γεγονός piου αpiοτελεί τη βασική καινοτομία της μελέτης piου piαρουσιάζεται σε αυτό το κεφάλαιο.
Ο κάθε εpiισκέpiτης διαισθανόμενος το piεριβάλλον στο οpiοίο βρίσκεται και λαμβάνοντας υpiόψιν το
ιστορικό των εpiιλογών του, εpiιλέγει τελικώς τη μορφή εpiίσκεψης piου μεγιστοpiοιεί την piοιότητα
της εμpiειρίας του.
΄Οσον αφορά την εύρεση του βέλτιστου χρόνου εpiίσκεψης, μοντελοpiοιούμε το piρόβλημα της μεγι-
στοpiοίησης της piοιότητας της εμpiειρίας και το εpiιλύουμε ως ένα μη συνεργατικό piαιχνίδι μεταξύ
των εpiισκεpiτών. Η piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη ορίζεται με βάση το χρόνο εpiίσκεψης
στο μουσείο, τον εpiιλεγμένο τρόpiο piεριήγησης και τη συμφόρηση της εpiιλεγμένης piεριήγησης.
Ο μηχανισμός για την εpiίλυση αυτού του συνδυαστικού piροβλήματος εκτελείται piροτού ο εpiι-
σκέpiτης ξεκινήσει την piεριήγησή του μέσα στο μουσείο. Θα μpiορεί να piαρέχεται ως εφαρμογή
αpiό το μουσείο, η οpiοία θα εγκαθίσταται και θα τρέχει στο κινητό του εpiισκέpiτη.
Κεφάλαιο 6
Το Κεφάλαιο 6 μελετά την piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας του εpiισκέpiτη piιο ρεαλιστικά, ακολουθώντας
τις βασικές αρχές της Θεωρίας Προοpiτικής. Σε αντίθεση με τις μελέτες piου υpiάρχουν στη βι-
βλιογραφία και οι οpiοίες θεωρούν τους εpiισκέpiτες ουδέτερους ως piρος τη μεγιστοpiοίηση της
εμpiειρίας τους, στη μελέτη μας piιστεύουμε ότι οι εpiισκέpiτες είτε piαίρνουν ρίσκα ή τα αpiοφε-
ύγουν στην piροσpiάθειά τους να λάβουν μεγαλύτερη ευχαρίστηση. Η τάση αυτή των εpiισκεpiτών
piαρατηρείται κυρίως στις piεριpiτώσεις piου χρειάζεται να λάβουν αpiοφάσεις piου ενέχουν ρίσκο ή
αβεβαιότητα, όpiως για piαράδειγμα όταν αpiοφασίζουν piοια εκθέματα να εpiισκεφτούν ή piόσο χρόνο
να αφιερώσουν σε αυτά. Η αpiόφαση του εpiισκέpiτη για το piόσο χρόνο θα αφιερώσει σε ένα έκθε-
μα, ενέχει ρίσκο γιατί αν υpiάρχει συμφόρηση γύρω αpiό αυτό, θα εpiενδύσει χρόνο χωρίς να λάβει
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ευχαρίστηση, γεγονός piου εpiηρεάζει καθοριστικά την piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας του.
Η βραβευμένη με Νόμpiελ “Θεωρία Προοpiτικής” είναι μία οικονομική θεωρία piου αφορά τις συ-
μpiεριφορικές τάσεις των ανθρώpiων υpiό συνθήκες ρίσκου ή αβεβαιότητας. ΄Εχει εφαρμοστεί σε
διάφορα piεδία piου ενέχουν τη λήψη αpiοφάσεων υpiό συνθήκες αβεβαιότητας, όpiως στον οικονομικό
και τον ασφαλιστικό κλάδο. Η χρήση της Θεωρίας Προοpiτικής για τη μελέτη της συμpiεριφοράς
των εpiισκεpiτών σε χώρους piολιτισμικής κληρονομιάς και τη μοντελοpiοίηση της piοιότητας της
εμpiειρίας τους εφαρμόζεται για piρώτη φορά στη βιβλιογραφία.
Η Θεωρία Προοpiτικής έχει τέσσερα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά. Το piρώτο χαρακτηριστικό της είναι
ότι οι άνθρωpiοι αξιολογούν τα κέρδη και τις αpiώλειες, με βάση ένα σημείο αναφοράς. Στην
piερίpiτωση των χώρων piολιτισμού, το σημείο αναφοράς για τους εpiισκέpiτες είναι μία piρογενέστερη,
θετική ή αρνητική εμpiειρία piου είχαν. Το δεύτερο στοιχείο της Θεωρίας Προοpiτικής είναι ότι οι
άνθρωpiοι δίνουν μεγαλύτερη σημασία στις αpiώλειες αpiό ότι στα κέρδη. Δηλαδή η αpiώλεια ενός
χρηματικού piοσού piροκαλεί μεγαλύτερη θλίψη στους ανθρώpiους αpiό ότι η χαρά σε piερίpiτωση
ισόpiοσου κέρδους. Στην piερίpiτωση των χώρων piολιτισμικής κληρονομιάς, οι εpiισκέpiτες λυpiούνται
piολύ piερισσότερο όταν δεν καταφέρουν να δουν ένα έκθεμα λόγω συνωστισμού σε σχέση με την
ευχαρίστηση piου νιώθουν αν μpiορέσουν να το δουν. Τρίτον, η Θεωρία Προοpiτικής εκφράζει ότι
οι άνθρωpiοι έχουν την τάση να αpiοφεύγουν το ρίσκο όταν κερδίζουν αλλά να ρισκάρουν όταν
piρόκειται να χάσουν. Τέλος, η Θεωρία Προοpiτικής ισχυρίζεται ότι οι άνθρωpiοι δεν μpiορούν να
κατανοήσουν τις piιθανότητες piου έχουν τα γεγονότα να συμβούν, γεγονός piου οφείλεται στην
ανθρώpiινη ψυχολογία και όχι σε ελλειpiές μαθηματικό υpiόβαθρο. Αυτό έχει ως αpiοτέλεσμα οι
άνθρωpiοι να υpiερεκτιμούν γεγονότα piου είναι αpiίθανο να συμβούν και να υpiοτιμούν γεγονότα
piου είναι piολύ piιθανό να συμβούν.
Εpiίσης ένα piολύ σημαντικό σημείο της μελέτης μας είναι ο διαχωρισμός των εκθεμάτων σε δύο
κατηγορίες: στα δημοφιλή εκθέματα και στα λιγότερο δημοφιλή. Τα λιγότερα δημοφιλή εκθέματα
έχουν συνήθως λιγότερο κόσμο, εpiομένως οι εpiισκέpiτες θα λάβουν ευχαρίστηση βλέpiοντάς τα
και άρα είναι ασφαλές να εpiενδύσουν το χρόνο τους σε αυτά. Για το λόγο αυτό, τα λιγότερα
δημοφιλή εκθέματα τα ονομάζουμε “ασφαλή” εκθέματα. Σε αντίθεση με τα “ασφαλή” εκθέματα, τα
δημοφιλή εκθέματα έχουν συνήθως piολύ κόσμο. Στη μελέτη μας τα χαρακτηρίζουμε ως “Πόρους
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Κοινής Χρήσης” ή Common Pool of Resources (CPR) γιατί έχουν τα εξής δύο χαρακτηριστικά.
Πρώτον, δε μpiορεί να αpiοκλειστεί κάpiοιος εpiισκέpiτης αpiό το να τα εpiισκεφτεί και δεύτερον η
piαρατήρησή τους αpiό έναν εpiισκέpiτη εμpiοδίζει την piαρατήρηση τους αpiό έναν άλλο. Εpiομένως,
αν οι εpiισκέpiτες αpiοφασίσουν εγωιστικά να piεράσουν piολύ χρόνο σε ένα δημοφιλές έκθεμα, το
έκθεμα θα “καταρρεύσει” και κανένας εpiισκέpiτης δε θα λάβει ευχαρίστηση αpiό την piαρατήρησή
του. Το φαινόμενο αυτό είναι γνωστό στη βιβλιογραφία ως η “Τραγωδία των Κοινών”.
Στο piαρόν κεφάλαιο piαρουσιάζεται η μοντελοpiοίηση της piοιότητας της εμpiειρίας των εpiισκε-
piτών με βάση τις συμpiεριφορικές τους τάσεις υpiό συνθήκες ρίσκου ή αβεβαιότητας, όpiως αυτές
piεριγράφηκαν piαραpiάνω. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας των εpiισκεpiτών λαμβάνει υ-
piόψιν της το σημείο αναφοράς των εpiισκεpiτών καθώς και piαραμέτρους αpiό τη Θεωρία Προοpiτικής,
όpiως η piαράμετρος “ευαισθησίας” και η “αpiοτροpiή αpiώλειας”. ΄Ενας εpiισκέpiτης με χαμηλότερη
piαράμετρο “ευαισθησίας” λαμβάνει μεγαλύτερη ευχαρίστηση αpiό έναν εpiισκέpiτη με υψηλότερη
piαράμετρο “ευαισθησίας” για την ίδια μουσειακή εμpiειρία. ΄Οσον αφορά την piαράμετρο “αpiοτροpiή
αpiώλειας”, αν αυτή είναι μεγαλύτερη της μονάδας, οι εpiισκέpiτες δίνουν μεγαλύτερη βαρύτητα στις
αpiώλειες αpiό ότι στα κέρδη, ενώ αν είναι μικρότερη της μονάδας, οι εpiισκέpiτες δίνουν μεγαλύτερη
σημασία στα κέρδη αpiό ότι στις αpiώλειες. Εpiίσης, χρησιμοpiοιώντας τη Θεωρία Παιγνίων και την
Τραγωδία των Κοινών, υpiολογίζουμε το βέλτιστο χρόνο εpiίσκεψης piου μεγιστοpiοιεί την piοιότητα
της εμpiειρίας των εpiισκεpiτών και piαράλληλα αpiοτρέpiει την «κατάρρευση» των εκθεμάτων.
Αpiό τα αριθμητικά αpiοτελέσματα των piειραματικών piροσωμοιώσεων piου εκτελέσαμε piροέκυψαν
piολύ ενδιαφέροντα συμpiεράσματα τόσο για τους εpiισκέpiτες όσο και για τους διευθυντές των
μουσείων. ΄Ενα μουσείο είναι piροτιμότερο να έχει εpiισκέpiτες piου έχουν χαμηλή piαράμετρο “ευαι-
σθησίας” γιατί ευχαριστιούνται piερισσότερο αpiό την εpiίσκεψή τους, χωρίς να αφιερώνουν piολύ
χρόνο σε αυτήν. Για το λόγο αυτό, ένα μουσείο μpiορεί να εξυpiηρετήσει piερισσότερους ανθρώpiους
με χαμηλή piαράμετρο “ευαισθησίας”, αpiό ότι με υψηλή, οι οpiοίοι και θα ολοκληρώσουν την εpiίσκε-
ψή τους χαρούμενοι και ευχαριστημένοι με την εμpiειρία piου είχαν. Εpiίσης ένα μουσείο θα piρέpiει
να piροτιμά εpiισκέpiτες με υψηλή τιμή “αpiοτροpiής αpiώλειας”, γιατί τα αριθμητικά αpiοτελέσματα
των piροσωμοιώσεων έδειξαν ότι κάνουν σύντομες εpiισκέψεις, ενώ η ευχαρίστηση piου λαμβάνουν
είναι αντίστοιχα υψηλή με αυτούς piου έχουν χαμηλή τιμή “αpiοτροpiής αpiώλειας” και των οpiοίων
οι εpiισκέψεις διαρκούν piερισσότερο χρόνο, piροκαλώντας συμφόρηση μέσα στο μουσείο. Ακόμα,
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ο διαφορετικός βαθμός ενδιαφέροντος των εpiισκεpiτών για τα εκθέματα μpiορεί να οδηγήσει στην
κατάρρευση των δημοφιλή εκθεμάτων όταν οι εpiισκέpiτες έχουν υψηλή τιμή “ευαισθησίας”. Η
κατάρρευση μpiορεί να αpiοφευχθεί αν οι εpiισκέpiτες έχουν χαμηλή τιμή “ευαισθησίας” γιατί τότε
εpiενδύουν λιγότερο χρόνο σε αυτά. Η ετερογένεια των εpiισκεpiτών ως piρος την τιμή της “ευαισθη-
σίας” τους ή την τιμή “αpiοτροpiής αpiώλειας” αυξάνει την piιθανότητα κατάρρευσης των δημοφιλή
εκθεμάτων.
Κεφάλαιο 7
Το Κεφάλαιο 7, piραγματεύεται το piρόβλημα της συμφόρησης των μουσείων, εpiεκτείνοντας piε-
ραιτέρω την έρευνα της διατριβής piου piαρουσιάζεται στο Κεφάλαιο 6. ΄Εχοντας piαρατηρήσει τις
αλληλεpiιδράσεις piου υpiάρχουν μεταξύ των εpiισκεpiτών ενός μουσείου και τη συχνά εγωιστική
συμpiεριφορά τους για τη μεγιστοpiοίηση της piοιότητας της εμpiειρίας τους, αδιαφορώντας για τις
εpiιpiτώσεις των αpiοφάσεών τους, ερευνώνται και piροτείνονται piιθανές τεχνικές για την αpiοφυγή
της κατάρρευσης των εκθεμάτων. Τα εκθέματα και κυρίως τα δημοφιλή αpiοτελούν piιθανά σημεία
συνωστισμού και είναι piιθανόν να “καταρρεύσουν” εξαιτίας της υpiερβολικής “χρήσης” τους.
Στο κεφάλαιο αυτό, piαρουσιάζεται η χρήση μηχανισμών κοστολόγησης των εpiισκεpiτών ως ένα
μέτρο piου συμβάλει στην ομαλή λειτουργία του μουσείου και τη θετική piοιότητα εμpiειρίας των
εpiισκεpiτών. Οι μηχανισμοί κοστολόγησης piαρακινούν τους εpiισκέpiτες να μειώσουν το χρόνο της
εpiίσκεψής τους, αpiοτρέpiοντας έτσι την κατάρρευση των εκθεμάτων και διατηρώντας τη σταθε-
ρότητα λειτουργίας του μουσείου. Συγκεκριμένα, στη μελέτη μας piροτείνουμε η κοστολόγηση να
γίνεται ανάλογα με το χρόνο piου αφιερώνουν οι εpiισκέpiτες στα δημοφιλή εκθέματα, αλλά μελετο-
ύνται και piαρουσιάζονται διαφορετικά σενάρια κοστολόγησης, άλλα λιγότερα και άλλα piερισσότερο
αυστηρά.
Τα αpiοτελέσματα της μελέτης εpiιβεβαιώνονται και piοσοτικοpiοιούνται μέσω εκτεταμένων αριθ-
μητικών και υpiολογιστικών piροσομοιώσεων, αντιpiροσωpiεύοντας μεγάλο αριθμό διαφορετικών
σεναρίων. Τα διαφορετικά σενάρια αφορούν τον αριθμό των εpiισκεpiτών, τις piροτιμήσεις τους
αpiέναντι στο ρίσκο καθώς εpiίσης και τις αpiοφάσεις τους σχετικά με το χρόνο piαρατήρησης των
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εκθεμάτων. Τα αpiοτελέσματα εpiιβεβαιώνουν ότι οι τεχνικές κοστολόγησης είναι δυνατόν να μει-
ώσουν το χρόνο piαραμονής των εpiισκεpiτών στο μουσείο και εμμέσως να οδηγήσουν στη μείωση
της συμφόρησης του μουσείου. Τέλος, χρησιμοpiοιώντας τη Θεωρία Προοpiτικής, την Τραγωδία
των Κοινών και τα S-Modular Games υpiολογίζεται ο βέλτιστος κοστολογημένος χρόνος εpiίσκε-
ψης piου μεγιστοpiοιεί την piοιότητα της εμpiειρίας των εpiισκεpiτών και piαράλληλα αpiοτρέpiει την
«κατάρρευση» των εκθεμάτων.
Κεφάλαιο 8
Το Κεφάλαιο 8, συνοψίζει το σύνολο της διατριβής, εpiιχειρηματολογώντας για τη σpiουδαιότητα
των εξεταζόμενων ερευνητικών piροβλημάτων και piαρουσιάζοντας συγκεντρωμένα τα κύρια συμpiε-
ράσματα piου ανέκυψαν. Εpiίσης, piροτείνονται ανοιχτά ερευνητικά θέματα για μελλοντική εργασία
piου είτε θα μpiορούσαν να αpiοτελούν τη συνέχεια αυτής της ερευνητικής piροσpiάθειας ή να εφαρ-
μοστούν σε νέους τομείς και δραστηριότητες, εκμεταλλεύοντας την αpiοκτημένη γνώση.
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